Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-7 (section)

== CCB 13 Indigenous and local knowledge (ILK) ==

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John Morton (United Kingdom), Fatima Denton (The Gambia), James Ford (United Kingdom), Joyce Kimutai (Kenya), Pamela McElwee (The United States of America), Marta Rivera Ferre (Spain), Lindsay Stringer (United Kingdom).

Indigenous and local knowledge (ILK) can play a key role in climate change adaptation ( ''high confidence'' ) (Mapfumo et al. 2017; Nyong et al. 2007; Green and Raygorodetsky 2010; Speranza et al. 2010; Alexander et al. 2011; Leonard et al. 2013; Nakashima et al. 2013; Tschakert 2007). The Summary for Policymakers of the Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014b, p. 26) states that ‘Indigenous, local, and traditional knowledge systems and practices, including indigenous peoples’ holistic view of community and environment, are a major resource for adapting to climate change, but these have not been used consistently in existing adaptation efforts. Integrating such forms of knowledge with existing practices increases the effectiveness of adaptation’ (see also Ford et al. 2016). The IPCC’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR15) (IPCC 2018a; de Coninck et al. 2018) confirms the effectiveness and potential feasibility of adaptation options based on ILK, but also raises concerns that such knowledge systems are being threatened by multiple socio-economic and environmental drivers ( ''high confidence'' ). The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) Land Degradation and Restoration Assessment (IPBES 2018) finds the same – that ILK can support adaptation to land degradation, but is threatened.

A variety of terminology has been used to describe ILK: indigenous knowledge, local knowledge, traditional knowledge, traditional ecological knowledge, and other terms are used in overlapping and often inconsistent ways (Naess 2013). SR15 (IPCC 2018a) reserves ‘indigenous knowledge’ for culturally distinctive ways of knowing associated with ‘societies with long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings’, while using ‘local knowledge’ for ‘understandings and skills developed by individuals and populations, specific to the places where they live’, but not all research studies observe this distinction. This Special Report generally uses ILK as a combined term for these forms of knowledge, but in some sections the terminology used follows that from the research literature assessed.

In contrast to scientific knowledge, ILK is context-specific, collective, transmitted informally, and is multi-functional (Mistry and Berardi 2016; Naess 2013; Janif et al. 2016). Persson et al. (2018) characterise ILK as ‘practical experience’, as locally held knowledges are acquired through processes of experience and interaction with the surrounding physical world. ILK is embedded in local institutions (Naess 2013) and in cultural aspects of landscape and food systems (Fuller and Qingwen 2013; Koohafkan and Altieri 2011). ILK can encompass such diverse content as factual information about the environment, guidance on rights and management, value statements about interactions with others, and cosmologies and worldviews that influence how information is perceived and acted on, among other topics (Spoon 2014; Usher 2000).

This cross-chapter box assesses evidence for the positive role of ILK in understanding climate change and other environmental processes, and in managing land sustainably in the face of climate change, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity. It also assesses constraints on and threats to the use of ILK in these challenges, and processes by which ILK can be incorporated in decision-making and governance processes.

'''ILK in understanding and responding to climate change impacts'''

ILK can play a role in understanding climate change and other environmental processes, particularly where formal data collection is sparse (Alexander et al. 2011; Schick et al. 2018), and can contribute to accurate predictions of impending environmental change (Green and Raygorodetsky 2010; Orlove et al. 2010) ( ''medium confidence'' ). At both global level (Alexander et al. 2011; Green and Raygorodetsky 2010), and local level (Speranza et al. 2010; Ayanlade et al. 2017), strong correlations between local perceptions of climate change and meteorological data have been shown, as calendars, almanacs, and other seasonal and interannual systems knowledge embedded in ILK hold information about environmental baselines (Orlove et al. 2010; Cochran et al. 2016).

ILK is strongly associated with sustainable management of natural resources, (including land), and with autonomous adaptation to climate variability and change, while also serving as a resource for externally-facilitated adaptation (Stringer et al. 2009). For example, women’s traditional knowledge adds value to a society’s knowledge base and supports climate change adaptation practices (Lane and McNaught 2009). In dryland environments, populations have historically demonstrated remarkable resilience and innovation to cope with high climatic variability, manage dynamic interactions between local communities and ecosystems, and sustain livelihoods (Safriel and Adeel 2008; Davies 2017). There is ''high confidence'' that pastoralists have created formal and informal institutions based on ILK for regulating grazing, collection and cutting of herbs and wood, and use of forests across the Middle East and North Africa (Louhaichi and Tastad 2010; Domínguez 2014; Auclair et al. 2011), Mongolia (Fernandez-Gimenez 2000), the Horn of Africa (Oba 2013) and the Sahel (Krätli and Schareika 2010). Herders in both the Horn of Africa and the Sahel have developed complex livestock breeding and selection systems for their dryland environment (Krätli 2008; Fre 2018). Numerous traditional water harvesting techniques are used across the drylands to adapt to climate variability: planting pits ( ''zai, ngoro'' ) and micro-basins and contouring hill slopes and terracing (Biazin et al. 2012), alongside the traditional ''ndiva'' water harvesting system in Tanzania to capture runoff in community- managed micro-dams for small-scale irrigation (Enfors and Gordon 2008).

Across diverse agro-ecological systems, ILK is the basis for traditional practices to manage the landscape and sustain food production, while delivering co-benefits in the form of biodiversity and ecosystem resilience at a landscape scale ( ''high confidence'' ). Flexibility and adaptiveness are hallmarks of such systems (Richards 1985a; Biggs et al. 2013), and documented examples include: traditional integrated watershed management in the Philippines (Camacho et al. 2016); widespread use of terracing, with benefits, in cases of both intensifying and decreasing rainfall (Arnáez et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2017b) and management of water harvesting and local irrigation systems in the Indo-Gangetic Plains (Rivera-Ferre et al. 2016). Rice cultivation in East Borneo is sustained by traditional forms of shifting cultivation, often involving intercropping of rice with bananas, cassava and other food crops (Siahaya et al. 2016), although the use of fire in land clearance implies trade-offs for climate change mitigation which have been sparsely assessed. Indigenous practices for enhanced soil fertility have been documented among South Asian farmers (Chandra et al. 2011; Dey and Sarkar 2011) and among Mayan farmers, where management of carbon has positive impacts on mitigation (Falkowski et al. 2016). Korean traditional groves or ‘bibosoop’ have been shown to reduce wind speed and evaporation in agricultural landscapes (Koh et al. 2010). Particularly in the context of changing climates, agriculture based on ILK that focuses on biodiversification, soil management, and sustainable water harvesting holds promise for long-term resilience (Altieri and Nicholls 2017) and rehabilitation of degraded land (Maikhuri et al. 1997). ILK is also important in other forms of ecosystem management, such as forests and wetlands, which may be conserved by efforts such as sacred sites (Ens et al. 2015; Pungetti et al. 2012). ILK can also play an important role in ecological restoration efforts, including for carbon sinks, through knowledge surrounding species selection and understanding of ecosystem processes, like fire (Kimmerer 2000).

'''Constraints on the use of ILK'''

Use of ILK as a resource in responding to climate change can be constrained in at least three ways ( ''high confidence'' ). First, the rate of climate change and the scale of its impacts may render incremental adaptation based on the ILK of smallholders and others, less relevant and less effective (Lane and McNaught 2009; Orlowsky and Seneviratne 2012; Huang et al. 2016; Morton 2017). Second, maintenance and transmission of ILK across generations may be disrupted, for example, by formal education, missionary activity, livelihood diversification away from agriculture, and a general perception that ILK is outdated and unfavourably contrasted with scientific knowledge (Speranza et al. 2010), and by HIV-related mortality (White and Morton 2005). Urbanisation can erode ILK, although ILK is constantly evolving, and becoming integrated into urban environments (Júnior et al. 2016; Oteros-Rozas et al. 2013; van Andel and Carvalheiro 2013). Third, ILK holders are experiencing difficulty in using ILK due to loss of access to resources, such as through large-scale land acquisition (Siahaya et al. 2016; Speranza et al. 2010; de Coninck et al. 2018). The increasing globalisation of food systems and integration into global market economy also threatens to erode ILK (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Oteros-Rozas et al. 2013; McCarter et al. 2014). The potential role that ILK can play in adaptation at the local level depends on the configuration of a policy–institutions–knowledge nexus (Stringer et al. 2018), which includes power relations across levels and interactions with government strategies (Alexander et al. 2011; Naess 2013).

'''Incorporation of ILK in decision-making'''

ILK can be used in decision-making on climate change adaptation, sustainable land management (SLM) and food security at various scales and levels, and is important for long-term sustainability ( ''high confidence'' ). Respect for ILK is both a requirement and an entry strategy for participatory climate action planning and effective communication of climate action strategies (Nyong et al. 2007). The nature, source, and mode of knowledge generation are critical to ensure that sustainable solutions are community-owned and fully integrated within the local context (Mistry and Berardi 2016). Integrating ILK with scientific information is a prerequisite for such community-owned solutions. Scientists can engage farmers as experts in processes of knowledge co-production (Oliver et al. 2012), helping to introduce, implement, adapt and promote locally appropriate responses (Schwilch et al. 2011). Specific approaches to decision-making that aim to integrate indigenous and local knowledge include some versions of decision support systems (Jones et al. 2014) as well as citizen science and participatory modelling (Tengö et al. 2014).

ILK can be deployed in the practice of climate governance, especially at the local level where actions are informed by the principles of decentralisation and autonomy (Chanza and de Wit 2016; Harmsworth and Awatere 2013). International environmental agreements are also increasingly including attention to ILK and diverse cultural perspectives, for reasons of social justice and inclusive decision- making (Brondizio and Tourneau 2016). However, the context-specific, and dynamic nature of ILK and its embeddedness in local institutions and power relations needs consideration (Naess 2013). It is also important to take a gendered approach so as not to further marginalise certain knowledge, as men and women hold different knowledge, expertise and transmission patterns (Díaz- Reviriego et al. 2017).

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=== 7.6.5 Land tenure ===

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Land tenure, defined as ‘the terms under which land and natural resources are held by individuals, households or social groups’, is a key dimension in any discussion of land–climate interactions, including the prospects for both adaptation and land-based mitigation, and possible impacts on tenure and thus land security of both climate change and climate action (Quan and Dyer 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1468|1468]]</sup> ) ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ).

Discussion of land tenure in the context of land–climate interactions in developing countries needs to consider the prevalence of informal, customary and modified customary systems of land tenure: estimates range widely, but perhaps as much as 65% of the world’s total land area is managed under some form of these local, customary or communal tenure systems, and only a small fraction of this (around 15%) is formally recognised by governments (Rights and Resources Initiative 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r1469|1469]]</sup> ). These customary land rights can extend across many categories of land, but are difficult to assess properly due to poor reporting, lack of legal recognition, and lack of access to reporting systems by indigenous and rural peoples (Rights and Resources Initiative 2018a <sup>[[#fn:r1470|1470]]</sup> ). Around 521 million ha of forest land is estimated to be legally owned, recognised, or designated for use by indigenous and local communities as of 2017 (Rights and Resources Initiative 2018b <sup>[[#fn:r1471|1471]]</sup> ), predominantly in Latin America, followed by Asia. However, in India approximately 40 million ha of forest land is managed under customary rights not recognised by the government (Rights and Resources Initiative 2015b <sup>[[#fn:r1472|1472]]</sup> ). In 2005 only 1% of land in Africa was legally registered (Easterly 2008a <sup>[[#fn:r1473|1473]]</sup> ).

Much of the world’s carbon is stored in the biomass and soil on the territories of customary landowners, including indigenous peoples (Walker et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1474|1474]]</sup> ; Garnett et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1475|1475]]</sup> ), making securing of these land tenure regimes vital in land and climate protection. These lands are estimated to hold at least 293 GtC of carbon, of which around one-third (72 GtC) is located in areas where indigenous peoples and local communities lack formal recognition of their tenure rights (Frechette et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1476|1476]]</sup> ).

Understanding the interactions between land tenure and climate change has to be based on underlying understanding of land tenure and land policy and how they relate to sustainable development, especially in low- and middle-income countries: such understandings have changed considerably over the last three decades, and now show that informal or customary systems can provide secure tenure (Toulmin and Quan 2000 <sup>[[#fn:r1477|1477]]</sup> ). For smallholder systems, Bruce and Migot- Adholla (1994) <sup>[[#fn:r1478|1478]]</sup> (among other authors) established that African customary tenure can provide the necessary security for long-term investments in farm fertility such as tree-planting. For pastoral systems, Behnke (1994) <sup>[[#fn:r1479|1479]]</sup> , Lane and Moorehead (1995) <sup>[[#fn:r1480|1480]]</sup> and other authors showed the rationality of communal tenure in situations of environmental variability and herd mobility. However, where customary systems are unrecognised or weakened by governments, or the rights from them are undocumented or unenforced, tenure insecurity may result (Lane 1998 <sup>[[#fn:r1481|1481]]</sup> ; Toulmin and Quan 2000 <sup>[[#fn:r1482|1482]]</sup> ). There is strong empirical evidence of the links between secure communal tenure and lower deforestation rates, particularly for intact forests (Nepstad et al. 2006 <sup>[[#fn:r1483|1483]]</sup> ; Persha et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1484|1484]]</sup> ; Vergara-Asenjo and Potvin 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1485|1485]]</sup> ). Securing and recognising tenure for indigenous communities (such as through revisions to legal or policy frameworks) has been shown to be highly cost effective in reducing deforestation and improving land management in certain contexts, and is therefore also apt to help improve indigenous communities’ ability to adapt to climate changes (Suzuki 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1486|1486]]</sup> ; Balooni et al. 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1487|1487]]</sup> ; Ceddia et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1488|1488]]</sup> ; Pacheco et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1489|1489]]</sup> ; Holland et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1490|1490]]</sup> ).

Rights to water for agriculture or livestock are linked to land tenure in complex ways still little understood and neglected by policymakers and planners (Cotula 2006a). Provision of water infrastructure tends to increase land values, but irrigation schemes often entail reallocation of land rights (Cotula 2006b <sup>[[#fn:r1491|1491]]</sup> ) and new inequalities based on water availability such as the creation of a category of tailenders (farmers at the downstream end of distribution channels) in large- scale irrigation (Chambers 1988 <sup>[[#fn:r1492|1492]]</sup> ) and disruption of pastoral grazing patterns through use of riverine land (Behnke and Kerven 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1493|1493]]</sup> ).

Understanding land tenure under climate change also has to take account of the growth in large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs), also referred to as land-grabbing, in developing countries. These LSLAs are defined by acquisition of more than 200 ha per deal (Messerli et al. 2014a <sup>[[#fn:r1494|1494]]</sup> ). Klaus Deininger (2011) links the growth in demand for land to the 2007–2008 food price spike, and demonstrates that high levels of demand for land at the country level are statistically associated with weak recognition of land rights. Land grabs, where LSLAs occur despite local use of lands, are often driven by direct collaboration of politicians, government officials and land agencies (Koechlin et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1495|1495]]</sup> ), involving corruption of governmental land agencies, failures to register community land claims and illegal lands uses, and lack of the rule of law and enforcement in resource extraction frontiers (Borras Jr et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1496|1496]]</sup> ). Though data is poor, overall, small- and medium-scale domestic investment has in fact been more important than foreign investment (Deininger 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1497|1497]]</sup> ; Cotula et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1498|1498]]</sup> ). There are variations in estimates of the scale of LSLAs: Nolte et al. (2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1499|1499]]</sup> concluded that deals totalled 42.2 million ha worldwide. Cotula et al. (2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1500|1500]]</sup> using cross-checked data for completed lease agreements in Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania conclude that they cover 1.9%, 1.9% and 1.1% respectively of each country’s total land suitable for agriculture. The literature expresses different views on whether these acquisitions concern marginal lands or lands already in use, thereby displacing existing users (Messerli et al. 2014b <sup>[[#fn:r1501|1501]]</sup> ). Land-grabbing is associated with, and may be motivated by, the acquisition of rights to water, and erosion of those rights for other users such as those downstream (Mehta et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1502|1502]]</sup> ). Quantification of the acquisition of water rights resulting from LSLAs raises major issues of definition, data availability, and measurement. One estimate of the total acquisition of gross irrigation water associated with land-grabbing across the 24 countries most affected is 280 billion m3 (Rulli et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1503|1503]]</sup> ).

While some authors see LSLAs as investments that can contribute to more efficient food production at larger scales (World Bank 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1504|1504]]</sup> ; Deininger and Byerlee 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1505|1505]]</sup> ), others have warned that local food security may be threatened by them (Daniel 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1506|1506]]</sup> ; Golay and Biglino 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1507|1507]]</sup> ; Lavers 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1508|1508]]</sup> ). Reports suggest that recent land-grabbing has affected 12 million people globally in terms of declines in welfare (Adnan 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1509|1509]]</sup> ; Davis et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1510|1510]]</sup> ). De Schutter (2011) <sup>[[#fn:r1511|1511]]</sup> argues that large-scale land acquisitions will: a) result in types of farming less liable to reduce poverty than smallholder systems, b) increase local vulnerability to food price shocks by favouring export agriculture and c) accelerate the development of a market for land, with detrimental impacts on smallholders and those depending on common property resources. Land-grabbing can threaten not only agricultural lands of farmers, but also protected ecosystems, like forests and wetlands (Hunsberger et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1512|1512]]</sup> ; Carter et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1513|1513]]</sup> ; Ehara et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1514|1514]]</sup> ).

The primary mechanisms for combating LSLAs have included restrictions on the size of land sales (Fairbairn 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1515|1515]]</sup> ), pressure on agribusiness companies to agree to Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, known as VGGT, or similar principles (Collins 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1516|1516]]</sup> ; Goetz 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1517|1517]]</sup> ), attempts to repeal biofuels standards (Palmer 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1518|1518]]</sup> ), strengthening of existing land law and land registration systems (Bebbington et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1519|1519]]</sup> ), use of community monitoring systems (Sheil et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1520|1520]]</sup> ), and direct protests against land acquisitions (Hall et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1521|1521]]</sup> ; Fameree 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1522|1522]]</sup> ).

Table 7.7 sets out, in highly summarised form, some key findings on the multi-directional inter-relations between land tenure and climate change, with particular reference to developing countries. The rows represent different categories of landscape or resource systems. For each system the second column summarises current understandings on land tenure and sustainable development, in many cases predating concerns over climate change. The third column summarises the most important implications of land tenure systems, policy about land tenure, and the implementation of that policy, for vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, and the fourth column gives a similar summary for mitigation of climate change. The fifth column summarises key findings on how climate change and climate action (both adaptation and mitigation) will impact land tenure, and the final column, findings on implications of climate change for evolving land policy.

In drylands, weak land tenure security, either for households disadvantaged within a customary tenure system or more widely as such a system is eroded, can be associated with increased vulnerability and decreased adaptive capacity ( ''limited evidence, high agreement'' ). There is ''medium evidence'' and ''medium agreement'' that land titling and recognition programmes, particularly those that authorise and respect indigenous and communal tenure, can lead to improved management of forests, including for carbon storage (Suzuki 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1523|1523]]</sup> ; Balooni et al. 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1524|1524]]</sup> ; Ceddia et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1525|1525]]</sup> ; Pacheco et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1526|1526]]</sup> ), primarily by providing legally secure mechanisms for exclusion of others (Nelson et al. 2001 <sup>[[#fn:r1527|1527]]</sup> ; Blackman et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1528|1528]]</sup> ). However, these titling programmes are highly context-dependent and there is also evidence that titling can exclude community and common management, leading to more confusion over land rights, not less, where poorly implemented (Broegaard et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1529|1529]]</sup> ). For all the systems, an important finding is that land policies can provide both security and flexibility in the face of climate change, but through a diversity of forms and approaches (recognition of customary tenure, community mapping, redistribution, decentralisation, co-management, regulation of rental markets, strengthening the negotiating position of the poor) rather than sole focus on freehold title ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) (Quan and Dyer, 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1530|1530]]</sup> ; Deininger and Feder 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1531|1531]]</sup> ; St. Martin 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1532|1532]]</sup> ). Land policy can be climate-proofed and integrated with national policies such as National Adaptation Programme of Action NAPAs (Quan and Dyer 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1533|1533]]</sup> ). Land administration systems have a vital role in providing land tenure security, especially for the poor, especially when linked to an expanded range of information relevant to mitigation and adaptation (Quan and Dyer 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1534|1534]]</sup> ; van der Molen and Mitchell 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1535|1535]]</sup> ). Challenges to such a role include outdated and overlapping national land and forest tenure laws, which often fail to recognise community property rights and corruption in land administration (Monterrosso et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1536|1536]]</sup> ), as well as lack of political will and the costs of improving land administration programmes (Deininger and Feder 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1537|1537]]</sup> ).

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'''Table 7.7'''

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'''Major findings on the interactions between land tenure and climate change.'''
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=== 7.6.6 Institutional dimensions of adaptive governance ===

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Institutional systems that demonstrate the institutional dimensions, or indicators (Table 7.8) enhance the adaptive capacity of the socio-ecological system to a greater degree than institutional systems that do not demonstrate these dimensions ( ''high confidence'' ) (Gupta et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r1538|1538]]</sup> ; Mollenkamp and Kasten 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1539|1539]]</sup> ). Governance processes and policy instruments supporting these characteristics are context specific ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) (Biermann 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r1540|1540]]</sup> ; Gunderson and Holling 2001 <sup>[[#fn:r1541|1541]]</sup> ; Hurlbert and Gupta 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1542|1542]]</sup> ; Bastos Lima et al. 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r1543|1543]]</sup> ; Gupta et al. 2013a <sup>[[#fn:r1544|1544]]</sup> ; Mollenkamp and Kasten 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1545|1545]]</sup> ; Nelson et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r1546|1546]]</sup> ; Olsson et al. 2006 <sup>[[#fn:r1547|1547]]</sup> ; Ostrom 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1548|1548]]</sup> ; Pahl-Wostl 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1549|1549]]</sup> ; Verweij et al. 2006 <sup>[[#fn:r1550|1550]]</sup> ; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001 <sup>[[#fn:r1551|1551]]</sup> ).

Consideration of these indicators is important when implementing climate change mitigation instruments. For example, a ‘variety,’ redundancy, or duplication of climate mitigation policy instruments is an important consideration for meeting Paris Agreement commitments. Given that 58% of EU emissions are outside of the EU Emissions Trading System, implementation of a ‘redundant’ carbon tax may add co-benefits (Baranzini et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1552|1552]]</sup> ). Further, a carbon tax phased in over time through a schedule of increases allows for ‘learning.’ The tax revenues could be earmarked to finance additional climate change mitigation and/or redistributed to achieve the indicator of ‘fair governance – equity’. It is recommended that carbon pricing measures be implemented using information-sharing and communication devices to enable public acceptance, openness, provide measurement and accountability (Baranzini et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1553|1553]]</sup> ; Siegmeier et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1554|1554]]</sup> ).

The impact of flood on a socio-ecological system is reduced with the governance indicator of both leadership and resources (Emerson and Gerlak 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1555|1555]]</sup> ).‘Leadership’ pertains to a broad set of stakeholders that facilitate adaptation (and might include scientists and leaders in NGOs) and those that respond to flood in an open, inclusive, and fair manner identifying the most pressing issues and actions needed. Resources are required to support this leadership and includes upfront financial investment in human capital, technology, and infrastructure (Emerson and Gerlak 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1556|1556]]</sup> ).

Policy instruments advancing the indicator of ‘participation’ in community forest management include favourable loans, tax measures, and financial support to catalyse entrepreneurial leadership, and build in rewards for supportive and innovative elites to reduce elite capture and ensure more inclusive participation (Duguma et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1557|1557]]</sup> ) (Section 7.6.4).

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<span id="table-7.8"></span>
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'''Table 7.8'''

<span id="institutional-dimensions-or-indicators-of-adaptive-governance."></span>
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'''Institutional dimensions or indicators of adaptive governance.'''

This table represents a summation of characteristics, evaluative criteria, elements, indicators or institutional design principles that advance adaptive governance.
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[[File:9f31618e286feca3f01da19695e151d2 table-7.8-1.png]]

Sources: 1) Binswanger et al. 1995; 2) Schlager and Ostrom 1992; 3) Toulmin and Quan 2000; 4) Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994; 5) Easterly 2008; 6) McCall and Dunn 2012; 7) Maxwell and Wiebe 1999; 8) Holden and Ghebru 2016; 9) Corsi et al. 2017; 10) Quan et al. 2017; 11) Harvey et al. 2014; 12) Antwi-Agyei et al. 2015; 13) Balehegn 2015; 14) Friis and Nielsen, 2016; 15) Scherr et al. 2012; 16) Barbier and Tesfaw 2012; 17) Mitchell 2010; 18) Sunderlin et al. 2018; 19) Behnke 1994; 20) Lane and Moorehead 1995; 21) Davies et al. 2015; 22) Morton 2007; 23) López-i-Gelats et al. 2016; 24) Oba 1994; 25) Fraser et al. 2011; 26) Dougill et al. 2011; 27) Roncoli et al. 2007; 28) Tennigkeit and Wilkes 2008; 29) Adano et al. 2012; 30) Agrawal et al. 2008; 31) Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009; 32) Gabay and Alam, 2017; 33) Holland et al. 2017; 34) Larson and Pulhin, 2012; 35) Pagdee et al. 2006; 36) Robinson et al. 2014; 37) Blackman et al. 2017; 38) Nelson et al. 2001; 39) Ramnath 2008; 40) Suzuki 2012; 41) Balooni et al. 2008; 42) Ceddia et al. 2015; 43) Pacheco et al. 2012; 44) Garnett et al. 2013; 45) Clover and Eriksen, 2009; 46) Damnyag et al. 2012; 47) Finley-Brook 2007; 48) Robinson et al. 2014; 49) Stickler et al. 2017; 50) Romijn 2011; 51) Aha and Ayitey 2017; 52) Payne 2001; 53) Barbedo et al. 2015; 54) Zhao et al. 2018; 55) Satterthwaite et al. 2018; 56) Mitchell et al. 2015; 57) Satterthwaite 2007; 58) Thomas 1996; 59) Welcomme et al. 2010; 60) Silvano and Valbo-Jørgensen 2008; 61) Biermann et al. 2012; 62) Abbott et al. 2007; 63) Béné et al. 2011; 64) McGrath et al. 1993; 65) Barkat et al. 2001; 66) FAO 2015; 67) Hall et al. 2013; 68) Berkes 2001; 69) ISO 2017; 70) Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997; 71) Baird and Dearden 2003; 72) Béné et al. 2010.

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=== 7.6.7 Inclusive governance for sustainable development ===

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Many sustainable development efforts fail because of lack of attention to societal issues, including inequality, discrimination, social exclusion and marginalisation (see Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this chapter) (Arts 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r1558|1558]]</sup> ). However, the human-rights-based approach of the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals commits to leaving no one behind (Arts 2017b). Inclusive governance focuses attention in issues of equity and the human-rights-based approach for development as it includes social, ecological and relational components used for assessing access to, as well as the allocations of rights, responsibilities and risks with respect to social and ecological resources ( ''medium agreement'' ) (Gupta and Pouw 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1559|1559]]</sup> ).

Governance processes that are inclusive of all people in decision-making and management of land, are better able to make decisions addressing trade-offs of sustainable development (Gupta et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1560|1560]]</sup> ) and achieve SDGs focusing on social and ecological inclusiveness (Gupta and Vegelin 2016). Citizen engagement is important in enhancing natural resource service delivery by citizen inclusion in management and governance decisions (Section 7.5.5). In governing natural resources, focus is now not only on rights of citizens in relation to natural resources, but also on citizen obligations, responsibilities (Karar and Jacobs-Mata 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1561|1561]]</sup> ; Chaney and Fevre 2001 <sup>[[#fn:r1562|1562]]</sup> ), feedback and learning processes (Tàbara et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r1563|1563]]</sup> ). In this respect, citizen engagement is also an imperative, particularly for

analysing and addressing aggregated informal coping strategies of local residents in developing countries, which are important drivers of natural resource depletions (but often overlooked in conventional policy development processes in natural resource management) (Ehara et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1564|1564]]</sup> ).

Inclusive adaptive governance makes important contributions to the management of risk. Inclusive governance concerning risk integrates people’s knowledge and values by involving them in decision-making processes where they are able to contribute their respective knowledge and values to make effective, efficient, fair, and morally acceptable decisions (Renn and Schweizer 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1565|1565]]</sup> ). Representation in decision-making would include major actors – government, economic sectors, the scientific community and representatives of civil society (Renn and Schweizer 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1566|1566]]</sup> ). Inclusive governance focuses attention on the well-being and meaningful participation in decision-making of the poorest (in income), vulnerable (in terms of age, gender, and location), and the most marginalised, and is inclusive of all knowledges (Gupta et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1567|1567]]</sup> ).

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