Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-7 (section)

=== 7.6.5 Land tenure ===

<div id="section-7-6-5-land-tenure-block-1"></div>

Land tenure, defined as ‘the terms under which land and natural resources are held by individuals, households or social groups’, is a key dimension in any discussion of land–climate interactions, including the prospects for both adaptation and land-based mitigation, and possible impacts on tenure and thus land security of both climate change and climate action (Quan and Dyer 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1468|1468]]</sup> ) ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ).

Discussion of land tenure in the context of land–climate interactions in developing countries needs to consider the prevalence of informal, customary and modified customary systems of land tenure: estimates range widely, but perhaps as much as 65% of the world’s total land area is managed under some form of these local, customary or communal tenure systems, and only a small fraction of this (around 15%) is formally recognised by governments (Rights and Resources Initiative 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r1469|1469]]</sup> ). These customary land rights can extend across many categories of land, but are difficult to assess properly due to poor reporting, lack of legal recognition, and lack of access to reporting systems by indigenous and rural peoples (Rights and Resources Initiative 2018a <sup>[[#fn:r1470|1470]]</sup> ). Around 521 million ha of forest land is estimated to be legally owned, recognised, or designated for use by indigenous and local communities as of 2017 (Rights and Resources Initiative 2018b <sup>[[#fn:r1471|1471]]</sup> ), predominantly in Latin America, followed by Asia. However, in India approximately 40 million ha of forest land is managed under customary rights not recognised by the government (Rights and Resources Initiative 2015b <sup>[[#fn:r1472|1472]]</sup> ). In 2005 only 1% of land in Africa was legally registered (Easterly 2008a <sup>[[#fn:r1473|1473]]</sup> ).

Much of the world’s carbon is stored in the biomass and soil on the territories of customary landowners, including indigenous peoples (Walker et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1474|1474]]</sup> ; Garnett et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1475|1475]]</sup> ), making securing of these land tenure regimes vital in land and climate protection. These lands are estimated to hold at least 293 GtC of carbon, of which around one-third (72 GtC) is located in areas where indigenous peoples and local communities lack formal recognition of their tenure rights (Frechette et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1476|1476]]</sup> ).

Understanding the interactions between land tenure and climate change has to be based on underlying understanding of land tenure and land policy and how they relate to sustainable development, especially in low- and middle-income countries: such understandings have changed considerably over the last three decades, and now show that informal or customary systems can provide secure tenure (Toulmin and Quan 2000 <sup>[[#fn:r1477|1477]]</sup> ). For smallholder systems, Bruce and Migot- Adholla (1994) <sup>[[#fn:r1478|1478]]</sup> (among other authors) established that African customary tenure can provide the necessary security for long-term investments in farm fertility such as tree-planting. For pastoral systems, Behnke (1994) <sup>[[#fn:r1479|1479]]</sup> , Lane and Moorehead (1995) <sup>[[#fn:r1480|1480]]</sup> and other authors showed the rationality of communal tenure in situations of environmental variability and herd mobility. However, where customary systems are unrecognised or weakened by governments, or the rights from them are undocumented or unenforced, tenure insecurity may result (Lane 1998 <sup>[[#fn:r1481|1481]]</sup> ; Toulmin and Quan 2000 <sup>[[#fn:r1482|1482]]</sup> ). There is strong empirical evidence of the links between secure communal tenure and lower deforestation rates, particularly for intact forests (Nepstad et al. 2006 <sup>[[#fn:r1483|1483]]</sup> ; Persha et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1484|1484]]</sup> ; Vergara-Asenjo and Potvin 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1485|1485]]</sup> ). Securing and recognising tenure for indigenous communities (such as through revisions to legal or policy frameworks) has been shown to be highly cost effective in reducing deforestation and improving land management in certain contexts, and is therefore also apt to help improve indigenous communities’ ability to adapt to climate changes (Suzuki 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1486|1486]]</sup> ; Balooni et al. 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1487|1487]]</sup> ; Ceddia et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1488|1488]]</sup> ; Pacheco et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1489|1489]]</sup> ; Holland et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1490|1490]]</sup> ).

Rights to water for agriculture or livestock are linked to land tenure in complex ways still little understood and neglected by policymakers and planners (Cotula 2006a). Provision of water infrastructure tends to increase land values, but irrigation schemes often entail reallocation of land rights (Cotula 2006b <sup>[[#fn:r1491|1491]]</sup> ) and new inequalities based on water availability such as the creation of a category of tailenders (farmers at the downstream end of distribution channels) in large- scale irrigation (Chambers 1988 <sup>[[#fn:r1492|1492]]</sup> ) and disruption of pastoral grazing patterns through use of riverine land (Behnke and Kerven 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1493|1493]]</sup> ).

Understanding land tenure under climate change also has to take account of the growth in large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs), also referred to as land-grabbing, in developing countries. These LSLAs are defined by acquisition of more than 200 ha per deal (Messerli et al. 2014a <sup>[[#fn:r1494|1494]]</sup> ). Klaus Deininger (2011) links the growth in demand for land to the 2007–2008 food price spike, and demonstrates that high levels of demand for land at the country level are statistically associated with weak recognition of land rights. Land grabs, where LSLAs occur despite local use of lands, are often driven by direct collaboration of politicians, government officials and land agencies (Koechlin et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1495|1495]]</sup> ), involving corruption of governmental land agencies, failures to register community land claims and illegal lands uses, and lack of the rule of law and enforcement in resource extraction frontiers (Borras Jr et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1496|1496]]</sup> ). Though data is poor, overall, small- and medium-scale domestic investment has in fact been more important than foreign investment (Deininger 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1497|1497]]</sup> ; Cotula et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1498|1498]]</sup> ). There are variations in estimates of the scale of LSLAs: Nolte et al. (2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1499|1499]]</sup> concluded that deals totalled 42.2 million ha worldwide. Cotula et al. (2014) <sup>[[#fn:r1500|1500]]</sup> using cross-checked data for completed lease agreements in Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania conclude that they cover 1.9%, 1.9% and 1.1% respectively of each country’s total land suitable for agriculture. The literature expresses different views on whether these acquisitions concern marginal lands or lands already in use, thereby displacing existing users (Messerli et al. 2014b <sup>[[#fn:r1501|1501]]</sup> ). Land-grabbing is associated with, and may be motivated by, the acquisition of rights to water, and erosion of those rights for other users such as those downstream (Mehta et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1502|1502]]</sup> ). Quantification of the acquisition of water rights resulting from LSLAs raises major issues of definition, data availability, and measurement. One estimate of the total acquisition of gross irrigation water associated with land-grabbing across the 24 countries most affected is 280 billion m3 (Rulli et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1503|1503]]</sup> ).

While some authors see LSLAs as investments that can contribute to more efficient food production at larger scales (World Bank 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1504|1504]]</sup> ; Deininger and Byerlee 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1505|1505]]</sup> ), others have warned that local food security may be threatened by them (Daniel 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1506|1506]]</sup> ; Golay and Biglino 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1507|1507]]</sup> ; Lavers 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1508|1508]]</sup> ). Reports suggest that recent land-grabbing has affected 12 million people globally in terms of declines in welfare (Adnan 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1509|1509]]</sup> ; Davis et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1510|1510]]</sup> ). De Schutter (2011) <sup>[[#fn:r1511|1511]]</sup> argues that large-scale land acquisitions will: a) result in types of farming less liable to reduce poverty than smallholder systems, b) increase local vulnerability to food price shocks by favouring export agriculture and c) accelerate the development of a market for land, with detrimental impacts on smallholders and those depending on common property resources. Land-grabbing can threaten not only agricultural lands of farmers, but also protected ecosystems, like forests and wetlands (Hunsberger et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1512|1512]]</sup> ; Carter et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1513|1513]]</sup> ; Ehara et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1514|1514]]</sup> ).

The primary mechanisms for combating LSLAs have included restrictions on the size of land sales (Fairbairn 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1515|1515]]</sup> ), pressure on agribusiness companies to agree to Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, known as VGGT, or similar principles (Collins 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1516|1516]]</sup> ; Goetz 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1517|1517]]</sup> ), attempts to repeal biofuels standards (Palmer 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1518|1518]]</sup> ), strengthening of existing land law and land registration systems (Bebbington et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1519|1519]]</sup> ), use of community monitoring systems (Sheil et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1520|1520]]</sup> ), and direct protests against land acquisitions (Hall et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1521|1521]]</sup> ; Fameree 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1522|1522]]</sup> ).

Table 7.7 sets out, in highly summarised form, some key findings on the multi-directional inter-relations between land tenure and climate change, with particular reference to developing countries. The rows represent different categories of landscape or resource systems. For each system the second column summarises current understandings on land tenure and sustainable development, in many cases predating concerns over climate change. The third column summarises the most important implications of land tenure systems, policy about land tenure, and the implementation of that policy, for vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, and the fourth column gives a similar summary for mitigation of climate change. The fifth column summarises key findings on how climate change and climate action (both adaptation and mitigation) will impact land tenure, and the final column, findings on implications of climate change for evolving land policy.

In drylands, weak land tenure security, either for households disadvantaged within a customary tenure system or more widely as such a system is eroded, can be associated with increased vulnerability and decreased adaptive capacity ( ''limited evidence, high agreement'' ). There is ''medium evidence'' and ''medium agreement'' that land titling and recognition programmes, particularly those that authorise and respect indigenous and communal tenure, can lead to improved management of forests, including for carbon storage (Suzuki 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1523|1523]]</sup> ; Balooni et al. 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1524|1524]]</sup> ; Ceddia et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1525|1525]]</sup> ; Pacheco et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1526|1526]]</sup> ), primarily by providing legally secure mechanisms for exclusion of others (Nelson et al. 2001 <sup>[[#fn:r1527|1527]]</sup> ; Blackman et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1528|1528]]</sup> ). However, these titling programmes are highly context-dependent and there is also evidence that titling can exclude community and common management, leading to more confusion over land rights, not less, where poorly implemented (Broegaard et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1529|1529]]</sup> ). For all the systems, an important finding is that land policies can provide both security and flexibility in the face of climate change, but through a diversity of forms and approaches (recognition of customary tenure, community mapping, redistribution, decentralisation, co-management, regulation of rental markets, strengthening the negotiating position of the poor) rather than sole focus on freehold title ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) (Quan and Dyer, 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1530|1530]]</sup> ; Deininger and Feder 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1531|1531]]</sup> ; St. Martin 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1532|1532]]</sup> ). Land policy can be climate-proofed and integrated with national policies such as National Adaptation Programme of Action NAPAs (Quan and Dyer 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1533|1533]]</sup> ). Land administration systems have a vital role in providing land tenure security, especially for the poor, especially when linked to an expanded range of information relevant to mitigation and adaptation (Quan and Dyer 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1534|1534]]</sup> ; van der Molen and Mitchell 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1535|1535]]</sup> ). Challenges to such a role include outdated and overlapping national land and forest tenure laws, which often fail to recognise community property rights and corruption in land administration (Monterrosso et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1536|1536]]</sup> ), as well as lack of political will and the costs of improving land administration programmes (Deininger and Feder 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1537|1537]]</sup> ).

<div id="section-7-6-5-land-tenure-block-2"></div>

<span id="table-7.7"></span>
<!-- START IMG -->
<!-- TABLE IMG -->
<!-- IMG TITLE -->
'''Table 7.7'''

<span id="major-findings-on-the-interactions-between-land-tenure-and-climate-change."></span>
<!-- IMG CAPTION -->
'''Major findings on the interactions between land tenure and climate change.'''
<!-- IMG FILE -->
[[File:070de4f410090d8c000bb2ce5cea732b table-7.7-a.png]] [[File:9668678f448ea6842da67d2b756de3c8 table-7.7-b.png]]

<!-- END IMG -->
<span id="institutional-dimensions-of-adaptive-governance"></span>