Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-8 (section)

==== 8.2.1.4 Climate-related Hazards, Livelihood Transitions and Migration ====

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Agricultural livelihoods of the rural poor, especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America, are already in transition due to the forces of industrialisation, urbanisation and economic globalisation ( [[#De%20Brauw--2014|De Brauw et al., 2014]] ; [[#Tacoli--2015|Tacoli et al., 2015]] ). Scientific evidence shows that climate change is accelerating livelihood transitions from rural agricultural production to urban wages ( [[#Cai--2016|Cai et al., 2016]] ; [[#Cattaneo--2016|Cattaneo and Peri, 2016]] ; [[#Kaczan--2020|Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020]] ).

There is now ''robust evidence'' from virtually every region on Earth showing that the livelihood impacts from a multitude of climate hazards are driving people to diversify rural income sources (Figure 8.2; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). Rural households frequently accomplish the goal of livelihood diversification with an increasing reliance on migration, urban wage labour and remittances ( [[#Marchiori--2012|Marchiori et al., 2012]] ; [[#Bohra-Mishra--2014|Bohra-Mishra et al., 2014]] ; [[#Gray--2016|Gray and Wise, 2016]] ; [[#Nawrotzki--2016|Nawrotzki and DeWaard, 2016]] ; [[#Banerjee--2019a|Banerjee et al., 2019a]] ). What is different about rural-to-urban livelihood transitions under climate change impacts is that they accelerate both rural and urban stratification of wealth ( [[#Barrett--2014|Barrett and Santos, 2014]] ; [[#Thiede--2016|Thiede et al., 2016]] ). On the one hand, climate change impacts on rural livelihoods increase the necessity of migration as an income strategy, accelerating migration ( [[#Cai--2016|Cai et al., 2016]] ) even while households that cannot select individuals for migration become more impoverished ( [[#Suckall--2017|Suckall et al., 2017]] ; [[#Nawrotzki--2018|Nawrotzki and DeWaard, 2018]] ).

On the other hand, climate change impacts widen the range of households willing or needing to engage in migration to include those less able to bear the costs of urban migration ( [[#Afifi--2016|Afifi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hunter--2017|Hunter and Simon, 2017]] ). The effect is also greater urban poverty, and a higher social burden of migrants seeking urban wages ( [[#Singh--2019|Singh, 2019]] ). Evidence suggests that poor households often move in desperation to make ends meet. In the context of climate hazards, such as coastal inundation and salinity, economic necessity often drives working-age adults in poor households to seek outside earnings ( [[#Dasgupta--2016|Dasgupta et al., 2016]] ). Labour migration in the context of climate change is also gendered, and as more men seek employment opportunities away from home, women are required to acquire new capacities to manage new challenges, including increasing vulnerability to climate change ( [[#Banerjee--2019b|Banerjee et al., 2019b]] ).

Migration and displacement are directly induced by the impacts of climate change ( ''high confidence'' ) (Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7), however, migration responses to climate change are differentiated across the spectrum of households’ wealth. In well-off households, migration can be used as a way to support income diversification through remittances ( [[#Gemenne--2017|Gemenne and Blocher, 2017]] ). High levels of poverty mean that a large part of the African population does not have sufficient resources to be mobile ( [[#Borderon--2019|Borderon et al., 2019]] ; [[#Leal%20Filho--2020c|Leal Filho et al., 2020c]] ). The poorest households, conversely, will typically lack the resources that would allow them to migrate in ways that maintain an acceptable standard of living, and may find themselves unable or unwilling to move in the face of climate change impacts ( [[#Sam--2021|Sam et al., 2021]] ).

There is ''high agreement'' and ''robust evidence'' that climate change impacts also have a major influence on key enabling conditions for migration, such as sociodemographic, economic and political factors ( [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al., 2019]] ; [[#Borderon--2019|Borderon et al., 2019]] ), and that climate change impacts to development and governance may affect how people migrate ( [[#Wrathall--2019|Wrathall et al., 2019]] ; CCB MIGRATE in Chapter 7). Mobility, which was considered the most viable climate change adaptation strategy to poor pastoralists, is restricted due to the political marginalisation of pastoral groups, land privatisation, governments’ decentralisation policies and plantation investment ( [[#Blench--2001|Blench, 2001]] ; [[#Randall--2015|Randall, 2015]] ; [[#Leal%20Filho--2020c|Leal Filho et al., 2020c]] ). While migration can be an adaptation response to climate change impacts ( [[#Black--2011|Black et al., 2011]] ; [[#Gemenne--2017|Gemenne and Blocher, 2017]] ), climate change impacts can also act as a direct driver of forced displacement ( [[#Marchiori--2012|Marchiori et al., 2012]] ). Societal groups that are forced to involuntarily migrate in response to climate change impacts may lack resources to invest in planned relocation mainly due to lack of good governance systems ( [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ). For people displaced by climate change impacts, policy interventions have a determining influence on migration outcomes, such as the numbers of migrants, the timing of migration and destinations ( [[#Gemenne--2017|Gemenne and Blocher, 2017]] ; [[#Wrathall--2019|Wrathall et al., 2019]] ).The process of displacement and forced migration leaves people more exposed to climate change-related extreme weather events, particularly in low-income countries which often host the highest number of displaced people ( [[#Adger--2018|Adger et al., 2018]] ).

Climate change may be accelerating livelihood transitions and migration in ways that accelerate urbanisation ( [[#Adger--2020|Adger et al., 2020]] ). Although a range of climate hazards are noted for accelerating rural-to-urban livelihood transitions (see Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7), a key theme to emerge across many case studies is the impact of rising temperatures on agricultural productivity ( [[#Mueller--2014|Mueller et al., 2014]] ; [[#Cattaneo--2016|Cattaneo and Peri, 2016]] ; [[#Call--2017|Call et al., 2017]] ; [[#Wrathall--2018|Wrathall et al., 2018]] ). In other words, when people cannot farm due to rising temperatures (and related stressors), they migrate. In this context, migration as a livelihood diversification strategy may evolve and take multiple forms over time (Bell et al., 2019), such as temporary migration ( [[#Mueller--2020|Mueller et al., 2020]] ), seasonal migration ( [[#Gautam--2017|Gautam, 2017]] ) or permanent migration ( [[#Nawrotzki--2017|Nawrotzki et al., 2017]] ), but generally conforms to existing patterns of migration ( [[#Curtis--2015|Curtis et al., 2015]] ).

A key concern for the poor is climate change impacts that undermine livelihood diversification and resilience, narrowing the set of available livelihood alternatives ( [[#Tanner--2015|Tanner et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bailey--2016|Bailey and Buck, 2016]] ; [[#Perfecto--2019|Perfecto et al., 2019]] ).

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