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==== 2.2.2. Mitigation Actions to Date ==== <div id="h3-3-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> '''There has been a consistent expansion of policies and laws addressing mitigation since AR5''' '''''(''''' '''''high confidence).''''' Climate governance supports mitigation by providing frameworks through which diverse actors interact, and a basis for policy development and implementation ( ''medium confidence'' ). Many regulatory and economic instruments have already been deployed successfully ( ''high confidence'' ). By 2020, laws primarily focussed on reducing GHG emissions existed in 56 countries covering 53% of global emissions ( ''medium confidence'' ). The application of diverse policy instruments for mitigation at the national and sub-national levels has grown consistently across a range of sectors. ( ''high confidence'' ). Policy coverage is uneven across sectors and remains limited for emissions from agriculture, and from industrial materials and feedstocks ( ''high confidence'' ). { ''WGIII SPM B.5, WGIII SPM B.5.2, WGIII SPM E.3, WGIII SPM E.4'' } Practical experience has informed economic instrument design and helped to improve predictability, environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, alignment with distributional goals, and social acceptance ( ''high confidence'' ). Low-emission technological innovation is strengthened through the combination of technology-push policies, together with policies that create incentives for behaviour change and market opportunities. ( ''high confidence'' ). (Section 4.8.3). Comprehensive and consistent policy packages have been found to be more effective than single policies ( ''high confidence'' ). Combining mitigation with policies to shift development pathways, policies that induce lifestyle or behaviour changes, for example, measures promoting walkable urban areas combined with electrification and renewable energy can create health co-benefits from cleaner air and enhanced active mobility ( ''high confidence'' ). Climate governance enables mitigation by providing an overall direction, setting targets, mainstreaming climate action across policy domains and levels, based on national circumstances and in the context of international cooperation. Effective governance enhances regulatory certainty, creating specialised organisations and creating the context to mobilise finance ( ''medium confidence'' ). These functions can be promoted by climate-relevant laws, which are growing in number, or climate strategies, among others, based on national and sub-national context ( ''medium confidence'' ). Effective and equitable climate governance builds on engagement with civil society actors, political actors, businesses, youth, labour, media, Indigenous Peoples and local communities ( ''medium confidence'' ). { ''WGIII SPM E.2.2, WGIII SPM E.3, WGIII SPM E.3.1, WGIII SPM E.4.2, WGIII SPM E.4.3, WGIII SPM E.4.4'' } '''The unit costs of several low-emission technologies, including solar, wind and lithium-ion batteries, have fallen consistently since 2010 (Figure 2.4). Design and process innovations in combination with the use of digital technologies have led to near-commercial availability of many low or zero emissions options in buildings, transport and industry.''' From 2010-2019, there have been sustained decreases in the unit costs of solar energy (by 85%), wind energy (by 55%), and lithium-ion batteries (by 85%), and large increases in their deployment, e.g., >10Γ for solar and >100Γ for electric vehicles (EVs), albeit varying widely across regions (Figure 2.4). Electricity from PV and wind is now cheaper than electricity from fossil sources in many regions, electric vehicles are increasingly competitive with internal combustion engines, and large-scale battery storage on electricity grids is increasingly viable. In comparison to modular small-unit size technologies, the empirical record shows that multiple large-scale mitigation technologies, with fewer opportunities for learning, have seen minimal cost reductions and their adoption has grown slowly. Maintaining emission-intensive systems may, in some regions and sectors, be more expensive than transitioning to low emission systems. ( ''high confidence'' ) { ''WGIII SPM B.4, WGIII SPM B.4.1, WGIII SPM C.4.2, WGIII SPM C.5.2, WGIII SPM C.7.2, WGIII SPM C.8, WGIII Figure SPM.3, WGIII Figure SPM.3'' } For almost all basic materials β primary metals, building materials and chemicals β many low- to zero-GHG intensity production processes are at the pilot to near-commercial and in some cases commercial stage but they are not yet established industrial practice. Integrated design in construction and retrofit of buildings has led to increasing examples of zero energy or zero carbon buildings. Technological innovation made possible the widespread adoption of LED lighting. Digital technologies including sensors, the internet of things, robotics, and artificial intelligence can improve energy management in all sectors; they can increase energy efficiency, and promote the adoption of many low-emission technologies, including decentralised renewable energy, while creating economic opportunities. However, some of these climate change mitigation gains can be reduced or counterbalanced by growth in demand for goods and services due to the use of digital devices. Several mitigation options, notably solar energy, wind energy, electrification of urban systems, urban green infrastructure, energy efficiency, demand side management, improved forest- and crop/grassland management, and reduced food waste and loss, are technically viable, are becoming increasingly cost effective and are generally supported by the public, and this enables expanded deployment in many regions. ( ''high confidence'' ) { ''WGIII SPM B.4.3, WGIII SPM C.5.2, WGIII SPM C.7.2, WGIII SPM E.1.1, WGIII TS.6.5'' } '''The magnitude of global climate finance flows has increased and financing channels have broadened (''' '''''high confidence).''''' Annual tracked total financial flows for climate mitigation and adaptation increased by up to 60% between 2013/14 and 2019/20, but average growth has slowed since 2018 ( ''medium confidence'' ).and most climate finance stays within national borders ( ''high confidence'' ). Markets for green bonds, environmental, social and governance and sustainable finance products have expanded significantly since AR5 ( ''high confidence'' ). Investors, central banks, and financial regulators are driving increased awareness of climate risk to support climate policy development and implementation ( ''high confidence'' ). Accelerated international financial cooperation is a critical enabler of low-GHG and just transitions ( ''high confidence'' ). { ''WGIII SPM B.5.4, WGIII SPM E.5, WGIII TS.6.3, WGIII TS.6.4'' } Economic instruments have been effective in reducing emissions, complemented by regulatory instruments mainly at the national and also sub-national and regional level ( ''high confidence'' ). By 2020, over 20% of global GHG emissions were covered by carbon taxes or emissions trading systems, although coverage and prices have been insufficient to achieve deep reductions ( ''medium confidence'' ). Equity and distributional impacts of carbon pricing instruments can be addressed by using revenue from carbon taxes or emissions trading to support low-income households, among other approaches. ( ''high confidence'' ). The mix of policy instruments which reduced costs and stimulated adoption of solar energy, wind energy and lithium-ion batteries includes public R&D, funding for demonstration and pilot projects, and demand-pull instruments such as deployment subsidies to attain scale ( ''high confidence'' ) (Figure 2.4). { ''WGIII SPM B.4.1, WGIII SPM B.5.2, WGIII SPM E.4.2, WGIII TS.3'' } <div id="figure-2-4" class="_idGenObjectStyleOverride-2 figure-cont"></div> [[File:304c23eece1056631eb516392dc8af56 IPCC_AR6_SYR_Figure_2_4.png]] '''Figure 2.4: Unit cost reductions and use in some rapidly changing mitigation technologies.''' The '''top panel (a)''' shows global costs per unit of energy (USD per MWh) for some rapidly changing mitigation technologies. Solid blue lines indicate average unit cost in each year. Light blue shaded areas show the range between the 5th and 95th percentiles in each year. Yellow shading indicates the range of unit costs for new fossil fuel (coal and gas) power in 2020 (corresponding to USD 55 to 148 per MWh). In 2020, the levelised costs of energy (LCOE) of the three renewable energy technologies could compete with fossil fuels in many places. For batteries, costs shown are for 1 kWh of battery storage capacity; for the others, costs are LCOE, which includes installation, capital, operations, and maintenance costs per MWh of electricity produced. The literature uses LCOE because it allows consistent comparisons of cost trends across a diverse set of energy technologies to be made. However, it does not include the costs of grid integration or climate impacts. Further, LCOE does not take into account other environmental and social externalities that may modify the overall (monetary and non-monetary) costs of technologies and alter their deployment. The '''bottom panel (b)''' shows cumulative global adoption for each technology, in GW of installed capacity for renewable energy and in millions of vehicles for battery-electric vehicles. A vertical dashed line is placed in 2010 to indicate the change over the past decade. The electricity production share reflects different capacity factors; for example, for the same amount of installed capacity, wind produces about twice as much electricity as solar PV. Renewable energy and battery technologies were selected as illustrative examples because they have recently shown rapid changes in costs and adoption, and because consistent data are available. Other mitigation options assessed in the WGIII report are not included as they do not meet these criteria. { ''WGIII Figure SPM.3, WGIII 2.5, 6.4'' } [https://www.ipcc.ch/figures/figure-2-4 ] '''Mitigation actions, supported by policies, have contributed to a decrease in global energy and carbon intensity between 2010 and 2019, with a growing number of countries achieving absolute GHG emission reductions for more than a decade (''' '''''high confidence).''''' While global net GHG emissions have increased since 2010, global energy intensity (total primary energy per unit GDP) decreased by 2% yr ''β1'' between 2010 and 2019. Global carbon intensity (CO 2 -FFI per unit primary energy) also decreased by 0.3% yr ''β1'' , mainly due to fuel switching from coal to gas, reduced expansion of coal capacity, and increased use of renewables, and with large regional variations over the same period. In many countries, policies have enhanced energy efficiency, reduced rates of deforestation and accelerated technology deployment, leading to avoided and in some cases reduced or removed emissions ( ''high confidence'' ). At least 18 countries have sustained production-based CO 2 and GHG and consumption-based CO 2 absolute emission reductions for longer than 10 years since 2005 through energy supply decarbonization, energy efficiency gains, and energy demand reduction, which resulted from both policies and changes in economic structure. ( ''high confidence'' ). Some countries have reduced production-based GHG emissions by a third or more since peaking, and some have achieved reduction rates of around 4% yr ''β1'' for several years consecutively ( ''high confidence'' ). Multiple lines of evidence suggest that mitigation policies have led to avoided global emissions of several GtCO 2 -eq yr ''β1'' ( ''medium confidence'' ). At least 1.8 GtCO 2 -eq yr ''β1'' of avoided emissions can be accounted for by aggregating separate estimates for the effects of economic and regulatory instruments ( ''medium confidence'' ). Growing numbers of laws and executive orders have impacted global emissions and are estimated to have resulted in 5.9 GtCO 2 -eq yr ''β1'' of avoided emissions in 2016 ''(medium confidence)'' . These reductions have only partly offset global emissions growth ( ''high confidence'' ). { ''WGIII SPM B.1, WGIII SPM B.2.4, WGIII SPM B.3.5, WGIII SPM B.5.1, WGIII SPM B.5.3, WGIII 1.3.2, WGIII 2.2.3'' } <div id="2.2.3" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="adaptation-actions-to-date"></span>
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