Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-17 (section)

=== 17.2.2 Institutions, Governance and Political Economy ===

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This subsection focuses on institutions, governance and the political economy. Institutional and governance arrangements can influence which actors possess authority, as well as how motivated they are to cooperate in transition processes that are directed at finding solutions to climate change and other sustainability challenges. Often cooperation is enabled when policy frameworks or institutions align climate change with the political and economic interests of national governments, cities or businesses, and when institutional and governance arguments that support that alignment expand the scale of the transitions. However, there may also be political and economic interests and structures that can lock-in unsustainable development patterns, frustrate this alignment and slow down transitions ( [[#Haas--2021|Haas 2021]] ; [[#Mattioli--2020|Mattioli et al. 2020]] ; [[#Newell--2013|Newell and Mulvaney 2013]] ; [[#Power--2016|Power 2016]] ).

An extensive literature has examined how the international climate agreements and architecture influence collaboration across countries regarding climate and sustainable development to support a transition ( [[#Bradley--2005|Bradley 2005]] ). For example, international institutions offer opportunities for governments and other actors to share new perspectives on integrated solutions (Cole 2015). For some observers, however, decades of difficulties in crafting a comprehensive climate change agreement and the resulting fragmented climate policy landscape have been inimical to the collaboration needed for a transition ( [[#van%20Asselt--2014|van Asselt 2014]] ; [[#Nasiritousi--2019|Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand 2019]] ) (Chapters 1 and 13). Yet others see the potential for more incremental cooperation across countries, even without a single, integrated form of climate governance ( [[#Keohane--2016|Keohane and Victor 2016]] ).

A related argument suggests that fragmentation at the global level provides opportunities for cooperation at the national level ( [[#Kanie--2017|Kanie and Biermann 2017]] ). For example, in contrast to the relatively top-down Kyoto Protocol, the bottom-up pledge and review architecture of the Paris Agreement has prompted national governments to integrate climate change with other sustainable development priorities (Nachmany and SetzerJoana 2018; [[#Townshend--2013|Townshend et al. 2013]] ). Concrete examples included incorporating the SDGs into the NDCs as an international response to climate change ( [[#The%20Energy%20and%20Resources%20Institute--2017|The Energy and Resources Institute 2017]] ) or bringing climate into sustainable development strategies and so-called Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) as part of the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda process ( [[#Elder--2018|Elder and King 2018]] ; [[#Elder--2019|Elder and Bartalini 2019]] ).

Another branch of institutional research is concerned with the interactions between multiple levels of governance. In this multi-level governance perspective, cities and other sub-national governments often lead transitions by devising innovative solutions to contribute to climate and local energy, transport, the environment, resilience and other forms of sustainability ( [[#Bellinson--2019|Bellinson and Chu 2019]] ; [[#Doll--2017|Doll and Puppim De Oliveira 2017]] ; [[#Geels--2011|Geels 2011]] ; [[#Koehn--2008|Koehn 2008]] ; [[#Rabe--2007|Rabe 2007]] ; [[#van%20der%20Heijden--2019|van der Heijden et al. 2019]] ). A complementary perspective suggests that national governments can help scale up transitions by allocating resources and can provide the technical support that can spread innovative solutions ( [[#Bowman--2017|Bowman et al. 2017]] ; [[#Corfee-Morlot--2009|Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009]] ; [[#Gordon--2015|Gordon 2015]] ). Such support has become increasingly important during the pandemic, as national governments transfer funds for investments in climate-friendly infrastructure, transport systems and energy systems. This line of thinking is supported by calls to strengthen vertical and horizontal integration within and across government agencies and stakeholders in ways that can enhance policy coherence ( [[#Amanuma--2018|Amanuma et al. 2018]] ; [[#OECD--2018|OECD 2018]] , 2019). The incoherence or misalignment between national and local fiscal institutions and policies can restrict the ability of local governments to secure resources for climate-friendly investments. Such investments are particularly likely to flow, as more local governments have adopted net-zero targets, climate emergency declarations and action plans that can stimulate innovations ( [[#Davidson--2020|Davidson et al. 2020]] ). Others have seen greater potential for collaboration and innovation, with more multi-centred or polycentric forms of governance that lead to the formulation and dissemination of transformative solutions to climate and other environmental challenges ( [[#Ostrom--2008|Ostrom 2008]] ). Though much of the above governance research has focused on western countries, there are some applications in other regions and countries such as China ( [[#Gu--2020|Gu et al. 2020]] ).

Yet another set of channels facilitating integration between climate and other concerns are networks of like-minded actors working across administrative borders and physical boundaries. For instance, city networks such as the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate &amp; Energy ( [[#Covenant%20of%20Mayors--2019|Covenant of Mayors 2019]] ), the World Mayors Council on Climate Change ( [[#ICLEI--2019|ICLEI 2019]] ; [[#C40%20Cities--2019|C40 Cities 2019]] ) and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction ( [[#UNDRR--2019|UNDRR 2019]] ) have agreed to share decision-making tools and good practices, and to sponsor ambition-raising campaigns that help align climate and sustainable development concerns within and across cities ( [[#Betsill--2006|Betsill and Bulkeley 2006]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-8|Chapter 8]] and [[#17.3.3.5|Section 17.3.3.5]] ). This can be particularly important for less capable ‘following’ and ‘laggard’ cities needing greater financing and other forms of support to move a transition forward ( [[#Fuhr--2018|Fuhr et al. 2018]] ).

Furthermore, sub-national governments may often work together with civil-society groups to create new networked forms of governance ( [[#Biermann--2012|Biermann et al. 2012]] ). Other forms of multi-stakeholder partnerships focusing on issues with strong climate synergies, such as forms of air pollution known as short-lived climate pollutants (Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)) or transport (Sustainable Low Carbon Transport Partnership (SLoCaT)), take their cue from global scientific communities or civic-minded advocacy groups that transmit knowledge across boundaries ( [[#Keck--1999|Keck and Sikkink 1999]] ). There is also scope for suggesting that the international climate regime serves a Global Framework for Climate Action (GFCA) in helping orchestrate the multilateral climate regime and non-state and sub-national initiatives ( [[#Chan--2014|Chan and Pauw 2014]] ), though questions remain about its actual impacts on mitigation ( [[#Michaelowa--2017|Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017]] ).

Policymaking institutions and networks are themselves policies. A significant literature has looked at integrated policy frameworks and efforts across sectors, including climate adaptation and mitigation, as drivers of transitions ( [[#Landauer--2015|Landauer et al. 2015]] ; [[#Favretto--2018|Favretto et al. 2018]] ; [[#Obersteiner--2016|Obersteiner et al. 2016]] ; [[#Steen--2017|Steen and Weaver 2017]] ; [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ). Policy coherence between climate and other development objectives is often considered essential to sustainable development ( [[#Sovacool--2018|Sovacool 2018]] ). A similar discussion about synergies and conflicts has been raised on the relationship between resilience and sustainability ( [[#Marchese--2018|Marchese et al. 2018]] ). To help achieve coherence, there have been some efforts to develop suitable tools and decision-making frameworks ( [[#Scobie--2016|Scobie 2016]] ).

A related line of reasoning has suggested that sustainable development often requires not one but a mix of policy instruments to bring about the multiple policy effects needed for social and technological change ( [[#Edmondson--2019|Edmondson et al. 2019]] ; [[#Rogge--2017|Rogge and Johnstone 2017]] ). Following these calls, some governments have aimed to address climate change and sustainability jointly with coherent and integrated approaches to achieving these agendas ( [[#Chimhowu--2019|Chimhowu et al. 2019]] ), although for some countries Small Island Developing States (SIDS) this has proven more challenging ( [[#Scobie--2016|Scobie 2016]] ).

Though the above work tends to downplay politics and business, others suggest that political economy should feature prominently in transitions. Some branches of political-economy research underline how resource-intensive and fossil-fuel industries leverage their resources and positions to undermine transitions (Jones, C.A. and Levy 2009; [[#Newell--2010|Newell and Paterson 2010]] ; [[#Zhao--2013|Zhao et al. 2013]] ; [[#Geels--2014|Geels 2014]] ; [[#Moe--2014|Moe 2014]] ) (Chapter 1). These vested interests can lock-in status quo policies in countries where political systems offer interest groups more opportunities to veto or overturn climate- or eco-friendly proposals ( [[#Madden--2014|Madden 2014]] ). Companies with a strong interest in earning profits and building competitiveness from conventional fossil fuel-based energy systems have particularly strong incentives to capture politicians and agencies ( [[#Meckling--2018|Meckling and Nahm 2018]] ). Such strategies can be particularly powerful when combined with concerns over job losses and dislocation, preventing transitions from gaining traction ( [[#Haas--2021|Haas 2021]] ; [[#Mattioli--2020|Mattioli et al. 2020]] ; [[#Newell--2013|Newell and Mulvaney 2013]] ; [[#Power--2016|Power 2016]] ).

This suggests that politics can be an impediment to change: other studies argue instead that politics can be harnessed to drive transitions forward. For example, some observers contend that building coalitions around green industrial policies and sequencing reforms to reward industries in such coalitions can align otherwise divergent interests and inject momentum into transitions ( [[#Meckling--2015|Meckling et al. 2015]] ). Others see the effects of political economy varying over time depending upon external market conditions. To illustrate, renewable feed-in tariffs in Europe persisted for over two decades and were crucial in wind and solar power technologies making the breakthrough. But once competition from China led to the demise of European technology providers, and once European populations started to oppose surcharges on their electricity bills, feed-in tariffs were abolished by politicians in the purely national interest ( [[#Michaelowa--2017|Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017]] ).

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