Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-11 (section)

== 11.7 Enabling Adaptation Decision-Making ==

<div id="11.7.1" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="observed-adaptation-decision-making"></span>
=== 11.7.1 Observed Adaptation Decision-Making ===

<div id="h2-20-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

The ambition, scope and progress on adaptation by governments have risen but are uneven, with a focus on high-level strategies at the national level, adaptation planning at sub-national levels and new enabling legislation ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Table 11.15a, Table 11.15b) ( [[#Lawrence--2015|Lawrence et al., 2015]] ; [[#Macintosh--2015|Macintosh et al., 2015]] ; [[#MfE--2020a|MfE, 2020a]] ). The adaptation process comprises vulnerability and risk assessments, identification of options, planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and review. Large gaps remain, especially in effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Supplementary Material SM 11.1) ( [[#CCATWG--2017|CCATWG, 2017]] ; [[#Warnken--2018|Warnken and Mosadeghi, 2018]] ), and current adaptation is largely incremental and reactive ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Box 11.4, Box 11.6, Table 11.14).

'''Table 11.15a |''' Examples of Australian adaptation strategies, plans and initiatives by government agencies at national, sub-national and regional or local levels. These examples have not been assessed for their effectiveness (see Supplementary Material Table SM11.1a).

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Jurisdiction

! Strategies/Plans/Actions

|-
| colspan="2"| National Level

|-
| Australia

| National Climate Resilience and Adaptation Strategy 2015 ( [[#CoA--2015|CoA, 2015]] )

National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (2018) ( [[#CoA--2018b|CoA, 2018b]] )

National Recovery and Resilience Agency and Australian Climate Service (CoA, 2021)

|-
|
|-
| colspan="2"| Sub-national

|-
| Australian Capital Territory (ACT)

| ACT Climate Change Strategy 2019–2025 ( [[#ACT%20Government--2019|ACT Government, 2019]] )

Canberra’s Living Infrastructure Plan: Cooling the City ( [[#ACT%20Government--2020b|ACT Government, 2020b]] ); ACT Well-being Framework ( [[#ACT%20Government--2020a|ACT Government, 2020a]] )

|-
| New South Wales

| NSW Climate Change Policy Framework ( [[#NSW%20Government--2016|NSW Government, 2016]] )

|-
|
| Coastal Management Framework ( [[#OEH--2018b|OEH, 2018b]] ) including

Coastal Management Act 2016, State Environmental Planning Policy (Coastal Management) 2018, NSW Coastal Management Manual ( [[#OEH--2018c|OEH, 2018c]] ; [[#OEH--2018a|OEH, 2018a]] )

|-
| Northern Territory

| Northern Territory Climate Change Response: Towards 2050 ( [[#DENR--2020b|DENR, 2020b]] ) three-year action plan ( [[#DENR--2020a|DENR, 2020a]] )

|-
| Queensland

| Pathways to climate-resilient Queensland: Queensland Climate Adaptation Strategy 2017–2030 ( [[#DEHP--2013|DEHP, 2013]] )

|-
|
| Sector adaptation plans: https://www.qld.gov.au/environment/climate/climate-change/adapting/sectors-systems

|-
|
| State heatwave risk assessment, 2019 ( [[#QFES--2019|QFES, 2019]] )

|-
|
| Planning Act 2016 ( [[#Queensland%20Government--2020|Queensland Government, 2020]] ) and the Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995 ( [[#Queensland%20Government--1995|Queensland Government, 1995]] ), plus supporting initiatives: Coastal Management Plan ( [[#DEHP--2013|DEHP, 2013]] ) and Shoreline Erosion Management Plans ( [[#DES--2018|DES, 2018]] )

Queensland’s QCoast2100 program

|-
| South Australia

| Directions for a Climate Smart South Australia ( [[#SA%20Government--2019a|SA Government, 2019a]] )

|-
| Tasmania

| Climate Action 21: Tasmania’s Climate Change Action Plan 2017–2021 ( [[#State%20of%20Tasmania--2017a|State of Tasmania, 2017a]] )

|-
|
| Tasmania’s 2016 State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment ( [[#White--2016a|White et al., 2016a]] )

|-
|
| Tasmanian Planning Scheme—State Planning Provisions 2017, Coastal Inundation Hazard Code and a Coastal Erosion Hazard Code ( [[#Government%20of%20Tasmania--2017|Government of Tasmania, 2017]] ).

|-
| Victoria

| In accordance with the Climate Change Act 2017, Victoria has a Climate Change Adaptation Plan 2017–2020 ( [[#Victoria%20State%20Government%20DELWP--2016|Victoria State Government DELWP, 2016]] ) including a Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting and Improvement (MERI) framework for Climate Change Adaptation in Victoria ( [[#DELWP--2018|DELWP, 2018]] ), Victorian Climate Projections (2019) and multiple resources for regions and local government (Victoria DELWP 2020).

|-
|
| Heatwaves in Victoria. A 2018 vulnerability assessment of the state to heatwaves using a Damage and Loss Assessment methodology ( [[#Natural%20Capital%20Economics--2018|Natural Capital Economics, 2018]] )

|-
| Western Australia

| Western Australian Government Adapting to our changing climate

2012 ( [[#WA%20Government--2016|WA Government, 2016]] )

|-
|
| State Planning Policy 2.6 – Coastal Planning (SPP2.6)

|-
| colspan="2"| Regional and local (examples only)

|-
| colspan="2"| 104 have declared climate emergencies to leverage climate action as of September 2021 covering 36.6% of the Australian population (Climate Emergency Declaration, 2022)

|-
| Tasmania

| 2017: Tasmanian Planning Scheme – State Planning Provisions. State of Tasmania, 514.

( [[#State%20of%20Tasmania--2017a|State of Tasmania, 2017a]] ; [[#State%20of%20Tasmania--2017b|State of Tasmania, 2017b]] )

|-
| South Australia

| Regional integrated vulnerability assessments (IVAs) and adaptation plans ( [[#SA%20Government--2019a|SA Government, 2019a]] )

|-
| NSW

| Enabling Regional Adaptation ( [[#Jacobs--2016|Jacobs et al., 2016]] )

|-
| Victoria

| Every region and catchment management authority in Victoria has an adaptation plan, as does virtually every local government. There are also three alliances of multiple local governments working on climate change and new initiatives such as the Climate Change Exchange: https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/967-epc-la/inquiry-into-tackling-climate-change-in-victorian-communities

|-
| NSW

| Coastal Zone Management Plan for Bilgola Beach (Bilgola) and Basin Beach (Mona Vale) ( [[#Haskoning%20Australia--2016|Haskoning Australia, 2016]] )

|-
| Queensland

| Torres Strait Climate Change Strategy ( [[#TSRA--2014|TSRA, 2014]] ), Torres Strait Regional Adaptation and Resilience Plan 2016–2021 ( [[#TSRA--2016|TSRA, 2016]] )

|-
|
| Climate Risk Management Framework for Queensland Local Government ( [[#Erhart--2020|Erhart et al., 2020]] )

|-
|
| Douglas Shire Coast Strategic Plan 2019 ( [[#Douglas%20Shire%20Council--2019|Douglas Shire Council, 2019]] )

|-
| Northern Territory

| Climate Change Action Plan (2011–2020) ( [[#Darwin%20City%20Council--2011|Darwin City Council, 2011]] )

|}

'''Table 11.15b |''' Examples of New Zealand’s adaptation strategies, plans and initiatives by government agencies at national, sub-national and regional or local levels. NB: These examples have not been assessed for their effectiveness (see Supplementary Material Table SM11.1b)

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Jurisdiction'''

! '''Strategies/Plans/Actions'''

|-
| New Zealand central Government

| The New Zealand Government’s adaptation policy framework is based on the following legislation: Resource Management Act 1991, Local Government Act 2002, National Disaster Resilience Strategy 2019 ( [[#CDEM--2019|CDEM, 2019]] ) and the Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon Amendment) Act 2002 (CCRA 2002)

Adaptation preparedness report 2020/2021 baseline is the reporting organisation responses from the first information request under the CCRA 2002 ( [[#MfE--2021|MfE, 2021]] ) to assist the monitoring of progress and effectiveness of adaptation by the Climate Change Commission

The Department of Conservation’s Climate Change Adaptation Action plan sets out a long-term strategy for climate research, monitoring and action; DOC climate adaptation plan

|-
| Local Government

| In July 2017, a group of 66 local government mayors and council chairs (of 78 in total) endorsed a 2015 local government declaration calling for urgent responsive leadership and a holistic approach on climate change, with the government needing to play a vital enabling leadership role ( [[#LGNZ--2017|LGNZ, 2017]] ; [[#Schneider--2017|Schneider et al., 2017]] ).

Seventeen councils have declared climate emergencies to leverage climate action plans as of September 2021, covering 75.3% of the New Zealand population.

The MfE adaptation preparedness report states that 18% of councils (11 of 61 surveyed in 2021) have some sort of plan or strategy to increase resilience to climate impacts ( [[#MfE--2021|MfE, 2021]] ). Out of New Zealand’s 15 regional and unitary councils, 2 have climate adaptation strategies in place. One council has conducted a climate risk assessment, and four have one in development. Five councils have climate action plans, and three are in development.

|-
| colspan="2"| '''Regional Councils (''' examples only)

|-
| Bay of Plenty Regional Council

| Climate Action Plan July 2019 (non-statutory) Climate Action Plan

|-
| Waikato Regional Council

| Long-Term Plan 2018–2028 (LTP)

|-
| Greater Wellington Regional Council

| GWRC’s Climate Change Strategy (October 2015) Climate change strategy implementation

Hutt River Flood Risk Management Plan

|-
| colspan="2"| '''Unitary Authorities''' (examples only)

|-
| Auckland Council

| Auckland Unitary Plan

AUP RPS B10

Table B11.9 (bottom of doc)

E36. Natural hazards and flooding

|-
| Marlborough District Council

| Marlborough Environment Plan first to integrate DAPP into plan policies.

|-
| Gisborne District Council

| Tairāwhiti Resource Management Plan (District Plan) March 2020

|-
| colspan="2"| '''District Council''' (example only)

|-
| Waimakariri District Council

| Infrastructure Strategy in the Long Term Plan 2017.

Long-Term-Plan-Further-Information-Document-WEB.pdf

Page 113/31

|}

Australia has a National Climate Resilience and Adaptation Strategy, a National Recovery and Resilience Agency (11.5.2.3), and the First National Action Plan to implement the National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework which acknowledges climate change as a disaster risk driver ( [[#Home%20Affairs--2020|Home Affairs, 2020]] ). States and territories have climate change adaptation strategies with plans to address them (Table 11.15a), with some adaptation implementation at the state level and, increasingly, at the local government level ( [[#Jacobs--2016|Jacobs et al., 2016]] ; [[#Warnken--2018|Warnken and Mosadeghi, 2018]] ) (Table 11.15a). In coastal zones, however, few local government planning instruments are being applied ( [[#Warnken--2018|Warnken and Mosadeghi, 2018]] ; [[#Harvey--2019|Harvey, 2019]] ; [[#Robb--2019|Robb et al., 2019]] ; [[#Elrick-Barr--2021|Elrick-Barr and Smith, 2021]] ). Some businesses and industry sectors are recognising climate-related risks and adaptation planning (11.3.4; 11.3.7; 11.3.10) ( [[#Harris--2016|Harris et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hennessy--2016|Hennessy et al., 2016]] ; [[#CBA--2019|CBA, 2019]] ). There is an opportunity for Australia to undertake a national risk assessment and to develop a national climate adaptation implementation plan that is aligned with Paris Agreement expectations of a national-level system for adaptation planning, monitoring and reporting ( [[#Morgan--2019|Morgan et al., 2019]] ).

New Zealand’s Climate Change Response Act 2019 creates a legal mandate for national climate change risk assessments (first one completed) ( [[#MfE--2020a|MfE, 2020a]] ) and national adaptation plans (first in preparation), as well as a Climate Change Commission to monitor and report on adaptation implementation. Preparation of natural and built environment, strategic planning and climate change adaptation acts is under way, including provision for funding and managed retreat ( [[#MfE--2020c|MfE, 2020c]] ). National coastal guidance is available for adaptation planning to address changing climate risks ( [[#MfE--2017a|MfE, 2017a]] ) (Table 11.15b). Meanwhile, several local authorities have developed integrated climate change strategies and plans and revised policies and rules to enable adaptation (Table 11.15b). Different adaptation approaches continue to create confusion and inertia while development pressures continue ( [[#Schneider--2017|Schneider et al., 2017]] ). Opportunities for integrated adaptation and mitigation planning in regional policies and plans have arisen through the Resource Management Amendment Act 2020 ( [[#Dickie--2020|Dickie, 2020]] ), the National Policy Statement on Freshwater Management ( [[#MfE--2020b|MfE, 2020b]] ) and the revised national coastal guidance ( [[#MfE--2017a|MfE, 2017a]] ), but rely on funding instruments to be in place and statutes are aligned for their effectiveness ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ; [[#CCATWG--2018|CCATWG, 2018]] ).

There is growing awareness of the need for more proactive adaptation planning at multiple scales and across sectors, and a better understanding of future risks and limits to adaptation is emerging ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Evans--2014|Evans et al., 2014]] ; [[#Archie--2018|Archie et al., 2018]] ; [[#Christie--2020|Christie et al., 2020]] ; [[#MfE--2020a|MfE, 2020a]] ). Disaster risk reduction is being positioned as part of climate change adaptation ( [[#Forino--2017|Forino et al., 2017]] ; [[#CDEM--2019|CDEM, 2019]] ; [[#Forino--2019|Forino et al., 2019]] ; [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ; [[#CSIRO--2020|CSIRO, 2020]] ). Public and private climate adaptation services are informing climate risk assessments, but they are characterised by fragmentation, duplication, inconsistencies, poor governance and inadequate funding; addressing these gaps presents adaptation opportunities ( [[#CCATWG--2018|CCATWG, 2018]] ; [[#Webb--2019|Webb et al., 2019]] ; [[#NESP%20ESCC--2021|NESP ESCC, 2021]] ) (Table 11.15a, Table 11.15b). Large infrastructure asset planning is starting to factor in climate risks, but implementation is uneven ( [[#Gibbs--2020|Gibbs, 2020]] ). Local governments in Australia are increasingly implementing adaptation plans, but few monitor or evaluate actual outcomes or know how to ( [[#Scott--2021|Scott and Moloney, 2021]] ).

Observed and projected rates of sea level rise (SLR) (Box 11.6) and increased flood frequency (11.3.3) are challenging established uses of modelling, risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis, where climate change damage functions cannot be projected or are unknown (deep uncertainty) or impacts on communities are ambiguous ( [[#Infometrics%20and%20PSConsulting--2015|Infometrics and PSConsulting, 2015]] ; [[#Lawrence--2019a|Lawrence et al., 2019a]] ; [[#MfE--2020a|MfE, 2020a]] ). New tools are available in the region (Table 11.17), but uptake cannot be assumed ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Lawrence--2017|Lawrence and Haasnoot, 2017]] ; [[#Palutikof--2019c|Palutikof et al., 2019c]] ).

Resilience and adaptation approaches are beginning to converge ( [[#White--2014|White and O’Hare, 2014]] ; [[#Aldunce--2015|Aldunce et al., 2015]] ) (Supplementary Material SM 11.1) but widespread ‘bounce-back’ resilience-driven responses that lock in risk by discounting ongoing and changing climate risk ( [[#Leitch--2014|Leitch and Bohensky, 2014]] ; [[#O’Hare--2016|O’Hare et al., 2016]] ; [[#Wenger--2017|Wenger, 2017]] ; [[#Torabi--2018|Torabi et al., 2018]] ) can create maladaptation and impede long-term adaptation goals ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Glavovic--2014|Glavovic and Smith, 2014]] ; [[#Dudney--2018|Dudney et al., 2018]] ).

Local government engagement with communities on adaptation is starting to motivate a change towards more collaborative engagement practices ( [[#Archie--2018|Archie et al., 2018]] ; [[#Bendall--2018|Bendall, 2018]] ; [[#MfE--2019|MfE, 2019]] ; [[#Schneider--2020|Schneider et al., 2020]] ). Nature-based adaptations ( [[#Colloff--2016|Colloff et al., 2016]] ; [[#Lavorel--2019|Lavorel et al., 2019]] ; [[#Della%20Bosca--2020|Della Bosca and Gillespie, 2020]] ) and ‘green infrastructure’ ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Lin--2016|Lin et al., 2016]] ; [[#Alexandra--2020|Alexandra and Norman, 2020]] ) are increasingly being adopted ( [[#Rogers--2020a|Rogers et al., 2020a]] ).

Some businesses have initiated active adaptation ( [[#Aldum--2014|Aldum et al., 2014]] ; [[#Linnenluecke--2015|Linnenluecke et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bremer--2017|Bremer and Linnenluecke, 2017]] ; [[#CCATWG--2017|CCATWG, 2017]] ; [[#MfE--2018|MfE, 2018]] ), with most focused on identifying climate risks ( [[#Aldum--2014|Aldum et al., 2014]] ; [[#Gasbarro--2016|Gasbarro et al., 2016]] ; [[#Cradock-Henry--2017|Cradock-Henry, 2017]] ). Businesses are more likely to engage in anticipatory adaptation when the frequency of climate events is known ( [[#McKnight--2019|McKnight and Linnenluecke, 2019]] ). Effective cooperation and a positive innovation culture can contribute to the collaborative development of climate change adaptation pathways ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Bardsley--2018|Bardsley et al., 2018]] ).

Some areas in northern Australia and New Zealand, especially those with higher proportions of Indigenous populations, face severe housing, health, education, employment and services deficits that exacerbate the impacts of climate change ( [[#Kotey--2015|Kotey, 2015]] ) (11.3.5; 11.4; 11.6).

Where adaptation relies upon an ageing population and an overstretched volunteer base, vulnerability to climate change impacts is being exacerbated ( [[#Astill--2018|Astill and Miller, 2018]] ; [[#Davies--2018|Davies et al., 2018]] ). Adaptation options that succeed within remote Indigenous communities are founded on connections to traditional lands, alignment with cultural values and contribute to social, cultural and economic goals ( [[#Nursey-Bray--2018|Nursey-Bray and Palmer, 2018]] ). Knowledge co-production for Indigenous adaptation pathways can enable transformative change from colonial legacies ( [[#Hill--2020|Hill et al., 2020]] ). Learning and experimentation across governance boundaries and between agencies and local communities enable adaptation to be better aligned with changing climate risks and community ( ''high confidenc'' e) ( [[#Fünfgeld--2015|Fünfgeld, 2015]] ; [[#Howes--2015|Howes et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bardsley--2016|Bardsley and Wiseman, 2016]] ; [[#Lawrence--2019b|Lawrence et al., 2019b]] ).

There is increasing focus on improving adaptive capacity for transitional and transformational responses, but reactive responses dominate ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Smith--2015|Smith et al., 2015]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2017|Schlosberg et al., 2017]] ; [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ). While extreme events can provide opportunities for positive transitions within communities ( [[#Cradock-Henry--2018b|Cradock-Henry et al., 2018b]] ) (e.g., Queensland Reconstruction Authority Building Back Better scheme), often rebuilding occurs in at-risk places to aid quick recovery ( [[#Lawrence--2017|Lawrence and Saunders, 2017]] ). Community-based adaptation innovations ( [[#Bendall--2018|Bendall, 2018]] ; [[#Kench--2018|Kench et al., 2018]] ; [[#Forino--2019|Forino et al., 2019]] ) include relationship building; use of new decision tools, pathways planning with communities, visualisation and serious games ( [[#Lawrence--2017|Lawrence and Haasnoot, 2017]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2017|Schlosberg et al., 2017]] ; [[#Flood--2018|Flood et al., 2018]] ; [[#Reiter--2018|Reiter et al., 2018]] ; [[#Serrao-Neumann--2018|Serrao-Neumann and Choy, 2018]] ); communities of practice; and climate information sharing ( [[#Astill--2019|Astill et al., 2019]] ; [[#Stone--2019|Stone et al., 2019]] ).

<div id="11.7.2" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="barriers-and-limits-to-adaptation"></span>
=== 11.7.2 Barriers and Limits to Adaptation ===

<div id="h2-21-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Major gaps in the adaptation process remain across all sectors and at all levels of decision-making ( ''very high confidence'' ) (11.3; Table 11.115a, Table 15b). Efforts to build, resource and deploy adaptive capacity are slow compared to escalating impacts and risks ( [[#Stephenson--2018|Stephenson et al., 2018]] ; [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ). Barriers to effective adaptation include governance inertia at all levels, hindering the development of careful and comprehensive adaptation plans and their implementation ( [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ; [[#MfE%20and%20Hawke’s%20Bay%20Regional%20Council--2020|MfE and Hawke’s Bay Regional Council, 2020]] ; [[#White--2020|White and Lawrence, 2020]] ). Lack of clarity about mandate, roles and leadership and inadequate funding for adaptation by national and state governments and sectors, are slowing adaptation ( [[#Lukasiewicz--2017|Lukasiewicz et al., 2017]] ; [[#Waters--2018|Waters and Barnett, 2018]] ; [[#LGNZ--2019|LGNZ, 2019]] ; [[#MfE--2020c|MfE, 2020c]] ) (11.3; 11.7.1). Established planning tools and measures were designed for static risk profiles, and practitioners are slow to take up tools better suited to changing climate risks ( [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ; [[#Schneider--2020|Schneider et al., 2020]] ) (11.5; Box 11.5). The communication of relevant climate change information remains ad hoc ( [[#Stevens--2015|Stevens and O’Connor, 2015]] ; [[#CCATWG--2017|CCATWG, 2017]] ; [[#Palutikof--2019c|Palutikof et al., 2019c]] ; [[#Salmon--2019|Salmon, 2019]] ). In Australia, the lack of national guidance or adaptation laws creates barriers to adaptation, reflected in uneven coastal adaptation based on a wait-and-see approach ( [[#Dedekorkut-Howes--2020|Dedekorkut-Howes et al., 2020]] ).

There are many barriers to starting adaptation pre-emptively ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#CCATWG--2018|CCATWG, 2018]] ) (Table 11.16). Recent institutional changes in New Zealand indicate that this is changing (11.7.1; Table 15b). Many groups are yet to engage deeply with climate change adaptation ( [[#Kench--2018|Kench et al., 2018]] ), and some adaptation processes are being blocked ( [[#Pearce--2018|Pearce et al., 2018]] ; [[#Garmestani--2019|Garmestani et al., 2019]] ; [[#Alexandra--2020|Alexandra, 2020]] ) or exploited to deflect from mitigation responsibilities ( [[#Smith--2018|Smith and Lawrence, 2018]] ; [[#Nyberg--2020|Nyberg and Wright, 2020]] ). Some actors are resistant to using climate change information ( [[#Tangney--2016|Tangney and Howes, 2016]] ; [[#Alexandra--2020|Alexandra, 2020]] ). Fear of litigation and demands for compensation can contribute to this reluctance (Tombs et al., 2018; [[#O’Donnell--2019|O’Donnell et al., 2019]] )and is increasingly inviting litigation and other costs ( [[#Hodder--2019|Hodder, 2019]] ; [[#Bell-James--2020|Bell-James and]] [[#Collins--2020|Collins, 2020]] ). Jurisprudence is evolving from cases on projects to cases about decision-making accountability in the public and private sectors ( [[#Bell-James--2020|Bell-James and]] [[#Collins--2020|Collins, 2020]] ; [[#Peel--2020|Peel et al., 2020]] ) and rights-based cases ( [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky, 2018]] ). National and sub-national governments may become exposed to unsustainable fiscal risk as insurers of last resort, which can lead to inequitable outcomes for vulnerable groups and future generations (11.3.8), path dependencies and negative effects on physical, social, economic and cultural systems ( [[#Hamin--2015|Hamin and Gurran, 2015]] ; [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ). Cross-scale governance tensions can prevent local adaptation initiatives from performing as intended ( [[#Tschakert--2016|Tschakert et al., 2016]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2019|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019]] ). Adaptation that draws on Māori cultural understanding in partnership with local government in New Zealand can lead to more effective and equitable adaptation outcomes ( [[#MfE--2020a|MfE, 2020a]] ).

'''Table 11.16 |''' Examples of barriers to adaptation action in the region

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Barrier

! Source

|-
| '''''Governments'''''

|
|-
| Lack of consistent policy direction from higher levels and frequent policy reversals

| ( [[#Dedekorkut-Howes--2020|Dedekorkut-Howes et al., 2020]] )

|-
| Conflicts between community-based initiatives, city councils and business interests

| ( [[#Forino--2019|Forino et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Different framings of adaptation between local governments (risk) and community groups (vulnerability, transformation)

| ( [[#Smith--2015|Smith et al., 2015]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2017|Schlosberg et al., 2017]] ; [[#McClure--2018|McClure and Baker, 2018]] )

|-
| Competing planning objectives

| ( [[#McClure--2018|McClure and Baker, 2018]] )

|-
| Divergent perceptions of risk concepts

| ( [[#Button--2015|Button and Harvey, 2015]] ; [[#Mills--2016b|Mills et al., 2016b]] ; [[#Tonmoy--2018|Tonmoy et al., 2018]] )

|-
| Focus on climate variability rather than climate change

| ( [[#Dedekorkut-Howes--2017|Dedekorkut-Howes and Vickers, 2017]] )

|-
| Low prioritisation of climate change adaptation among competing institutional objectives

| ( [[#Glavovic--2014|Glavovic and Smith, 2014]] ; [[#Lawrence--2015|Lawrence et al., 2015]] ; [[#McClure--2018|McClure and Baker, 2018]] )

|-
| Constraints in using new knowledge

| ( [[#Temby--2016|Temby et al., 2016]] )

|-
| Lack of institutional and professional capabilities and capacity (e.g., to monitor and evaluate adaptation outcomes)

| ( [[#Lawrence--2015|Lawrence et al., 2015]] ; [[#Scott--2021|Scott and Moloney, 2021]] )

|-
| Lack of understanding of Indigenous knowledge and practices

| ( [[#Parsons--2019|Parsons et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Lack of authority and political legitimacy

| ( [[#Hayward--2008|Hayward, 2008]] ; [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ; [[#CCATWG--2018|CCATWG, 2018]] ; [[#Parsons--2019|Parsons et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Fear of litigation

| (Tombs et al., 2018; [[#Iorns%20Magallanes--2019|Iorns Magallanes and Watts, 2019]] ; [[#O’Donnell--2019|O’Donnell et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Upfront costs of adaptation relative to competing demands on government expenditure

| ( [[#Gawith--2020|Gawith et al., 2020]] ; [[#Warren-Myers--2020b|Warren-Myers et al., 2020b]] )

|-
| '''''Private sector'''''

|
|-
| Governance and policy uncertainty, lack of cross-sector coordination, lack of capital investment in climate solutions

| ( [[#CCATWG--2017|CCATWG, 2017]] ; [[#Forino--2017|Forino et al., 2017]] ; [[#IGCC--2021a|IGCC, 2021a]] )

|-
| Inconsistent hazard information and incomplete understanding of adaptation

| ( [[#CCATWG--2017|CCATWG, 2017]] ; [[#Harvey--2019|Harvey, 2019]] )

|-
| Mismatch in duration of insurance cover (annual) lending (decades) and infrastructure and housing investment (50–100 years)

| ( [[#Storey--2017|Storey and Noy, 2017]] ; [[#O’Donnell--2020|O’Donnell, 2020]] )

|-
| Perceived unaffordability of adaptation, lack of client demand and awareness of climate change risks and limited and inconsistent climate risk regulation in the construction industry

| ( [[#Hurlimann--2008|Hurlimann, 2008]] ; [[#Hurlimann--2018|Hurlimann et al., 2018]] )

|-
| Translating information into organisations to address disinterest among clients in the property industry

| ( [[#Warren-Myers--2020b|Warren-Myers et al., 2020b]] ; [[#Warren-Myers--2020a|Warren-Myers et al., 2020a]] )

|-
| Erosion of adaptive capacity and challenges of transformational adaptation in agriculture and rural communities

| ( [[#Jakku--2016|Jakku et al., 2016]] )

|-
| '''''Communities'''''

|
|-
| Nature of government engagement with communities

| ( [[#Public%20Participation--2014|Public Participation, 2014]] ; [[#MfE--2017a|MfE, 2017a]] ; [[#Archie--2018|Archie et al., 2018]] ; [[#OECD--2019b|OECD, 2019b]] )

|-
| Lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities

| ( [[#Gorddard--2016|Gorddard et al., 2016]] ; [[#Elrick-Barr--2017|Elrick-Barr et al., 2017]] ; [[#Goode--2017|Goode et al., 2017]] ; [[#Waters--2018|Waters and Barnett, 2018]] )

|-
| Lack of resourcing of adaptation

| ( [[#Singh-Peterson--2015|Singh-Peterson et al., 2015]] ; [[#Lukasiewicz--2017|Lukasiewicz et al., 2017]] ; [[#Brookfield--2018|Brookfield and Fitzgerald, 2018]] )

|-
| Lack of deep engagement with climate change

| ( [[#Kench--2018|Kench et al., 2018]] ; [[#Pearce--2018|Pearce, 2018]] )

|-
| Diverging perceptions, values and goals within communities

| ( [[#Austin--2018|Austin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Fitzgerald--2019|Fitzgerald et al., 2019]] ; [[#Marshall--2019|Marshall et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Inequities within and between communities

| ( [[#Eriksen--2014|Eriksen, 2014]] ; [[#Parkinson--2019|Parkinson, 2019]] )

|-
| Lack of sustained engagement, learning and trust between community, scientists and policy makers

| ( [[#Serrao-Neumann--2020|Serrao-Neumann et al., 2020]] )

|}

Communities’ vulnerabilities are dynamic and uneven ( ''high confidence'' ). In Australia, 435,000 people in remote areas face particular challenges ( [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ). Some groups do not have the time, resources or opportunity to participate in formal adaptation planning as it is currently organised ( [[#Victorian%20Council%20of%20Social%20Service--2016|Victorian Council of Social Service, 2016]] ; [[#Tschakert--2017|Tschakert et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mathew--2018|Mathew et al., 2018]] ). Linguistically diverse groups can be disadvantaged by social isolation, language barriers and others’ ignorance of the knowledge and skills they can bring to adaptation ( [[#Shepherd--2014|Shepherd and van Vuuren, 2014]] ; Dun et al., 2018) (11.1.2). Social, cultural and economic vulnerabilities, biases and injustices, such as those faced by many women ( [[#Eriksen--2014|Eriksen, 2014]] ; [[#Parkinson--2019|Parkinson, 2019]] ) and non-heterosexual groups and gender minorities ( [[#Dominey-Howes--2016|Dominey-Howes et al., 2016]] ; [[#Gorman-Murray--2017|Gorman-Murray et al., 2017]] ), can deepen impacts and impede adaptation; ( [[#Fitzgerald--2019|Fitzgerald et al., 2019]] ; [[#Marshall--2019|Marshall et al., 2019]] ) (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18).

Potential biophysical limits to adaptation for non-human species and ecosystems where impacts are projected to be irreversible, with limited scope for adaptation, are signalled in key risks 1–4 (11.6). In some human systems, fundamental limits to adaptation include thermal thresholds and safe freshwater ( [[#Alston--2018|Alston et al., 2018]] ) (Table 11.14) and the inability of some low-lying coastal communities to adapt in place (Box 11.6) ( ''very high confidence'' ). Some individuals and communities are already reaching their psycho-social adaptation limits ( [[#Evans--2016|Evans et al., 2016]] ). A lack of robust and timely adaptation means key risks will increasingly manifest as impacts, and numerous systems, communities and institutions are projected to reach limits (Table 11.14, Figure 11.6), compounding current adaptation deficits and undermining society’s capacity to adapt to future impacts ( ''very high confidence'' ).

<div id="_idContainer048" class="Figure"></div>

[[File:3b215465f7952009dc52951b26738d4d IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_11_006.png]]

'''Figure 11.6 |''' '''Burning embers diagram for each of the nine key risks for low and moderate adaptation.''' The risk categories are undetectable, moderate, high and very high. While there is no risk category beyond very high, risks obviously get worse with further global warming, and the risk for coral reefs is already very high. The assessment is based on available literature and expert judgement, summarised in Table 11.14 and described in Supplementary Material SM 11.2. The global warming range associated with each risk transition has a confidence rating ( ''**** very high, *** high, ** moderate, * low'' ) based on the amount of evidence and level of agreement between lines of evidence

<div id="11.7.3" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="adaptation-enablers"></span>
=== 11.7.3 Adaptation Enablers ===

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Adaptation enablers include understanding relevant knowledge, diverse values and governance, institutions and resources ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Gorddard--2016|Gorddard et al., 2016]] ). Skills and learning, community networks, people–place connections, trust-building, community resources and support and engaged governance build social resilience that support adaptation ( [[#Maclean--2014|Maclean et al., 2014]] ; [[#Eriksen--2019|Eriksen, 2019]] ; [[#Phelps--2019|Phelps and Kelly, 2019]] ). A multi-faceted focus on the role societal inequalities and environmental degradation play in generating climate change vulnerability can enable fairer adaptation outcomes ( [[#McManus--2014|McManus et al., 2014]] ; [[#Ambrey--2017|Ambrey et al., 2017]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2017|Schlosberg et al., 2017]] ; [[#Graham--2018|Graham et al., 2018]] ).

The feasibility and effectiveness of adaptation options will change over time depending on place, values, cultural appropriateness, social acceptability, ongoing cost-effectiveness, leadership and the ability to implement them through the prevailing governance regime ( [[#Singh--2020|Singh et al., 2020]] ). The capacity and commitment of the political system can drive early action that can reduce risks ( [[#Boston--2017|Boston, 2017]] ).

Decision makers face the challenge of how to adapt when there are ongoing knowledge gaps and uncertainties about when some climate change impacts will occur and their scale, for example coastal flooding (Box 11.6) or extreme rainfall events and their cascading effects (Box 11.4) ( ''very high confidence'' ). No-regrets decisions are ''likely'' to be insufficient ( [[#Hallegatte--2012|Hallegatte et al., 2012]] ). A perception exists in some sectors that all climate risks are manageable based on past experience ( [[#CCATWG--2017|CCATWG, 2017]] ). Projected impacts, however, are outside the range experienced, meaning that decisions must be made now for long-lived assets, land uses and communities exposed to the key risks ( [[#Paulik--2019a|Paulik et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Paulik--2020|Paulik et al., 2020]] ) often under contested conditions where adaptation competes with other public expenditures ( [[#Kwakkel--2016|Kwakkel et al., 2016]] ). New planning approaches being used across the region can enable more effective adaptation, for example continual iterative adaptation ( [[#Khan--2015|Khan et al., 2015]] ), rapid deployment of decision tools appropriate for addressing uncertainties ( [[#Marchau--2019|Marchau et al., 2019]] ) and transformation of governance and institutional arrangements ( [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ) (Table 11.17). Recognising co-benefits for mitigation and sustainable development can help incentivise adaptation (11.3.5.3, 11.8.2).

'''Table 11.17 |''' Key enablers for adaptation

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Enabler

! Example

|-
| ''Governance frameworks''

| Clear climate change adaptation mandate

Measures that inform a shift from reactive to anticipatory decision-making (e.g., decision tools that have long time frames)

Institutional frameworks integrated across all levels of government for better coordination

Revised design standards for buildings, infrastructure, landscape such as common land use planning guidance and codes of practice that integrate consideration of climate risks to address existing and future exposures and vulnerability of people and physical and cultural assets

(11.3.1, 11.3.2, 11.3.3, 11.3.4.3, 11.3.5, 1.3.6, 11.4.1, 11.4.2, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.6, 11.7.1, 11.7.2, 11.8.1, 11.8.2, Table 11.7, Table 11.14, Box 11.1, Box 11.3, Box 11.5, Box 11.6)

|-
| ''Building capacity for adaptation''

| Provision of nationally consistent risk information through agreed methodologies for risk assessment that address non-stationarity

Targeted research including understanding the projected scope and scale of cascading and compounding risks

Education, training and professional development for adaptation under changing risk conditions

Accessible adaptation tools and information

(11.1.2, 11.3.4, 11.3.5, 11.4.1, 11.5.1, 11.6, 11.7.1, 11.7.2, Table 11.14, Table 11.16, Table 11.18, Box 11.6)

|-
| ''Community partnership and collaborative engagement''

| Community engagement based on principles that consider social and cultural and Indigenous Peoples’ contexts and an understanding of what people value and wish to protect (e.g., International Association of Public Participation) ( [[#Public%20Participation--2014|Public Participation, 2014]] )

Use of collaborative and learning-oriented engagement approaches tailored for the social and informed by the cultural context

Community awareness and network building

Building on Indigenous Australian and Māori communities’ social-cultural networks and conventions that promote collective action and mutual support

(11.3.5, 11.4, 11.7.1, 11.7.3.2, Table Box 11.1.1, Table 11.14, Box 11.6)

|-
| ''Dynamic adaptive decision-making''

| Increased understanding and use of decision-making tools to address uncertainties and changing risks, such as scenario planning and DAPP to enable effective adaptation as climate risk profiles worsen

(11.7.3.1, 11.7.3.2, Table 11.14, Table 15b, Table 11.18, Box 11.4, Box 11.6)

|-
| ''Funding mechanisms''

| Adaptation funding framework to increase investment in adaptation actions

New private-sector financial instruments to support adaptation

(11.7.1, 11.7.2, Table 11.16)

|-
| ''Reducing systemic vulnerabilities''

| Economic and social policies that reduce income and wealth inequalities

Strengthening social capital and cohesion

Identifying and redressing rigid or fragmented administrative and service delivery systems

Reviewing land use and spatial planning to reduce exposure to climate risks

Restoring degraded ecosystems and avoiding further environmental degradation and loss.

(11.1.1, 11.1.2, 11.3.5, 11.3.11, 11.4.1, 11.5.1.3, 11.7.2, 11.8.1; Table 11.10, Table 11.13)

|}

<div id="11.7.3.1" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="planning-and-tools"></span>
==== 11.7.3.1 Planning and Tools ====

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Adaptation decision support tools enable a shift from reactive to anticipatory planning for changing climate risks ( ''high confidence'' ). The available tools are diversifying with futures and systems methodologies and dynamic adaptive policy pathways being increasingly used ( [[#Bosomworth--2017|Bosomworth et al., 2017]] ; [[#Prober--2017|Prober et al., 2017]] ; [[#Lawrence--2018a|Lawrence et al., 2018a]] ; [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ; [[#Rogers--2020a|Rogers et al., 2020a]] ; [[#Schneider--2020|Schneider et al., 2020]] ) (11.5; Box 11.6) to facilitate the shift from static to dynamic adaptation by highlighting path dependencies and potential lock-in of decisions, system dependencies and the potential for cascading impacts (Table 11.17) ( [[#Wilson--2013|Wilson et al., 2013]] ; [[#Clarvis--2015|Clarvis et al., 2015]] ; [[#Pearson--2018|Pearson et al., 2018]] ; [[#Cradock-Henry--2020b|Cradock-Henry et al., 2020b]] ; [[#Lawrence--2020b|Lawrence et al., 2020b]] ). Modelling and tools to test the robustness and cost-effectiveness of options ( [[#Infometrics%20and%20PSConsulting--2015|Infometrics and PSConsulting, 2015]] ; [[#Qin--2020|Qin and Stewart, 2020]] ) can be used alongside adaptation strategies with decision-relevant and usable information ( [[#Smith--2016|Smith et al., 2016]] ; [[#Tangney--2019|Tangney, 2019]] ; [[#Serrao-Neumann--2020|Serrao-Neumann et al., 2020]] ), particularly when supported by effective governance and national and sub-national guidance (Box 11.6).

More inclusive, collaborative and learning-oriented community engagement processes are fundamental to effective adaptation outcomes (11.7.3.2) ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Boston--2016|Boston, 2016]] ; [[#Lawrence--2017|Lawrence and Haasnoot, 2017]] ; [[#Sellberg--2018|Sellberg et al., 2018]] ; [[#Serrao-Neumann--2019a|Serrao-Neumann et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Simon--2020|Simon et al., 2020]] ). More participatory vulnerability and risk assessments can better reflect different knowledge systems, values, perspectives, trade-offs, dilemmas, synergies, costs and risks ( [[#Jacobs--2019|Jacobs et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ogier--2020|Ogier et al., 2020]] ; [[#Tonmoy--2020|Tonmoy et al., 2020]] ). A shift from hierarchical to more cooperative governance modalities can assist effective adaptation ( [[#Vermeulen--2018|Vermeulen et al., 2018]] ; [[#Steffen--2019|Steffen et al., 2019]] ; [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ; [[#Lawrence--2020b|Lawrence et al., 2020b]] ; [[#MfE--2020a|MfE, 2020a]] ; [[#Hanna--2021|Hanna et al., 2021]] ).

Regular monitoring, evaluation, communication and coordination of adaptation are essential for accelerating learning and adjusting to dynamic climate impacts and changes in socioeconomic and cultural conditions ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Moloney--2018|Moloney and McClaren, 2018]] ; [[#Palutikof--2019a|Palutikof et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Cradock-Henry--2020a|Cradock-Henry et al., 2020a]] ). Training to improve decision makers’ ‘evaluative capacity’ can play a role ( [[#Scott--2021|Scott and Moloney, 2021]] ). Climate action benchmarking, diagnostic tools and networking can enhance the adaptation process across diverse decision settings (e.g., water, coasts, protected areas and Indigenous Peoples) ( [[#Ayre--2017|Ayre and Nettle, 2017]] ; [[#Davidson--2018|Davidson and Gleeson, 2018]] ; [[#Coenen--2019|Coenen et al., 2019]] ; [[#Gibbs--2020|Gibbs, 2020]] ). Effective adaptation requires cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral policy coherence and national coordination ( [[#Delany-Crowe--2019|Delany-Crowe et al., 2019]] ; [[#Rychetnik--2019|Rychetnik et al., 2019]] ; [[#MfE--2020c|MfE, 2020c]] ).

<div id="11.7.3.2" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="attitudes-engagement-and-accessible-information-as-enablers"></span>
==== 11.7.3.2 Attitudes, Engagement and Accessible Information as Enablers ====

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Concern for climate change has become widespread ( [[#Hopkins--2015|Hopkins, 2015]] ; [[#Borchers%20Arriagada--2020|Borchers Arriagada et al., 2020]] ), giving climate adaptation social legitimacy ( ''high confidence'' ). Over three quarters of Australians (77%) agree that climate change is occurring, and 61% believe climate change is caused by humans ( [[#Merzian--2019|Merzian et al., 2019]] ). A growing proportion of Australians perceive links between climate change and high temperatures experienced during heatwaves and extremely hot days (Summer 2018/2019) (48%), droughts and flooding (42%) and urban water shortages (30%) ( [[#Merzian--2019|Merzian et al., 2019]] ). Rural populations in NSW perceive climate change impacts as stressing their well-being and mental health and requiring leadership and action ( [[#Austin--2020|Austin et al., 2020]] ). In New Zealand, between 2009 and 2018, the proportion of New Zealanders who agreed or strongly agreed that climate change is real increased from 58% to 78% (a 34.5% increase), while those agreeing or strongly agreeing that it was caused by humans increased from 41% to 64% (a 56.1% increase) ( [[#Milfont--2021|Milfont et al., 2021]] ). Nevertheless, New Zealanders have a tendency to overestimate the amount of sea level rise (SLR), especially among those most concerned about climate change and incorrectly associate it with melting sea ice, which has implications for engagement and communication strategies ( [[#Priestley--2021|Priestley et al., 2021]] ).

The use of more systemic, collaborative and future-oriented engagement approaches is facilitating adaptation in local contexts ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Rouse--2013|Rouse et al., 2013]] ; [[#MfE--2017a|MfE, 2017a]] ; [[#Leitch--2019|Leitch et al., 2019]] ). Local ‘adaptation champions’ and experimental and tailored engagement processes can enhance learning ( [[#McFadgen--2017|McFadgen and Huitema, 2017]] ; [[#Lindsay--2019|Lindsay et al., 2019]] ). Dynamic adaptive pathways planning ( [[#Lawrence--2019a|Lawrence et al., 2019a]] ) and inclusive community governance ( [[#Schneider--2020|Schneider et al., 2020]] ) can help progress difficult decisions such as the relocation of cultural assets and managed retreat, and contestation about which public goods to prioritise and how adaptation should be implemented ( [[#Kwakkel--2016|Kwakkel et al., 2016]] ) ( [[#Colliar--2018|Colliar and Blackett, 2018]] ). Participatory climate change scenario planning can test assumptions about the present and the future ( [[#Mitchell--2017|Mitchell et al., 2017]] ; [[#Serrao-Neumann--2018|Serrao-Neumann and Choy, 2018]] ; [[#Chambers--2019|Chambers et al., 2019]] ; [[#Serrao-Neumann--2019c|Serrao-Neumann et al., 2019c]] ) and help envision people-centred, place-based adaptation ( [[#Barnett--2014|Barnett et al., 2014]] ; [[#Lindsay--2019|Lindsay et al., 2019]] ). Social network analysis can inform engagement and communication of adaptation ( [[#Cunningham--2017|Cunningham et al., 2017]] ). Knowledge brokers, information portals and alliances can help communities, governments and sector groups to better access and use climate change information ( [[#Shaw--2013|Shaw et al., 2013]] ; [[#Fünfgeld--2015|Fünfgeld, 2015]] ; [[#Lawrence--2017|Lawrence and Haasnoot, 2017]] ). Novel approaches to building climate change literacy and adaptation capability go hand in hand with dedicated expert organisational support ( [[#Stevens--2015|Stevens and O’Connor, 2015]] ; [[#CCATWG--2018|CCATWG, 2018]] ; [[#Palutikof--2019c|Palutikof et al., 2019c]] ; [[#Salmon--2019|Salmon, 2019]] ). All of these approaches depend on adequate resourcing ( ''very high confidence'' ).

<div id="11.7.3.3" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="knowledge-gaps-and-implementation-enablers"></span>
==== 11.7.3.3 Knowledge Gaps and Implementation Enablers ====

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There are two priority areas where new knowledge is critical for accelerating adaptation implementation.

# ''System complexity and uncertainty in observed and projected impacts''
#* Regionally relevant projections of rainfall, runoff, compound and extreme weather (11.2.1, 11.3.3; Box 11.4)
#* Inclusion of cascading and compounding impacts in integrated assessments (11.5.1), including for infrastructure (11.3.5), tourism (11.3.7) and health (11.3.6) and for different groups, including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and Tangata Whenua Māori communities (11.4)
#* Impacts on terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, including ''in situ'' monitoring to detect ongoing changes especially in New Zealand (11.3.1), and marine biodiversity, including environmental tolerances of key life stages (11.3.2)
#* Repository of indigenous species distribution data for monitoring responses to climate change and climate advisory services for New Zealand (11.3.1.3)
#* National risk assessment for Australia (11.7.1)
#* The interactions between adaptation and mitigation, particularly where land carbon mitigation is impacted by climate change (11.3.4.3; Box 11.5)
# ''Supporting adaptation decision making''
#* Better understanding of who and what is exposed and where and their vulnerability to climate hazards (11.3, 11.4)
#* National assessments of the costs and benefits of climate change, with and without different levels and timings of adaptation and mitigation (11.5.2.3) (11.7.1)
#* Understanding available adaptation strategies and options, their feasibility and effectiveness as the climate changes, including their intended and unintended outcomes (11.7, 11.8)
#* Understanding how to embed robust planning approaches into decision making that retain flexibility to change course in the future (11.7.1).
#* Mechanisms for sharing knowledge and practice of adaptation (11.7).
#* The role of development paradigms, values and political economy in adaptation framing and effective implementation (11.8).
#* Understanding social transitions and social licence, for timely, robust and transformational adaptation (11.8.2).

<div id="11.8" class="h1-container"></div>

<span id="climate-resilient-development-pathways"></span>