Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-12 (section)

=== 12.5.7 Poverty, Livelihood and Sustainable Development ===

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Climate-change impacts are increasing and exacerbating poverty and social inequalities, affecting those already vulnerable and disfavoured, generating new and interlinked risk and challenging climate resilient development pathways ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.2.1.4|Section 8.2.1.4]] ; [[#Shi--2016|Shi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Otto--2017|Otto et al., 2017]] ; [[#Johnson--2021|Johnson et al., 2021]] ). Poverty, high levels of inequality and pre-existing vulnerabilities can also be worsened by climate-change policies ( [[#Antwi-Agyei--2018|Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018]] ; [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC, 2018]] ; [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ; [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ). Those already suffering are losing their livelihoods and reducing their development options; poor populations and countries are more vulnerable and have lower adaptive capacity to climate change compared to rich ones ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.5.2.1|Section 8.5.2.1]] ; [[#Rao--2017|Rao et al., 2017]] ).

Inequality is growing, a CSA structural characteristic; the Gini index average for Latin American countries (including Mexico) decreased to 0.466 in 2017, where 1% of the richest got 22 times more income than 10% of the poorest ( [[#ECLAC--2019b|ECLAC, 2019b]] ; [[#Busso--2020|Busso and Messina, 2020]] ), but in 2018, 29.6% of Latin American populations were poor (which increased to 182 million) and 10.2% were living in extreme poverty; in 2018 (increased to 63 million) ( [[#ECLAC--2019b|ECLAC, 2019b]] ) and in 2020, due to the COVID crisis, the Gini coefficient projection of increases range from 1.1% to 7.8% ( [[#ECLAC%20and%20PAHO--2020|ECLAC and PAHO, 2020]] ), with poverty increasing to 33.7% (209 millions) and extreme poverty to 12.5% (78 millions) ( [[#ECLAC%20and%20PAHO--2020|ECLAC and PAHO, 2020]] ; [[#ECLAC--2021|ECLAC, 2021]] ). Those poverty and extreme poverty rates are higher among children, young people, women, Indigenous Peoples ( [[#Reckien--2017|Reckien et al., 2017]] ; [[#Busso--2020|Busso and Messina, 2020]] ), migrants ( [[#Dodman--2019|Dodman et al., 2019]] ) and rural populations. Climate change has differential impacts, and even within a household there may be important differences in relation to age, gender, health and disability; these factors may intersect with one another ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Reckien--2017|Reckien et al., 2017]] ; [[#Busso--2020|Busso and Messina, 2020]] ).

In IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR), AR4 and AR5, WGII recognised higher risks associated with poor living conditions, substandard housing, inadequate services, location of hazardous sites stemming from a lack of alternatives and the need to work more seriously on strengthening governance structures involving residents and community organisations, among others ( [[#Wilbanks--2007|Wilbanks et al., 2007]] ; [[#Revi--2014|Revi et al., 2014]] ). The AR5 CSA chapter stated that poverty levels remained high (45% for CA and 30% for SA in 2010) despite years of sustained economic growth. Poor and vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected in negative ways by climate change ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.2.1.4|Section 8.2.1.4]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.2|Section 8.2.2.3]] ; SR15 [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.2|Section 5.2]] and [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.2.1|Section 5.2.1]] , [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ) due to physical exposure derived from their place of residence or work, illiteracy, low income and skills, political and institutional marginalisation tied to a lack of recognition of informal settlements and employment, poor access to good-quality services and infrastructure, resources and information and other factors ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#UN-Habitat--2018|UN-Habitat, 2018]] ; SR15 Sections 5.2.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.6.4, [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ).

International agreements aim for climate resilient development pathways where efforts to eradicate poverty, reduce inequality and promote fair and cross-scalar adaptation and mitigation are strengthened. The first and second objectives of the SDGs aim to reduce poverty, allowing no one to fall through the cracks ( [[#UN%20General%20Assembly--2015|UN General Assembly, 2015]] ). Researchers argue that poverty is mischaracterised and has multiple dimensions ( [[#Castán%20Broto--2013|Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2013]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.1|Section 8.1.1]] ), that biodiversity loss, climate change and pollution will undermine efforts on 80% of assessed SDG targets, that biodiversity and climate change must be tackled together ( [[#Pörtner--2021|Pörtner et al., 2021]] ; [[#United%20Nations%20Environment%20Programme--2021|United Nations Environment Programme, 2021]] ) and due to the COVID crisis LAC countries have made uneven progress in terms of meeting SDGs ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#ECLAC--2020|ECLAC, 2020]] ).

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==== 12.5.7.1 Challenges and Opportunities ====

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Climate change exacerbates pre-existing vulnerability conditions and can drive societies further away from achieving resilience, equity and sustainable development ( [[#Tanner--2015b|Tanner et al., 2015b]] ; [[#Bartlett--2016|Bartlett and Satterthwaite, 2016]] ; [[#Kalikoski--2018|Kalikoski et al., 2018]] ; [[#Bárcena--2020a|Bárcena et al., 2020a]] ). Existing inequalities in the provision and consumption of services are bound to be exacerbated by future risks and uncertainties associated with climate-change scenarios ( [[#Miranda%20Sara--2017|Miranda Sara et al., 2017]] ). Climate change will be a major obstacle in reducing poverty ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Bartlett--2016|Bartlett and Satterthwaite, 2016]] ; [[#Allen--2017a|Allen et al., 2017a]] ; [[#Hallegatte--2018|Hallegatte et al., 2018]] ; [[#UN-Habitat--2018|UN-Habitat, 2018]] ; [[#United%20Nations%20Environment%20Programme--2021|United Nations Environment Programme, 2021]] ), affecting even wealthier populations that become vulnerable facing climate-change scenarios (WGI AR6 Chapter 12, [[#Ranasinghe--2021|Ranasinghe et al., 2021]] ), dragging them into poverty and erasing decades of work and asset accumulation.

CSA is highly urbanised, and the vast majority of the region’s poor live in urban areas (except in CA), while urban extreme poverty is becoming more pronounced ( [[#Rosenzweig--2018|Rosenzweig et al., 2018]] ; [[#Dodman--2019|Dodman et al., 2019]] ; [[#Almansi--2020|Almansi et al., 2020]] ; [[#Sette%20Whitaker%20Ferreira--2020|Sette Whitaker Ferreira et al., 2020]] ), with those living in informal settlements and working within informal economy being critical factors in each city’s economy ( [[#Satterthwaite--2018|Satterthwaite et al., 2018]] , 2020). Many households in the region’s cities live in precarious neighbourhoods with insufficient infrastructure and substandard housing ( [[#Adler--2018|Adler et al., 2018]] ; [[#Rojas--2019|Rojas, 2019]] ). On average, between 21% and 25% of urban populations live in informal settlements ( [[#Jaitman--2015|Jaitman, 2015]] ; [[#UN-Habitat--2015|UN-Habitat, 2015]] ; [[#Rojas--2019|Rojas, 2019]] ; [[#Sandoval--2019|Sandoval and Sarmiento, 2019]] ). This hides important disparities: Habitat III reports, by individual countries, the percentage of urban population living in informal settlements, which ranged from 5% to 60% and in absolute terms means 105 million people living in precarious conditions (106 million estimated in 1990) ( [[#12.5.5|Section 12.5.5]] ; [[#Sandoval--2019|Sandoval and Sarmiento, 2019]] ).

High levels of inequality and informality remain the biggest challenges in terms of adaptation measures being effective ( [[#Rosenzweig--2018|Rosenzweig et al., 2018]] ; [[#Dodman--2019|Dodman et al., 2019]] ). The interaction of projected impacts with existing vulnerabilities in the region (such as hunger, malnutrition and health inequalities, arising from the region’s social, economic and demographic profile) affects CSA development and well-being in different ways ( [[#Reyer--2017|Reyer et al., 2017]] ) increasing poverty and inequality and threatening paths to sustainable development ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-18#18.1.1|Section 18.1.1]] ; [[#Reckien--2017|Reckien et al., 2017]] ).

The uneven enforcement of land use regulations, relocations and evictions in connection with environmental risk management and climate adaptation is a contested issue ( [[#Brockington--2015|Brockington and Wilkie, 2015]] ; [[#Lavell--2016|Lavell, 2016]] ; [[#Quimbayo%20Ruiz--2016a|Quimbayo Ruiz and Vásquez Rodríguez, 2016a]] ; [[#Quimbayo%20Ruiz--2016b|Quimbayo Ruiz and Vásquez Rodríguez, 2016b]] ; [[#Anguelovski--2018|Anguelovski et al., 2018]] ; Anguelovski et al., 2019; [[#Shokry--2020|Shokry et al., 2020]] ; [[#Chávez%20Eslava--2021|Chávez Eslava, 2021]] ; [[#Oliver-Smith--2021|Oliver-Smith, 2021]] ). This suggests that caution in framing climate adaptation and resilience related interventions equally benefits everyone ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Brown--2014|Brown, 2014]] ; [[#Chu--2016|Chu et al., 2016]] ; [[#Connolly--2019|Connolly, 2019]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2019|Romero-Lankao and Gnatz, 2019]] ; [[#Johnson--2021|Johnson et al., 2021]] ) and that equality and justice dimensions should be incorporated into decision-making ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-18#18.1.2|Section 18.1.2.2]] ; [[#Agyeman--2016|Agyeman et al., 2016]] ; [[#Meerow--2016|Meerow and Newell, 2016]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2016|Romero-Lankao et al., 2016]] ; [[#Shi--2016|Shi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Reckien--2017|Reckien et al., 2017]] ; [[#Leal%20Filho--2021|Leal Filho et al., 2021]] ).

Poor rural households in marginal territories that have a low productive potential and/or that are far from markets and infrastructure are highly vulnerable to climate-change impacts and could easily fall into poverty-environment traps ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Barbier--2019|Barbier and Hochard, 2019]] ; [[#Heikkinen--2021|Heikkinen, 2021]] ). Climate change is one of the main threats to rural livelihoods in CA, since agriculture is a pillar of rural economies and food security, especially in the poorest sectors, which rely on subsistence crops in areas with low soil fertility and rainfall seasonality ( [[#Bouroncle--2017|Bouroncle et al., 2017]] ).

Impacts are likely to occur simultaneously, exacerbating the challenges faced by the poorer segments of society, but also creating new groups at risk ( [[#Miranda%20Sara--2016|Miranda Sara et al., 2016]] ; [[#Rosenzweig--2018|Rosenzweig et al., 2018]] ; [[#Dodman--2019|Dodman et al., 2019]] ). The material basis for poor and vulnerable urban and rural populations’ adaptations is in a critical state across the CSA region, magnifying extreme events’ impacts, making CSA less resilient. Consequences in terms of social vulnerability and livelihood will be widely felt, inasmuch as the security and protection of critical assets (housing, infrastructure and water, land and ecosystem services) continue to lag behind. Small businesses are usually located within homes, and if the home is affected, so is the business ( [[#Stein--2015|Stein and Moser, 2015]] ), adding another layer of vulnerability for this population.

As productivity declines, outside sources of income are sought, and people rely on resource extraction for subsistence and for income, further increasing their vulnerability to climate change ( [[#Barbier--2018a|Barbier and Hochard, 2018a]] ). Cycles of declining productivity, environmental degradation, wildlife poaching and trafficking, the search for outside employment, reduced incomes, livelihood opportunities and poverty have been observed in rural El Salvador, Honduras, Amazonia ( [[#López-Feldman--2014|López-Feldman, 2014]] ; [[#Graham--2017|Graham, 2017]] ; [[#Barbier--2018a|Barbier and Hochard, 2018a]] ). The protection of communities that defend and are dependent on wildlife and natural environments requires immediate attention. Latin America is home to eight million forest-dependent people, which represents about 82% of the region’s rural extreme poor ( [[#FAO%20and%20UNEP--2020|FAO and UNEP, 2020]] ).

Poverty and disaster risk reduction interlinked with climate-change adaptation share a focus on identifying and acting on local risks and their root causes, even though they view risk through different lenses ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#IPCC--2014|IPCC, 2014]] ; [[#Allen--2017a|Allen et al., 2017a]] ; [[#Satterthwaite--2018|Satterthwaite et al., 2018]] , 2020; [[#UN-Habitat--2018|UN-Habitat, 2018]] ). Construction of climate knowledge and risk perceptions affect decision-making to define implementation priorities, but the poor are less able to cope with and adapt so as to avoid so-called adaptation injustices ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Mansur--2016|Mansur et al., 2016]] ; [[#Miranda%20Sara--2017|Miranda Sara et al., 2017]] ; [[#Reckien--2017|Reckien et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hardoy--2019|Hardoy et al., 2019]] ).

Adaptation, social policies, poverty reduction and inequality are weakly articulated to daily or chronic risk reduction. Poor residents are often caught in ‘risk traps’, accumulated cycles of everyday risks and small-scale disasters ( ''medium confidence: medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Bartlett--2016|Bartlett and Satterthwaite, 2016]] ; [[#Mansur--2016|Mansur et al., 2016]] ; [[#Allen--2017a|Allen et al., 2017a]] ; [[#Leal%20Filho--2021|Leal Filho et al., 2021]] ), which are exacerbated by climate risks and COVID pandemic with the most vulnerable populations suffering. Chronic and everyday risks (poor access to infrastructure, services, incomes, housing, land tenure, education, security, location and poor-quality environment and networks and lack of a voice) are often exacerbated and generate new unknown risks by climate change ( ''medium confidence: medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Bartlett--2016|Bartlett and Satterthwaite, 2016]] ; [[#Mansur--2016|Mansur et al., 2016]] ; [[#Satterthwaite--2018|Satterthwaite et al., 2018]] ; [[#Leal%20Filho--2021|Leal Filho et al., 2021]] ), extreme events and risks related to ENSO oscillation. All these risks need to be considered simultaneously ( [[#UN-Habitat--2018|UN-Habitat, 2018]] ). Risks are seldom distributed equally, highlighting socioeconomic inequalities and governance failures ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#IPCC--2014|IPCC, 2014]] ; [[#Bartlett--2016|Bartlett and Satterthwaite, 2016]] ; [[#Rasch--2016|Rasch, 2016]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2018|Romero-Lankao et al., 2018]] ).

Adaptation, disaster risk reduction and social and poverty reduction policies contribute to sustainable development ( [[#Hallegatte--2018|Hallegatte et al., 2018]] ; [[#Satterthwaite--2020|Satterthwaite et al., 2020]] ) and improve prospects for climate-resilient pathways ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-18#18.1.1|Section 18.1.1]] ). Without pro-poor interventions, adaptation options could reinforce poverty cycles ( [[#Kalikoski--2018|Kalikoski et al., 2018]] ). Secure locations, good-quality infrastructure, services and housing are critical to reducing risks from extreme climate events ( [[#Satterthwaite--2018|Satterthwaite et al., 2018]] ; [[#Dodman--2019|Dodman et al., 2019]] ).

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==== 12.5.7.2 Governance and Finance ====

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Poor and most vulnerable groups have limited political influence, fewer capacities and opportunities to participate in decision and policymaking and are less able to leverage government support to invest in adaptation measures linked with poverty, inequality and vulnerability reduction ( ''very high confidence)'' (Chapter 8; [[#Miranda%20Sara--2017|Miranda Sara et al., 2017]] ; [[#Reyer--2017|Reyer et al., 2017]] ; [[#Kalikoski--2018|Kalikoski et al., 2018]] ; [[#Dodman--2019|Dodman et al., 2019]] ; [[#Satterthwaite--2020|Satterthwaite et al., 2020]] ).

Existing imbalances in power relations, corruption, historic structural problems and high levels of risk tolerance ( [[#Miranda%20Sara--2016|Miranda Sara et al., 2016]] ) constitute climate governance barriers to implementing more effective adaptation and preventive measures. Corruption, particularly in the construction and infrastructure sectors, has proven to be a barrier to CSA development, even reproducing and reconstructing the same risks ( [[#French--2017|French and Mechler, 2017]] ; [[#Vergara--2018|Vergara, 2018]] ; [[#Durand--2019|Durand, 2019]] ). Critical infrastructure and valuable assets continue to be placed in vulnerable areas ( [[#Calil--2017|Calil et al., 2017]] ; [[#Escalante%20Estrada--2020|Escalante Estrada and Miranda, 2020]] ), demonstrating the persistence of maladaptation and adaptation deficit ( [[#Villamizar--2017|Villamizar et al., 2017]] ).

Social organisation, participation and governance reconfiguration are essential for building climate resilience ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Stein--2015|Stein and Moser, 2015]] ; [[#Kalikoski--2018|Kalikoski et al., 2018]] ; [[#Satterthwaite--2018|Satterthwaite et al., 2018]] , 2020; [[#Stein--2018|Stein et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hardoy--2019|Hardoy et al., 2019]] ; [[#Stein--2019|Stein, 2019]] ; [[#Miranda%20Sara--2021|Miranda Sara, 2021]] ). Adaptation measures have trade-offs that need to be acknowledged and acted upon, most importantly by developing the capacity to convene discussions that draw in all key actors and commit them to do things differently ( [[#Almeida--2018|Almeida et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hardoy--2019|Hardoy et al., 2019]] ). Collaborative approaches integrate groups and organisations (e.g., saving, women’s groups, clubs, vendor associations, cooperatives) contributing to the exchange of information to visibilise people’s needs, generate safety networks and negotiate for improvements and enhance adaptive capacity.

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==== 12.5.7.3 Adaptation Options ====

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Effective adaptation can be achieved by addressing pre-existing development deficits, particularly the needs and priorities of informal settlements and economies ( [[#Revi--2014|Revi et al., 2014]] ; [[#UN-Habitat--2018|UN-Habitat, 2018]] ). There is urgency in making sure that social systems are better able to respond to climate-related risks and increase their adaptive capacity ( [[#Lemos--2016|Lemos et al., 2016]] ), focusing on path dependency, lock-ins and poor specific needs ( [[#Leal%20Filho--2021|Leal Filho et al., 2021]] ).

The linkages between climate adaptation and poverty are not clearly addressed at the national level ( [[#Kalikoski--2018|Kalikoski et al., 2018]] ). A revision of some NDCs presented by CSA countries ( https://unfccc.int ) shows that NDCs are developed with almost no connection to poverty and livelihoods. Exceptions include Bolivia, whose NDC developed the ‘good life’ concept as an alternative development pathway, supporting sustainable livelihoods as a means to eradicate poverty. Honduras asserts that climate action should improve living conditions. Peru defined a poverty and vulnerability reduction approach. Finally, El Salvador conditioned its NDCs to macroeconomic stability, economic growth and poverty reduction. A sustainable development approach permeates the proposed actions for sectors such as energy, agriculture, transport, water and forestry.

Adaptive capacity is linked to addressing climate-related risks (specific capacity) and structural deficits (generic capacity) and synergies, and a strategic balance between both is necessary ( [[#Eakin--2014|Eakin et al., 2014]] ; [[#Lemos--2016|Lemos et al., 2016]] ). Adaptation institutional context can undermine one form of capacity with repercussions for the other compromising overall adaptation and sustainable development ( [[#Eakin--2014|Eakin et al., 2014]] ).

The literature assessing the effectiveness of pro-poor or community-based adaptation practices and livelihood options continues to be weak, though such practices and options are being increasingly documented, as in AR5 ( [[#Magrin--2014|Magrin et al., 2014]] ). A great variety of measures and financial instruments are being applied to strengthen and protect livelihoods and assets: collective insurance schemes, micro-credit, financial instruments for transferring risks, agricultural insurance and PES ( [[#Dávila--2016|Dávila, 2016]] ; [[#Hardoy--2016|Hardoy and Velásquez, 2016]] ; [[#Lemos--2016|Lemos et al., 2016]] ; [[#Porras--2016|Porras et al., 2016]] ; [[#Kalikoski--2018|Kalikoski et al., 2018]] ). Small-scale household businesses in poor neighbourhoods develop adaptation strategies to keep operations going, showing how household-level adaptation strategies are multi-purpose ( [[#Stein--2018|Stein et al., 2018]] ; [[#Stein--2019|Stein, 2019]] ). There are emerging interinstitutional communities of practice whose aim is to share practices and lessons learned ( [[#ECLAC--2013|ECLAC, 2013]] , 2015, 2019a).

There is also increasing evidence of human mobility associated with climate change and disaster risk ( [[#IOM--2021|IOM, 2021]] ) and the adoption of sustainable tourism, diversification of livelihood strategies, climate forecasts, appropriate construction techniques, neighbourhood layout, integral urban upgrading initiatives, territorial and urban planning, regulatory frameworks, water harvesting and NbS ( [[#Stein--2014|Stein and Moser, 2014]] ; [[#Hardoy--2016|Hardoy and Mastrangelo, 2016]] ; [[#Almeida--2018|Almeida et al., 2018]] ; [[#Barbier--2018a|Barbier and Hochard, 2018a]] ; [[#Desmaison--2018|Desmaison et al., 2018]] ; [[#Satterthwaite--2018|Satterthwaite et al., 2018]] , 2020; [[#Villafuerte--2018|Villafuerte et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hidalgo--2020|Hidalgo, 2020]] ). Mostly, socioeconomical and sociopolitical factors show that safety and continuity measures are critical enablers of adaptation.

At the municipal level, a study in CA highlighted that adaptive capacity in rural areas is associated with the satisfaction of basic needs (safe drinking water, school, quality dwelling, gender parity index), access to resources for innovation and action (road density, economically active population with non-agricultural employment and rural demographic dependency ratio) and access to credit and technical support ( [[#Bouroncle--2017|Bouroncle et al., 2017]] ).

CSA adaptation initiatives to reduce poverty, improve livelihoods and achieve sustainable development in scale and scope, from planned and collective interventions to autonomous and individual actions. Many of them are bottom-up, community-led initiatives together with civil society organisations; others are government-led, including local governments, or a combination of them ( [[#McNamara--2017|McNamara and Buggy, 2017]] ; [[#Berrang-Ford--2021|Berrang-Ford et al., 2021]] ). Vulnerable groups are a focus to achieve equity at planning and as a target including mainly rural low-income, Indigenous Peoples and women and migrants in most references. Responses detected were focused on behavioural and cultural followed by ecosystem-based responses, institutional, and technological/infrastructural responses. Out of 55 articles analysed from CSA ( [[#Berrang-Ford--2021|Berrang-Ford et al., 2021]] ) about poverty, equity and adaptation options, half covered adaptation planning and early implementation, but only 2% could show evidence of risk reduction associated with adaptation efforts.

Tensions and conflicts may result from differing perceptions and knowledge of vulnerabilities and risk, which can hinder the acceptance of adaptation measures or the implementation of stronger adaptive or preventive actions ( [[#Miranda%20Sara--2016|Miranda Sara et al., 2016]] ). There is a need to better understand complex interactions and community responses to climate change in the Amazonian and Andean regions. Climate-change hotspot impacts have shown that poverty reduction measures alone were not enough to improve adaptive capacity because people will not necessarily invest in their enhancement ( [[#Pinho--2014|Pinho et al., 2014]] ; [[#Filho--2016|Filho et al., 2016]] ; [[#Nelson--2016|Nelson et al., 2016]] ; [[#Lapola--2018|Lapola et al., 2018]] ; [[#Zavaleta--2018|Zavaleta et al., 2018]] ). Current adaptation strategies and methods may be neglecting cultural values, even eroding them, in the Peruvian Andes, indicating that success of adaptation practices is tied to deep cultural values ( [[#Walshe--2016|Walshe and Argumedo, 2016]] ).

Limits to adaptation include access to land, territory and resources ( [[#Mesclier--2015|Mesclier et al., 2015]] ), poor labour opportunities coupled with knowledge gaps, weak multi-actor coordination, and lack of effective policies and supportive frameworks ( [[#Berrang-Ford--2021|Berrang-Ford et al., 2021]] ).

Low participation of women in income-earning opportunities contrasts with their role in unpaid activities ( [[#ECLAC--2019b|ECLAC, 2019b]] ). Despite the progress that has been made, gender differences in labour markets remain an unjustifiable form of inequality ( [[#OIT--2019|OIT, 2019]] ), and women easily fall back on the informal labour market during crisis situations, such as those generated by climate events ( [[#Collodi--2020|Collodi et al., 2020]] ).

Participatory processes are leveraging adaptation measures throughout CSA; they contribute to the prioritisation of specific adaptation measures as well as the strengthening of local capacities. Results of participatory processes show how climate adaptation needs to be part of larger transformation processes to that have vulnerable communities at the center and reduce vulnerability drivers ( [[#Stein--2015|Stein and Moser, 2015]] ; [[#Stein--2018|Stein et al., 2018]] ; [[#Stein--2019|Stein, 2019]] ). Stronger national policies interlinking poverty and inequality reduction to adaptation considering the coupled human-environmental systems to comprehend poor and vulnerable groups’ capacity to adapt are urgently needed.

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