Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-13 (section)

== 13.9 Inter-regional Impacts, Risks and Adaptation ==

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This section addresses inter-regional risks between Europe and other parts of the world. Global risk pathways affecting sectors and supply chains relevant for European economies and societies involve (a) ecosystems, (b) people (e.g., through migration), (c) financial flows and (d) trade; and these pathways ultimately impact security, health, well-being and food supply (Cross-Chapter Box INTEREG in Chapter 16; [[#Yokohata--2019|Yokohata et al., 2019]] ).

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=== 13.9.1 Consequences of Climate-Change-Driven Impacts, Risks and Adaptation Emerging in Other Parts of the World for Europe ===

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Recent literature ( [[#Wenz--2016|Wenz and Levermann, 2016]] ; [[#Hedlund--2018|Hedlund et al., 2018]] ; [[#Benzie--2019|Benzie et al., 2019]] ) strengthens the confidence in the AR5 statement that ‘with increasing globalisation, the impacts of climate change outside the European region are ''likely'' to have implications for countries within the region’ ( [[#Kovats--2014|Kovats et al., 2014]] ). The exposure of European countries to trans-European climate impact and risk pathways varies depending on their territorial settings, national policies and position in the global supply chain ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Berry--2015|Berry et al., 2015]] ; [[#Hedlund--2018|Hedlund et al., 2018]] ; [[#Benzie--2019|Benzie et al., 2019]] ). There is ''limited evidence'' that Europe is more exposed to inter-regional risks than North America, and less than Africa and Asia ( [[#Hedlund--2018|Hedlund et al., 2018]] ). The social and governance context in Europe make the region less vulnerable to conflicts driven by climate change than other regions, at least up to 2°C GWL ( [[#Buhaug--2014|Buhaug et al., 2014]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ).

Climate risks in other parts of the world can be transmitted to European economies via trade networks (Figure 13.25). European agricultural imports exert a high water footprint in originating countries already today ( [[#Dolganova--2019|Dolganova et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ercin--2019|Ercin et al., 2019]] ), and some crop imports, such as tropical fruits, are highly vulnerable to future climate change ( [[#Brás--2019|Brás et al., 2019]] ). Simultaneous breadbasket failures, and trade restrictions, increase risks to food supply ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Fellmann--2014|Fellmann et al., 2014]] ; [[#d’Amour--2016|d’Amour et al., 2016]] ; [[#Gaupp--2017|Gaupp et al., 2017]] ; [[#Gaupp--2020|Gaupp et al., 2020]] ). There is ''high confidence'' that the European economy could be negatively affected by supply chain disruptions due to flooding destroying facilities, heatwaves and malaria reducing productivity in labour-intensive industries and regions ( [[#13.7.1|Section 13.7.1]] ), and SLR affecting ports and cities along coastlines ( [[#13.6.1.2|Section 13.6.1.2]] ; [[#Nicholls--2012|Nicholls and Kebede, 2012]] ; Challinor, 2016; [[#Wenz--2016|Wenz and Levermann, 2016]] ; [[#Hedlund--2018|Hedlund et al., 2018]] ; [[#Koks--2018|Koks, 2018]] ; [[#Szewczyk--2018|Szewczyk et al., 2018]] ; [[#Willner--2018|Willner et al., 2018]] ; [[#Knittel--2020|Knittel et al., 2020]] ; [[#Kulmer--2020|Kulmer et al., 2020]] ; [[#Carter--2021|Carter et al., 2021]] ).

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[[File:a28165100294e5c06888408627fcb76f IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_13_025.png]]

'''Figure 13.25 |''' '''Trans-European climate risks in trade: virtual water flows embodied in agricultural imports to Europe in 2018 and the vulnerability to climate change of the most important crops in the originating countries''' ''(Dolganova et al., 2019; [[#Ercin--2019|Ercin et al., 2019]] )''

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=== 13.9.2 Inter-regional Consequences of Climate Risks and Adaptation Emerging from Europe ===

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New literature since AR5 suggests that climate risks in Europe can propagate worldwide in response to 3°C GWL ( ''medium confidence'' ). Key concerns include climate impacts on European agriculture threatening global food security ( [[#13.5.1|Section 13.5.1]] ; [[#Berry--2017|Berry et al., 2017]] ; [[#van%20der%20Velde--2018|van der Velde et al., 2018]] ) and the European demand limiting the adaptation potential for ecosystems in South America, Africa and Asia ( [[#IPBES--2018|IPBES, 2018]] ; [[#Pendrill--2019|Pendrill et al., 2019]] ; [[#Fuchs--2020|Fuchs et al., 2020]] ). Emerging literature suggests that coastal and riverine flood risks in Europe could be amplified through the global financial system and generate a systemic financial crisis (Figure 13.26; [[#Mandel--2021|Mandel et al., 2021]] ). For 3°C GWL and without adaptation, northern Atlantic flight routes and European ports are projected to be increasingly disrupted by changing winds, waves and SLR ( [[#13.6.1.2|Section 13.6.1.2]] ; [[#Williams--2013|Williams and Joshi, 2013]] ; [[#Irvine--2016|Irvine et al., 2016]] ; [[#Williams--2016|Williams, 2016]] ; [[#Becker--2018|Becker et al., 2018]] ; [[#Camus--2019|Camus et al., 2019]] ; [[#Verschuur--2020|Verschuur et al., 2020]] ).

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'''Figure 13.26 |''' '''The transmission of coastal and riverine flood risks via finance flows from Europe to the rest of the world.''' (From [[#Mandel--2021|Mandel et al., 2021]] ).

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=== 13.9.3 European Territories Outside Europe ===

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European territories outside Europe are critically exposed to climate risks such as increased forest fires (e.g., in Russian Siberia) (Chapter 10; [[#Sitnov--2017|Sitnov et al., 2017]] ), climate-change-induced biodiversity losses and SLR (e.g., in British, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Dutch overseas regions and territories) (Chapters 12, 15; [[#Ferdinand--2018|Ferdinand, 2018]] ; [[#Sieber--2018|Sieber et al., 2018]] ). Climate risks emerging from these territories include smoke and dust from Siberian forest fires ( [[#Sitnov--2017|Sitnov et al., 2017]] ) and, depending on European health-risk mitigation measures, dengue and other mosquito-transmitted diseases ( [[#13.7|Section 13.7]] ; [[#Schaffner--2014|Schaffner and Mathis, 2014]] ). Some MPAs ( [[#13.4.3|Section 13.4.3]] ) in European overseas territories are increasingly affected by changes originating in far-field upstream areas. These changes ultimately undermine their ability to curb biodiversity losses and provide ecosystem services ( [[#Schaffner--2014|Schaffner and Mathis, 2014]] ; [[#Robinson--2017|Robinson et al., 2017]] ). Adaptation options and regulations developed within Europe apply in these territories, despite ''low confidence'' that they meet local and regional adaptation challenges and address the aspiration for social justice, promotion of local solutions and consideration of traditional knowledge ( [[#Ferdinand--2018|Ferdinand, 2018]] ; [[#Terorotua--2020|Terorotua et al., 2020]] ).

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=== 13.9.4 Solution Space and Adaptation Options ===

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European countries can address inter-regional risks at the place of origin or destination, for example, by (a) developing local adaptation capacity in trading-partner countries and in European territories outside Europe ( [[#Petit--2008|Petit and Prudent, 2008]] ; [[#Benzie--2019|Benzie et al., 2019]] ; [[#Adams--2020|Adams et al., 2020]] ; [[#Terorotua--2020|Terorotua et al., 2020]] ), (b) providing international adaptation finance ( [[#Dzebo--2015|Dzebo and Stripple, 2015]] ; [[#BMUB--2017|BMUB, 2017]] ), (c) developing insurance mechanisms suitable for adaptation or (d) providing European climate services to support global adaptation (Cross-Chapter Box INTEREG in Chapter 16; [[#Linnerooth-Bayer--2015|Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2015]] ; [[#Brasseur--2016|Brasseur and Gallardo, 2016]] ; [[#Street--2016|Street, 2016]] ; [[#Cavelier--2017|Cavelier et al., 2017]] ). Along the supply chain, risks can be reduced by trade diversification and alternative sourcing ( [[#Benzie--2019|Benzie and Persson, 2019]] ; [[#Adams--2020|Adams et al., 2020]] ). Within Europe, risks can be reduced by integrating inter-regional climate risks into national adaptation strategies and plans, and mainstreaming them into EU policies (e.g., Common Agricultural Policy, trade agreements) ( [[#Benzie--2019|Benzie and Persson, 2019]] ; [[#Benzie--2019|Benzie et al., 2019]] ; [[#Groundstroem--2019|Groundstroem and Juhola, 2019]] ; [[#Adams--2020|Adams et al., 2020]] ). There is ''high confidence'' that the exposure of European countries to inter-regional risks can be reduced by international governance (Cross-Chapter Paper 4; [[#Dzebo--2015|Dzebo and Stripple, 2015]] ; [[#Cramer--2018|Cramer et al., 2018]] ; [[#Persson--2019|Persson and Dzebo, 2019]] ), for example, fulfilling the targets of environmental agreements such as the Convention for Biological Diversity ( [[#IPBES--2018|IPBES, 2018]] ). There is ''emerging evidence'' that supporting adaptation outside Europe may generate economic co-benefits for Europe ( [[#Román--2018|Román et al., 2018]] ).

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