Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

==== 13.2.3.1 The Forms of Climate Institutions ====

<div id="h3-1-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

Universal ‘best-practice’ formulations of organisations may not be applicable across country contexts, but institutions that are suited to national context can be ratcheted up over time in their scope and effectiveness ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). National climate institutions take diverse forms because they emerge out of country-specific interactions between national climate politics and existing institutional structures. Certain institutional forms tend to be common across countries, such as expert climate change commissions; a review finds eleven such institutions in existence as of mid-2020. Although this institutional form may be common, these commissions vary in terms of expertise, independence and focus ( [[#Abraham-Dukuma--2020|Abraham-Dukuma et al. 2020]] ), reinforcing the important shaping role of national context.

A review of institutions in eight countries suggests three broad processes through which institutions emerge: ‘purpose-built’ dedicated institutions focused explicitly on mitigation; ‘layering’ of mitigation objectives on existing institutions; and ‘latent’ institutions created for other purposes that nonetheless have implications for mitigation outcomes ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ). In relatively few countries do new, purpose-built, legally-mandated bodies created specifically for climate mitigation exist although this number is growing; examples include the UK ( [[#Averchenkova--2018|Averchenkova et al. 2018]] ), China ( [[#Teng--2021|Teng and Wang 2021]] ), Australia ( [[#Keenan--2012|Keenan et al. 2012]] ) and New Zealand ( [[#Timperley--2020|Timperley 2020]] ). These cases indicate that dedicated and lasting institutions with a strategic long-term focus on mitigation emerge only under conditions of broad national political agreement around climate mitigation as a national priority ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ). However, the specific forms of those institutions differ, as illustrated by the case of the UK’s Climate Change Committee established as an independent agency (Box 13.2) and China, which is built around a top-down planning structure (Box 13.3).

Where economy-wide institutions do not exist, new institutions may still address sub-sets of the challenge. In Australia, while political conditions resulted in the repeal of an overarching Clean Energy Act in 2014, although a Climate Change Authority continued, other institutions primarily focused on the energy sector such as the Clean Energy Regulator, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, and the Australia Renewable Agency continued to shape energy outcomes ( [[#MacNeil--2021|MacNeil 2021]] ).

Where new dedicated organisations have not emerged, countries may layer climate responsibilities on existing institutions; the addition of mitigation to the responsibilities of the US Environmental Protection Agency is an example ( [[#Mildenberger--2021|Mildenberger 2021]] ). Layering is also a common approach when climate change is embedded within consideration of multiple objectives of policy. In these cases, climate institutions tend to be layered on sectoral institutions for the pursuit of co-benefits or broader development concerns. Examples include India, where energy security was an important objective of renewable energy promotion policy (Pillai and [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ), Brazil’s mitigation approach focused on sectoral forest policy ( [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ) and South Africa’s emphasis on job creation as a necessary factor in mitigation policy ( [[#Chandrashekeran--2017|Chandrashekeran et al. 2017]] ; [[#Rennkamp--2019|Rennkamp 2019]] ). Prior to this process of layering, sectoral institutions, such as in forest and energy sectors, may play an important latent role in shaping climate outcomes, before climate considerations are part of their formal mandate.

New rules and organisations are not only created, they are also dismantled or allowed to wither away. Cases of institutional dismantling or neglect include the Australian Clean Energy Act ( [[#Crowley--2017|Crowley 2017]] ; [[#MacNeil--2021|MacNeil 2021]] ), the Indian Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, which, while formally functional, effectively does not meet (Pillai and [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ), and the weakening of climate units inside sectoral ministries in Brazil ( [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ). While there is limited literature on the robustness of climate institutions, case studies suggest institutions are more likely to emerge, persist and be effective when institutions map to a framing of climate change that has broad political support ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). Thus while mitigation focused framings and institutions may win political support in some countries, in other cases sectorally focused or multiple objectives oriented institutions may be most useful and resilient ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ).

<div id="13.2.3.2" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="addressing-climate-governance-challenges"></span>