Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-11 (section)

=== 11.7.2 Barriers and Limits to Adaptation ===

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Major gaps in the adaptation process remain across all sectors and at all levels of decision-making ( ''very high confidence'' ) (11.3; Table 11.115a, Table 15b). Efforts to build, resource and deploy adaptive capacity are slow compared to escalating impacts and risks ( [[#Stephenson--2018|Stephenson et al., 2018]] ; [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ). Barriers to effective adaptation include governance inertia at all levels, hindering the development of careful and comprehensive adaptation plans and their implementation ( [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ; [[#MfE%20and%20Hawke’s%20Bay%20Regional%20Council--2020|MfE and Hawke’s Bay Regional Council, 2020]] ; [[#White--2020|White and Lawrence, 2020]] ). Lack of clarity about mandate, roles and leadership and inadequate funding for adaptation by national and state governments and sectors, are slowing adaptation ( [[#Lukasiewicz--2017|Lukasiewicz et al., 2017]] ; [[#Waters--2018|Waters and Barnett, 2018]] ; [[#LGNZ--2019|LGNZ, 2019]] ; [[#MfE--2020c|MfE, 2020c]] ) (11.3; 11.7.1). Established planning tools and measures were designed for static risk profiles, and practitioners are slow to take up tools better suited to changing climate risks ( [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ; [[#Schneider--2020|Schneider et al., 2020]] ) (11.5; Box 11.5). The communication of relevant climate change information remains ad hoc ( [[#Stevens--2015|Stevens and O’Connor, 2015]] ; [[#CCATWG--2017|CCATWG, 2017]] ; [[#Palutikof--2019c|Palutikof et al., 2019c]] ; [[#Salmon--2019|Salmon, 2019]] ). In Australia, the lack of national guidance or adaptation laws creates barriers to adaptation, reflected in uneven coastal adaptation based on a wait-and-see approach ( [[#Dedekorkut-Howes--2020|Dedekorkut-Howes et al., 2020]] ).

There are many barriers to starting adaptation pre-emptively ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#CCATWG--2018|CCATWG, 2018]] ) (Table 11.16). Recent institutional changes in New Zealand indicate that this is changing (11.7.1; Table 15b). Many groups are yet to engage deeply with climate change adaptation ( [[#Kench--2018|Kench et al., 2018]] ), and some adaptation processes are being blocked ( [[#Pearce--2018|Pearce et al., 2018]] ; [[#Garmestani--2019|Garmestani et al., 2019]] ; [[#Alexandra--2020|Alexandra, 2020]] ) or exploited to deflect from mitigation responsibilities ( [[#Smith--2018|Smith and Lawrence, 2018]] ; [[#Nyberg--2020|Nyberg and Wright, 2020]] ). Some actors are resistant to using climate change information ( [[#Tangney--2016|Tangney and Howes, 2016]] ; [[#Alexandra--2020|Alexandra, 2020]] ). Fear of litigation and demands for compensation can contribute to this reluctance (Tombs et al., 2018; [[#O’Donnell--2019|O’Donnell et al., 2019]] )and is increasingly inviting litigation and other costs ( [[#Hodder--2019|Hodder, 2019]] ; [[#Bell-James--2020|Bell-James and]] [[#Collins--2020|Collins, 2020]] ). Jurisprudence is evolving from cases on projects to cases about decision-making accountability in the public and private sectors ( [[#Bell-James--2020|Bell-James and]] [[#Collins--2020|Collins, 2020]] ; [[#Peel--2020|Peel et al., 2020]] ) and rights-based cases ( [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky, 2018]] ). National and sub-national governments may become exposed to unsustainable fiscal risk as insurers of last resort, which can lead to inequitable outcomes for vulnerable groups and future generations (11.3.8), path dependencies and negative effects on physical, social, economic and cultural systems ( [[#Hamin--2015|Hamin and Gurran, 2015]] ; [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ). Cross-scale governance tensions can prevent local adaptation initiatives from performing as intended ( [[#Tschakert--2016|Tschakert et al., 2016]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2019|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019]] ). Adaptation that draws on Māori cultural understanding in partnership with local government in New Zealand can lead to more effective and equitable adaptation outcomes ( [[#MfE--2020a|MfE, 2020a]] ).

'''Table 11.16 |''' Examples of barriers to adaptation action in the region

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Barrier

! Source

|-
| '''''Governments'''''

|
|-
| Lack of consistent policy direction from higher levels and frequent policy reversals

| ( [[#Dedekorkut-Howes--2020|Dedekorkut-Howes et al., 2020]] )

|-
| Conflicts between community-based initiatives, city councils and business interests

| ( [[#Forino--2019|Forino et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Different framings of adaptation between local governments (risk) and community groups (vulnerability, transformation)

| ( [[#Smith--2015|Smith et al., 2015]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2017|Schlosberg et al., 2017]] ; [[#McClure--2018|McClure and Baker, 2018]] )

|-
| Competing planning objectives

| ( [[#McClure--2018|McClure and Baker, 2018]] )

|-
| Divergent perceptions of risk concepts

| ( [[#Button--2015|Button and Harvey, 2015]] ; [[#Mills--2016b|Mills et al., 2016b]] ; [[#Tonmoy--2018|Tonmoy et al., 2018]] )

|-
| Focus on climate variability rather than climate change

| ( [[#Dedekorkut-Howes--2017|Dedekorkut-Howes and Vickers, 2017]] )

|-
| Low prioritisation of climate change adaptation among competing institutional objectives

| ( [[#Glavovic--2014|Glavovic and Smith, 2014]] ; [[#Lawrence--2015|Lawrence et al., 2015]] ; [[#McClure--2018|McClure and Baker, 2018]] )

|-
| Constraints in using new knowledge

| ( [[#Temby--2016|Temby et al., 2016]] )

|-
| Lack of institutional and professional capabilities and capacity (e.g., to monitor and evaluate adaptation outcomes)

| ( [[#Lawrence--2015|Lawrence et al., 2015]] ; [[#Scott--2021|Scott and Moloney, 2021]] )

|-
| Lack of understanding of Indigenous knowledge and practices

| ( [[#Parsons--2019|Parsons et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Lack of authority and political legitimacy

| ( [[#Hayward--2008|Hayward, 2008]] ; [[#Boston--2018|Boston and Lawrence, 2018]] ; [[#CCATWG--2018|CCATWG, 2018]] ; [[#Parsons--2019|Parsons et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Fear of litigation

| (Tombs et al., 2018; [[#Iorns%20Magallanes--2019|Iorns Magallanes and Watts, 2019]] ; [[#O’Donnell--2019|O’Donnell et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Upfront costs of adaptation relative to competing demands on government expenditure

| ( [[#Gawith--2020|Gawith et al., 2020]] ; [[#Warren-Myers--2020b|Warren-Myers et al., 2020b]] )

|-
| '''''Private sector'''''

|
|-
| Governance and policy uncertainty, lack of cross-sector coordination, lack of capital investment in climate solutions

| ( [[#CCATWG--2017|CCATWG, 2017]] ; [[#Forino--2017|Forino et al., 2017]] ; [[#IGCC--2021a|IGCC, 2021a]] )

|-
| Inconsistent hazard information and incomplete understanding of adaptation

| ( [[#CCATWG--2017|CCATWG, 2017]] ; [[#Harvey--2019|Harvey, 2019]] )

|-
| Mismatch in duration of insurance cover (annual) lending (decades) and infrastructure and housing investment (50–100 years)

| ( [[#Storey--2017|Storey and Noy, 2017]] ; [[#O’Donnell--2020|O’Donnell, 2020]] )

|-
| Perceived unaffordability of adaptation, lack of client demand and awareness of climate change risks and limited and inconsistent climate risk regulation in the construction industry

| ( [[#Hurlimann--2008|Hurlimann, 2008]] ; [[#Hurlimann--2018|Hurlimann et al., 2018]] )

|-
| Translating information into organisations to address disinterest among clients in the property industry

| ( [[#Warren-Myers--2020b|Warren-Myers et al., 2020b]] ; [[#Warren-Myers--2020a|Warren-Myers et al., 2020a]] )

|-
| Erosion of adaptive capacity and challenges of transformational adaptation in agriculture and rural communities

| ( [[#Jakku--2016|Jakku et al., 2016]] )

|-
| '''''Communities'''''

|
|-
| Nature of government engagement with communities

| ( [[#Public%20Participation--2014|Public Participation, 2014]] ; [[#MfE--2017a|MfE, 2017a]] ; [[#Archie--2018|Archie et al., 2018]] ; [[#OECD--2019b|OECD, 2019b]] )

|-
| Lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities

| ( [[#Gorddard--2016|Gorddard et al., 2016]] ; [[#Elrick-Barr--2017|Elrick-Barr et al., 2017]] ; [[#Goode--2017|Goode et al., 2017]] ; [[#Waters--2018|Waters and Barnett, 2018]] )

|-
| Lack of resourcing of adaptation

| ( [[#Singh-Peterson--2015|Singh-Peterson et al., 2015]] ; [[#Lukasiewicz--2017|Lukasiewicz et al., 2017]] ; [[#Brookfield--2018|Brookfield and Fitzgerald, 2018]] )

|-
| Lack of deep engagement with climate change

| ( [[#Kench--2018|Kench et al., 2018]] ; [[#Pearce--2018|Pearce, 2018]] )

|-
| Diverging perceptions, values and goals within communities

| ( [[#Austin--2018|Austin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Fitzgerald--2019|Fitzgerald et al., 2019]] ; [[#Marshall--2019|Marshall et al., 2019]] )

|-
| Inequities within and between communities

| ( [[#Eriksen--2014|Eriksen, 2014]] ; [[#Parkinson--2019|Parkinson, 2019]] )

|-
| Lack of sustained engagement, learning and trust between community, scientists and policy makers

| ( [[#Serrao-Neumann--2020|Serrao-Neumann et al., 2020]] )

|}

Communities’ vulnerabilities are dynamic and uneven ( ''high confidence'' ). In Australia, 435,000 people in remote areas face particular challenges ( [[#CoA--2020e|CoA, 2020e]] ). Some groups do not have the time, resources or opportunity to participate in formal adaptation planning as it is currently organised ( [[#Victorian%20Council%20of%20Social%20Service--2016|Victorian Council of Social Service, 2016]] ; [[#Tschakert--2017|Tschakert et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mathew--2018|Mathew et al., 2018]] ). Linguistically diverse groups can be disadvantaged by social isolation, language barriers and others’ ignorance of the knowledge and skills they can bring to adaptation ( [[#Shepherd--2014|Shepherd and van Vuuren, 2014]] ; Dun et al., 2018) (11.1.2). Social, cultural and economic vulnerabilities, biases and injustices, such as those faced by many women ( [[#Eriksen--2014|Eriksen, 2014]] ; [[#Parkinson--2019|Parkinson, 2019]] ) and non-heterosexual groups and gender minorities ( [[#Dominey-Howes--2016|Dominey-Howes et al., 2016]] ; [[#Gorman-Murray--2017|Gorman-Murray et al., 2017]] ), can deepen impacts and impede adaptation; ( [[#Fitzgerald--2019|Fitzgerald et al., 2019]] ; [[#Marshall--2019|Marshall et al., 2019]] ) (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18).

Potential biophysical limits to adaptation for non-human species and ecosystems where impacts are projected to be irreversible, with limited scope for adaptation, are signalled in key risks 1–4 (11.6). In some human systems, fundamental limits to adaptation include thermal thresholds and safe freshwater ( [[#Alston--2018|Alston et al., 2018]] ) (Table 11.14) and the inability of some low-lying coastal communities to adapt in place (Box 11.6) ( ''very high confidence'' ). Some individuals and communities are already reaching their psycho-social adaptation limits ( [[#Evans--2016|Evans et al., 2016]] ). A lack of robust and timely adaptation means key risks will increasingly manifest as impacts, and numerous systems, communities and institutions are projected to reach limits (Table 11.14, Figure 11.6), compounding current adaptation deficits and undermining society’s capacity to adapt to future impacts ( ''very high confidence'' ).

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[[File:3b215465f7952009dc52951b26738d4d IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_11_006.png]]

'''Figure 11.6 |''' '''Burning embers diagram for each of the nine key risks for low and moderate adaptation.''' The risk categories are undetectable, moderate, high and very high. While there is no risk category beyond very high, risks obviously get worse with further global warming, and the risk for coral reefs is already very high. The assessment is based on available literature and expert judgement, summarised in Table 11.14 and described in Supplementary Material SM 11.2. The global warming range associated with each risk transition has a confidence rating ( ''**** very high, *** high, ** moderate, * low'' ) based on the amount of evidence and level of agreement between lines of evidence

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