Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.9.1 Consequences of Climate-Change-Driven Impacts, Risks and Adaptation Emerging in Other Parts of the World for Europe ===

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Recent literature ( [[#Wenz--2016|Wenz and Levermann, 2016]] ; [[#Hedlund--2018|Hedlund et al., 2018]] ; [[#Benzie--2019|Benzie et al., 2019]] ) strengthens the confidence in the AR5 statement that ‘with increasing globalisation, the impacts of climate change outside the European region are ''likely'' to have implications for countries within the region’ ( [[#Kovats--2014|Kovats et al., 2014]] ). The exposure of European countries to trans-European climate impact and risk pathways varies depending on their territorial settings, national policies and position in the global supply chain ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Berry--2015|Berry et al., 2015]] ; [[#Hedlund--2018|Hedlund et al., 2018]] ; [[#Benzie--2019|Benzie et al., 2019]] ). There is ''limited evidence'' that Europe is more exposed to inter-regional risks than North America, and less than Africa and Asia ( [[#Hedlund--2018|Hedlund et al., 2018]] ). The social and governance context in Europe make the region less vulnerable to conflicts driven by climate change than other regions, at least up to 2°C GWL ( [[#Buhaug--2014|Buhaug et al., 2014]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ).

Climate risks in other parts of the world can be transmitted to European economies via trade networks (Figure 13.25). European agricultural imports exert a high water footprint in originating countries already today ( [[#Dolganova--2019|Dolganova et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ercin--2019|Ercin et al., 2019]] ), and some crop imports, such as tropical fruits, are highly vulnerable to future climate change ( [[#Brás--2019|Brás et al., 2019]] ). Simultaneous breadbasket failures, and trade restrictions, increase risks to food supply ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Fellmann--2014|Fellmann et al., 2014]] ; [[#d’Amour--2016|d’Amour et al., 2016]] ; [[#Gaupp--2017|Gaupp et al., 2017]] ; [[#Gaupp--2020|Gaupp et al., 2020]] ). There is ''high confidence'' that the European economy could be negatively affected by supply chain disruptions due to flooding destroying facilities, heatwaves and malaria reducing productivity in labour-intensive industries and regions ( [[#13.7.1|Section 13.7.1]] ), and SLR affecting ports and cities along coastlines ( [[#13.6.1.2|Section 13.6.1.2]] ; [[#Nicholls--2012|Nicholls and Kebede, 2012]] ; Challinor, 2016; [[#Wenz--2016|Wenz and Levermann, 2016]] ; [[#Hedlund--2018|Hedlund et al., 2018]] ; [[#Koks--2018|Koks, 2018]] ; [[#Szewczyk--2018|Szewczyk et al., 2018]] ; [[#Willner--2018|Willner et al., 2018]] ; [[#Knittel--2020|Knittel et al., 2020]] ; [[#Kulmer--2020|Kulmer et al., 2020]] ; [[#Carter--2021|Carter et al., 2021]] ).

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'''Figure 13.25 |''' '''Trans-European climate risks in trade: virtual water flows embodied in agricultural imports to Europe in 2018 and the vulnerability to climate change of the most important crops in the originating countries''' ''(Dolganova et al., 2019; [[#Ercin--2019|Ercin et al., 2019]] )''

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