Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-12 (section)

=== 12.5.8 Cross-cutting Issues in the Human Dimension ===

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==== 12.5.8.1 Public Policies, Social Movements and Participation ====

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Public policies related to adaptation must be seen in the wider context of environmental policies and governance, as they usually address climatic processes in synergy with other environmental and socioeconomic drivers ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Ding--2017|Ding et al., 2017]] ; [[#Aldunce%20Ide--2020|Aldunce Ide et al., 2020]] ; [[#Comisión%20Europea--2020|Comisión Europea, 2020]] ; [[#Lampis--2020|Lampis et al., 2020]] ; [[#Scoville-Simonds--2020|Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020]] ). However, some people point to education, sanitation or social assistance, among other sectors ( [[#Bonatti--2019|Bonatti et al., 2019]] ). In Brazil, for example, it would be difficult to clearly separate climate-change adaptation and urban policies ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#PBMC--2016|PBMC, 2016]] ; [[#Barbi--2017|Barbi and da Costa Ferreira, 2017]] ; [[#Marques%20Di%20Giulio--2017|Marques Di Giulio et al., 2017]] ; [[#Empresa%20de%20Pesquisa%20Energética--2018|Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2018]] ; [[#Checco--2019|Checco and Caldas, 2019]] ; [[#Canil--2020|Canil et al., 2020]] ).

Many public policies related to climate change have become symbolic, in conflict with prevailing economic policies and practices ( ''medium confidence: low evidence, high agreement'' ). Urban adaptation plans can be in conflict with other policies, and there may exist insufficient support in multiple areas such as social attitudes and behaviour, knowledge, education and human capital, finance, governance, institutions and policy ( [[#Villamizar--2017|Villamizar et al., 2017]] ; [[#Koch--2018|Koch, 2018]] ). Some policies around climate-related displacements and migrants have been considered in NDCs (Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017; [[#Yamamoto--2018|Yamamoto et al., 2018]] ; [[#de%20Salles%20Cavedon-Capdeville--2020|de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville et al., 2020]] ).

Because there are asymmetries among populations regarding the vulnerability and benefits of adaptation, along the lines of gender, age, socioeconomic conditions and ethnicity, it has been noticed that adaptation policies and programmes must be adequate to diverse conditions and actors ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Kaijser--2014|Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014]] ; [[#Walshe--2016|Walshe and Argumedo, 2016]] ; [[#Baucom--2017|Baucom and Omelsky, 2017]] ; [[#Harvey--2018|Harvey et al., 2018]] ).

Effective adaptation and mitigation depend on policies and measures at multiple scales, especially when it comes to the involvement of more exposed and vulnerable people. The participation of experts, communities and citizens has shown to be effective ( [[#FAO%20and%20Fundación%20Futuro%20Latinoamericano--2019|FAO and Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano, 2019]] ), particularly through partnerships between grassroots organisations and impoverished communities, providing valued expertise and capacities to support the implementation of government climate resilience strategies (World Bank Group, 2015). More inclusive planning processes correspond to higher climate equity and justice outcomes in the short term, but an emphasis on building dedicated multi-sector governance institutions may also enhance long-term programmes’ stability while ensuring civil society has a voice in adaptation planning and implementation ( [[#Chu--2016|Chu et al., 2016]] ). Some local organisations and people have succeeded when they were in charge of their own resiliency efforts, where international projects and protocols proved less effective ( [[#Doughty--2016|Doughty, 2016]] ). Some decentralised governmental programmes have tried to increase public responsiveness to the adaptation needs of the people, but such programmes have proven to be only mildly successful and provoke the mobilisation of communities against existing governance structures ( [[#Thompson--2016|Thompson, 2016]] ).

IKLK participation is thought to be more considered in adaptation policies because it yields good results ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Nagy--2014b|Nagy et al., 2014b]] ; [[#Jurt--2015|Jurt et al., 2015]] ; [[#Arias--2016|Arias et al., 2016]] ; [[#Stensrud--2016|Stensrud, 2016]] ). IK has been adaptive for long periods in the Andes ( [[#Cuvi--2018|Cuvi, 2018]] ), but there might be limits to adaptation in the face of present climatic and other environmental and socioeconomic drivers ( [[#Postigo--2019|Postigo, 2019]] ). Approaches integrating IK with more formal sciences, to address research and policies, have improved adaptation processes, but they carry their own complications ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Doswald--2014|Doswald et al., 2014]] ; [[#Metternicht--2014|Metternicht et al., 2014]] ; [[#Tengö--2014|Tengö et al., 2014]] ; [[#Drenkhan--2015|Drenkhan et al., 2015]] ; [[#Keenan--2015|Keenan, 2015]] ; [[#Lasage--2015|Lasage et al., 2015]] ; [[#Camacho%20Guerreiro--2016|Camacho Guerreiro et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hurlbert--2016|Hurlbert and Gupta, 2016]] ; [[#Roco--2016|Roco et al., 2016]] ; [[#Santos--2016|Santos et al., 2016]] ; [[#Walshe--2016|Walshe and Argumedo, 2016]] ; [[#Uribe%20Rivera--2017|Uribe Rivera et al., 2017]] ; [[#Kasecker--2018|Kasecker et al., 2018]] ; [[#Cuesta--2019|Cuesta et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ulloa--2019|Ulloa, 2019]] ; [[#Ariza-Montobbio--2020|Ariza-Montobbio and Cuvi, 2020]] ). More interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research will help to better understand and manage the relationships among governance, implementation, management priorities, wealth distribution and trade-offs between adaptation, mitigation and the SDGs.

Representations of climate change can also emerge as critiques and resistances that reveal that climate-change-labelled politics or interventions have posed even greater risks or do not address poverty issues ( ''medium confidence: medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Lampis--2013|Lampis, 2013]] ; [[#Pokorny--2013|Pokorny et al., 2013]] ; [[#Ojeda--2014|Ojeda, 2014]] ). Indigenous and social movements have joined with climate justice activists, calling for action to address climate change ( [[#Hicks--2016|Hicks and Fabricant, 2016]] ; [[#Ruiz-Mallén--2017|Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2017]] ; [[#Charles--2021|Charles, 2021]] ). The Bolivian Platform against Climate Change, a coalition of civil society and social movement organisations working to address the effects of global warming in Bolivia and to influence the broader global community, reflects an innovative dimension that, though at times conflictual, has shown how increasing climate variability hinders the right of Indigenous Peoples to the conservation of their culture and practices and illustrates how grassroots movements are increasingly taking over climate-change policy in the region ( [[#Hicks--2016|Hicks and Fabricant, 2016]] ). Social movements have engaged with international networks, such as Blokadia, which surged after COP 23, whose claims try to go beyond the protection of the environment and delve into issues of democracy and resource control ( [[#Martínez-Alier--2018|Martínez-Alier et al., 2018]] ).

Many social movements address adaptation to climate change. Some engage and participate in policy and planning, often producing good results at the local level. In contrast, top-down approaches without citizen or community participation have shown to be less effective ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Krellenberg--2014|Krellenberg and Katrin, 2014]] ; [[#Nagy--2014b|Nagy et al., 2014b]] ; [[#Stein--2014|Stein and Moser, 2014]] ; [[#Ruiz-Mallén--2015|Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2015]] ; [[#Sherman--2015|Sherman et al., 2015]] ; [[#Waylen--2015|Waylen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bizikova--2016|Bizikova et al., 2016]] ; [[#Chelleri--2016|Chelleri et al., 2016]] ; [[#Merlinsky--2016|Merlinsky, 2016]] ; [[#Villamizar--2017|Villamizar et al., 2017]] ).

Some conflicts in which the direct biophysical impacts of climate change play a major role can unleash social protests and strengthen social movements ( [[#12.6.4|Section 12.6.4]] ). In Cartagena, since 2010, the increase in precipitation has increasingly impacted the ''barrio'' Policarpa, promoprting residents to call for solutions to the problems caused by the coupled effect of flooding and industrial pollution. Also, in El Cambray II, in Guatemala City, in 2015 a nearby hill collapsed, causing the deaths of 280 people, 70 missing and the destruction of hundreds of homes. The affected community entered into a conflict with the municipality demanding resettlement and a reform of land-use planning ( [[#Stein%20Heinemann--2018|Stein Heinemann, 2018]] ).

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==== 12.5.8.2 Perceptions ====

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Perception and understanding of climate change can be seen as an adaptive feature. In CSA, the awareness of climate change as a threat is increasing, a situation related to growth in climate justice activism and to the occurrence of extreme weather events of all kinds ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Forero--2014|Forero et al., 2014]] ; [[#Magrin--2014|Magrin et al., 2014]] ; [[#Capstick--2015|Capstick et al., 2015]] ). Perception of climate change is positively associated across countries with the HDI and ND-Gain Readiness Index and negatively associated with the Vulnerability Index and, within countries, with education level, while perception is negatively associated with the degree of political affinity for the market economy ( [[#Azócar--2021|Azócar et al., 2021]] ). However, some communities do not associate their problems with the scientific concept of climate change, so discussions on whether it is human induced and its causes or relationship with other problems can become irrelevant ( [[#Sapiains%20Arrué--2017|Sapiains Arrué and Ugarte Caviedes, 2017]] ). Even communities affected by the same changes do not necessarily perceive them in the same way ( [[#Bonatti--2016|Bonatti et al., 2016]] ). The interpretations of change, as well as its causes and effects, can vary widely ( [[#Paerregaard--2018|Paerregaard, 2018]] ; [[#Scoville-Simonds--2018|Scoville-Simonds, 2018]] ). Rather than adapting to climate change, some people adapt climate change to their social worlds ( [[#Rasmussen--2016a|Rasmussen, 2016a]] ).

Perceptions tend to be different in rural and urban areas ( [[#Sherman--2015|Sherman et al., 2015]] ). In rural areas, it largely relates to temperature rise and changes in rainfall patterns, changes in agriculture (pests, calendars), biodiversity loss, solar radiation or changes in the oceans, and their impacts are sometimes related or even more attributed to socioeconomic and environmental drivers, as well as to negative financial outcomes ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Infante--2013|Infante and Infante, 2013]] ; [[#Postigo--2014|Postigo, 2014]] ; [[#Jacobi--2015|Jacobi et al., 2015]] ; [[#Barrucand--2017|Barrucand et al., 2017]] ; [[#Harvey--2018|Harvey et al., 2018]] ; [[#Martins--2018|Martins and Gasalla, 2018]] ; [[#Meldrum--2018|Meldrum et al., 2018]] ; [[#Córdoba%20Vargas--2019|Córdoba Vargas et al., 2019]] ; [[#Leroy--2019|Leroy, 2019]] ; [[#Viguera--2019|Viguera et al., 2019]] ; [[#Gutierrez--2020|Gutierrez et al., 2020]] ; [[#Iniguez-Gallardo--2020|Iniguez-Gallardo et al., 2020]] ; [[#Lambert--2020|Lambert and Eise, 2020]] ). In such places as Amazonia, perception increases with age ( [[#Funatsu--2019|Funatsu et al., 2019]] ). In Mediterranean Chile, younger, more educated producers and those who own their land tend to have clearer perceptions than older, less educated or tenant farmers, but they do not have a clear perception or how it may affect their yields and farming operation ( [[#Roco--2015|Roco et al., 2015]] ). In some dry and humid Ecuadorian montane forests, peasantss perceptions are in line with the scientific data, but they have a lot of difficulties to predict the changes and believe that they may not be prepared and can only be reactive ( [[#Herrador-Valencia--2016|Herrador-Valencia and Paredes, 2016]] ). In an Andean community, perceptions of climate change are homogeneous and do not vary according to gender, age or ethnicity ( [[#Cáceres-Arteaga--2020|Cáceres-Arteaga et al., 2020]] ). Among representatives of five municipalities of Lima, it was found that climate change is not well understood and residents have trouble distinguishing it from other environmental issues ( [[#Siña--2016|Siña et al., 2016]] ). In an Amazonian region, farmers provided a more accurate description than regional institutions of how it affects the local livelihood system ( [[#Altea--2020|Altea, 2020]] ). In Cuenca Auqui peasants attribute recently experienced challenges in agricultural production mainly to perceived changes in precipitation patterns, but statistical analyses of daily precipitation records at nearby stations do not corroborate those perceived changes ( [[#Gurgiser--2016|Gurgiser et al., 2016]] ).

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==== 12.5.8.3 Gender and Intersectionality ====

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There is ample empirical evidence that the impacts of climate change are not of equal scope for men and women. Women, particularly the poorest, are more vulnerable and are impacted in greater proportion. Often, for several economic and social reasons, women have less capacity to adapt, further widening structural gender gaps ( ''high confidence'' ) (Box 7.4; [[#Arana%20Zegarra--2017|Arana Zegarra, 2017]] ; [[#Casas%20Varez--2017|Casas Varez, 2017]] ; [[#Segnestam--2017|Segnestam, 2017]] ; [[#Acosta--2019|Acosta et al., 2019]] ; [[#Aldunce%20Ide--2020|Aldunce Ide et al., 2020]] ; [[#Olivera--2021|Olivera et al., 2021]] ; [[#Silva%20Rodríguez%20de%20San%20Miguel--2021|Silva Rodríguez de San Miguel et al., 2021]] ). Gender equity is deemed to be central to discussions on climate-change adaptation policies. In issues such as drinking water, energy, disasters, impacts on health and agriculture and capacity to migrate, women (poor women in particular) are affected in greater proportion, further widening structural gender gaps. In a rural community vulnerable to drought, short-term coping was more common among the women, especially among female heads of household, while adaptive actions were more common among the men; there are gendered inequalities in access to and control over different forms of capital that lead to a gender-differentiated capacity to adapt, where men are better able to adapt and women experience a downward spiral in their capacity to adapt and increasing vulnerability to drought ( [[#Segnestam--2017|Segnestam, 2017]] ).

However, women are not always the more vulnerable group. While in a broad sense climate-change impacts women more severely, there are situations where they have reacted, adapted better to or been more resilient. Grassroots women self-help groups can be active agents of change for their communities, designing and delivering gender-responsive adaptation solutions ( [[#Huairou%20Commission--2019|Huairou Commission, 2019]] ). Some studies suggest that women establish friendlier relationships with the environment and towards natural resources; studies on masculinity and environment confirm this tendency ( [[#Brough--2016|Brough et al., 2016]] ). In a multi-country study, some female-headed households tend to be slightly less vulnerable and more resilient than male-headed households, though some exceptions were found among sub-groups ( [[#Andersen--2017|Andersen et al., 2017]] ). In Chile, women are more likely to modernise irrigation and infrastructure, and gender appears to be an important element in drought adaptation ( [[#Roco--2016|Roco et al., 2016]] ). A change to agroecological practices has improved gender equality and adaptive capacity to climate change ( [[#Cáceres-Arteaga--2020|Cáceres-Arteaga et al., 2020]] ).

Recent studies emphasise that a gender approach to social inequalities ought to move beyond just looking at men and women as experiencing impacts in a differentiated manner; rather, an intersectional analysis illuminates how different individuals and groups relate differently to climate change due to their situatedness in power structures based on context-specific and dynamic social categorisations ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Kaijser--2014|Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014]] ; [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Thompson-Hall--2016|Thompson-Hall et al., 2016]] ; [[#Olivera--2021|Olivera et al., 2021]] ). Thus, the relationship between gender and adaptation demands an analytical framework that connects environmental problems with social inequalities in a complex way ( [[#Godfrey--2012|Godfrey, 2012]] ). An intersectional approach helps to better capture the diversity of adaptive strategies that men and women adopt vis-à-vis climate change. Particular constellations of race, gender, class, age or nationality reveal more complex realities ( ''high confidence'' ).

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==== 12.5.8.4 Migrations and Displacements ====

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Migration and displacements are multi-causal phenomena, and climate may exacerbate political, social, economic or other environmental drivers ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Kaenzig--2014|Kaenzig and Piguet, 2014]] ; [[#Brandt--2016|Brandt et al., 2016]] ; Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017; [[#Sudmeier-Rieux--2017|Sudmeier-Rieux et al., 2017]] ; [[#Radel--2018|Radel et al., 2018]] ; [[#Heslin--2019|Heslin et al., 2019]] ; [[#Hoffmann--2020|Hoffmann et al., 2020]] ; [[#Silva%20Rodríguez%20de%20San%20Miguel--2021|Silva Rodríguez de San Miguel et al., 2021]] ). Many case studies have been conducted on the region, but data to assess and monitor precisely the effects of climate- and weather-related disasters in migration and displacements from a broad perspective remain inaccurate (Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017; [[#Abeldaño%20Zuñiga--2020|Abeldaño Zuñiga and Fanta Garrido, 2020]] ). The most common climatic drivers include tropical storms and hurricanes, heavy rains, floods and droughts ( [[#Kaenzig--2014|Kaenzig and Piguet, 2014]] ). Positive climatic conditions also can facilitate migration ( [[#Gray--2013|Gray and Bilsborrow, 2013]] ). Peru, Colombia and Guatemala are among the countries with the largest average displacements caused by hydro-meteorological causes; Brazil had 295,000 people displaced because of disasters in 2019 (Global Internal Displacement Database, https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data ).

These processes can be interpreted as impacts on vulnerable peoples, but also as adaptation strategies to manage risks and reduce exposure when people continue with their lives, temporarily or permanently, in a different but stable situationor when family members send remittances to those that remain in the affected areas ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-7#7.4.3.2|Section 7.4.3.2]] ; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). The remittances create opportunities for adaptive capacity building because they reduce some vulnerabilities in the form of infrastructures, agricultural supplies, food, education or health, as in northern CA (NU [[#CEPAL--2018|CEPAL, 2018]] ). Anyhow, migration as adaptation is not available to everyone ( [[#Kaenzig--2014|Kaenzig and Piguet, 2014]] ), and the idea has also been contested because it may not help to overcome structural problems or point to in situ options ( [[#Radel--2018|Radel et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ruiz-de-Oña--2019|Ruiz-de-Oña et al., 2019]] ). The causal processes are complex. Surveys of migrants usually find that the main reported reason for migration is to find a job or to increase household income ( [[#Wrathall--2016|Wrathall and Suckall, 2016]] ; [[#OIM--2017|OIM, 2017]] ; [[#Radel--2018|Radel et al., 2018]] ), but the underlying reason for the lack of a job or income is rarely examined and at times may be related to climatic hazards.

Migration most often originates in rural areas, with people moving to other rural or urban areas within their home countries (Table Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE 1 in Chapter 7). In the Amazon, approximately 80% of the population are concentrated in cities due to rural–urban migrations in search of better income, livelihoods and services, in cases associated with extreme floods and droughts ( [[#Pinho--2015|Pinho et al., 2015]] ). In Ecuador, environmental variables are most likely to enhance international than internal migration ( [[#Gray--2013|Gray and Bilsborrow, 2013]] ). Hurricanes have been seen as positive triggers for international migration in CA ( [[#Spencer--2018|Spencer and Urquhart, 2018]] ). The highlands of Peru see different patterns, including daily circular migration to combine the scarce income from agricultural production with urban income, rather than abandoning farm land ( [[#Milan--2014|Milan and Ho, 2014]] ; [[#Zimmerer--2014|Zimmerer, 2014]] ; [[#Bergmann--2021|Bergmann et al., 2021]] ).

Migration to cities can mean opportunities for migrants and for urban areas, but it can also worsen existing problems, as urban poor people can become even more exposed and vulnerable, and the pressure on urban capacities may not be well absorbed ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Chisari--2016|Chisari and Miller, 2016]] ; [[#Gemenne--2020|Gemenne et al., 2020]] ). Internal migration to cities is likely to exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities related to inequality, poverty, indigence and informal activities and housing ( [[#Warn--2014|Warn and Adamo, 2014]] ). Immigration can make cities/residents more vulnerable to climate-change risks (Sections 12.5.5 and 12.5.7). Groups such as children, Indigenous Peoples and the poor are usually among the most vulnerable in migrations and displacements, which poses challenges to national policies and international aid ( [[#Sedeh--2014|Sedeh, 2014]] ; [[#Gamez--2016|Gamez, 2016]] ; [[#Ulla--2016|Ulla, 2016]] ; Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017; [[#Ramos--2017|Ramos and de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville, 2017]] ; [[#Amar-Amar--2019|Amar-Amar et al., 2019]] ; [[#Gemenne--2020|Gemenne et al., 2020]] ). In migration or displacement driven by climate effects, women are prone to lose their leadership, autonomy and voice, especially in new organisational structures imposed by authorities. This is especially the case in temporary accommodation camps created after disasters, exacerbating existing differentiated vulnerabilities ( [[#Aldunce%20Ide--2020|Aldunce Ide et al., 2020]] ). International migration has become more dangerous and difficult as border controls have become stricter, but programmes such as one to help temporary agricultural workers from Guatemala to Canada have proven successful ( [[#Gabriel--2018|Gabriel and Macdonald, 2018]] ). At the same time, emigration may lead to the loss of IKLK for adaptation ( [[#Moreno--2020b|Moreno et al., 2020b]] ).

Some areas are more likely to generate climatic migration: the Andes, the dry areas of Amazonia, northern Brazil and northern countries in CA ( ''high confidence'' ). Northeastern Brazil will lose population that will move to the south, deepening existing inequalities ( [[#Oliveira--2020|Oliveira and Pereda, 2020]] ). In a study of eight countries around the world, including Guatemala and Peru, a link was found between rainfall variability and food insecurity, which could lead to migration in areas of high prevalence of rainfed agriculture and low diversification ( [[#Warner--2014|Warner and Afifi, 2014]] ). In CA, younger individuals are more likely to migrate in response to hurricanes and especially to droughts ( [[#Baez--2017|Baez et al., 2017]] ).

The perception of gradual changes lowers the likelihood of internal migration, while sudden-onset events increase movement ( [[#Koubi--2016|Koubi et al., 2016]] ). On the other hand, it has been seen that extreme events like floods or droughts can hinder population mobility, immobilising them in their localities ( [[#Thiede--2016|Thiede et al., 2016]] ). These immobilised populations are supposed to face a double set of risks: they are unable to move away from environmental threats, and their lack of capital makes them especially vulnerable to environmental changes ( [[#Black--2011|Black et al., 2011]] ). In CSA, migrating to the US is becoming dangerous and expensive because that country is restricting entry; these trends expose local populations to the risk of becoming immobile in the near future in a place where they are extremely vulnerable ( [[#Ruano--2014|Ruano and Milan, 2014]] ; [[#McLeman--2019|McLeman, 2019]] ). A survey in Guatemala found no correlation between migration to the US and severe food insecurity in households, but the correlation became significant if the level of food insecurity was moderate, suggesting that families in extreme hardship did not have the resources to migrate ( [[#Aguilar--2019|Aguilar et al., 2019]] ). At the same time, some populations just have chosen not to move, as in Peru, where immobility among dissatisfied people is more likely to be caused by attachment to place than resource constraints ( [[#Adams--2016|Adams, 2016]] ; [[#Correia--2017|Correia and Ojima, 2017]] ). Some populations have chosen to adapt relying on their IKLK ( [[#Boillat--2013|Boillat and Berkes, 2013]] ).

Migration is often the last resort for rural communities facing water stress problems ( [[#Magrin--2014|Magrin et al., 2014]] ; [[#Ruano--2014|Ruano and Milan, 2014]] ). In Bolivia, glacial retreat has not triggered new migration flows and had a limited impact on the existing migratory patterns ( [[#Kaenzig--2015|Kaenzig, 2015]] ). In SA, climatic variability increases the likelihood of interprovince migration, rather than trapping populations. In a study of interprovincial migration motivated by temperature, an exception arose in Bolivia, and even if that could suggest an immobilised population ( [[#Thiede--2016|Thiede et al., 2016]] ), it is not clear whether they want to stay and adapt. In some cases, people want to move but wait for relocation until after the climate-related disasters have subsided (Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017).

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==== 12.5.8.5 Financing ====

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Climate-change financing is unequally distributed among CSA countries ( ''high confidence'' ). Financing of climate-change adaptation remains very much delegated to multilateral and bilateral cooperation, and the governments in the region have heavily relied on it. Still, there are some concerns regarding justice in the distribution of these funds ( [[#Khan--2020|Khan et al., 2020]] ). The UNFCCC has created financing mechanisms throughout its functioning years, but a wide range of issues that present challenges for access by recipients ( [[#Hickmann--2019|Hickmann et al., 2019]] ). These include a lack of technical capacity, difficulties in following the procedures established by the various financial entities and low levels of awareness about the need for action, as well as the different sources of funds available. The fiscal policies of various countries have contributed to government financing in the fight against climate change ( [[#World%20Bank--2021|World Bank, 2021]] ). Since the Paris Agreement, countries have pledged NDCs that introduce the need to design and implement carbon budgets with a corresponding consideration of the efficiency and costs and benefits involved in each mitigation or adaptation to climate-change projects ( [[#Fragkos--2020|Fragkos, 2020]] ).

According to UNFCCC, Latin America and the Caribbean, for the period 2015–2016, obtained 22% of climate financing from multilateral climate funds. In this section we use data from https://climatefundsupdate.org/data-dashboard , and most of the reported information for Latin American and the Caribbean includes Mexico, since the scope of this chapter does not include Mexico, so we must rely on the raw data included in the data dashboard mentioned in the link (see also Guzmán et al. [2016]). According to the data, 76% of climate-related financing went to mitigation projects, with the remaining 24% going to adaptation. Of the total financing provided by the multilateral climate funds to the region, 51% took the form of concessional loans, while 47% was provided as grants. For the region, approvals in the 2015–2016 period were concentrated in Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Colombia, where large-scale mitigation projects were launched supported by the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Clean Technology Fund (CTF). For the period 2003–2019, the total contribution of climate financing to SA and the Caribbean is about USD 3558 million. The largest contributors to climate financing in the region come from the GCF, which approved USD 824.2 million for 23 projects. Brazil is the top recipient with USD 195 million, followed by Argentina with about USD 162 million. The second provider is the Amazon Fund with USD 717 million allocated to 102 projects in Brazil. In 2018, the CTF became the third largest source of financing, with USD 483 million dollars approved for 24 projects; the main recipient is Chile with USD 16,207 million, followed by Colombia with USD 170 million. The five largest projects approved in the region in 2018 were through the GCF. Brazil (USD 195 million) received support for reducing energy consumption across Brazilian cities, while Argentina (USD 103 million) received support to scale up investments by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in renewable energy and energy efficiency. In both cases, financing is predominantly provided as concessional loans.

Climate financing in CSA is mainly focused on mitigation actions ( ''high confidence'' ). In SA and the Caribbean, 73% (USD 2579 million) of funding to date has supported mitigation. Only 21% (USD 761 million) of the funding supports adaptation projects, and the remaining 4% (USD 217 million) supports multi-focus projects. Of the 51 new projects in SA and the Caribbean approved in 2018–2019, the GCF financed USD 508 million over ten projects. Amazon Fund was next with USD 81 million for 10 projects. While the GCF focuses on large and transformative projects and programmes, and in connection with broader reform of the policy framework in the region, the Amazon Fund targets smaller project interventions.

Climate financing in the region is concentrated in Brazil, which receives a third of the region’s funding, with 41 mitigation activities receiving more than 6 times that of adaptation from multilateral climate funds. By the size of its GDP, Brazil receives the largest amount of financing; this leaves the poorest countries with little or no financing and therefore reinforces a vicious circle of poverty and vulnerability. Whether this is due to Brazil’s being more successful at presenting eligible projects, a lack of commitment from other developing countries or some other structural factors is an open question. In any case, compensation schemes for the most vulnerable countries appear as needed, given the differences in vulnerability to climate-related damage ( [[#Antimiani--2017|Antimiani et al., 2017]] ). This is aggravated by the fact that fund management is in the hands of supranational entities while inequalities remain in regions within a country, particularly in highly centralised countries, as is the case for countries in the region.

COVID-19 recovery plans can have synergistic effects for climate-change adaptation ( ''medium confidence: low evidence, high agreement'' ). A key decision point for adaptation will be how the world responds to the pandemic. The global recovery can serve as a catalyst to increased and more equitable climate financing. Globally, recovery packages will likely have the power to change the global trajectory towards meeting the targets of the Paris Agreement and building a more just future ( [[#Forster--2020|Forster et al., 2020]] ). Several factors are relevant to the design of economic recovery packages: the long-run economic multiplier, contributions to the productive asset base and national wealth, speed of implementation, affordability, simplicity, impact on inequality and various political considerations ( [[#Hepburn--2020|Hepburn et al., 2020]] ). A key objective of any recovery package is to stabilise expectations, restore confidence and channel desired surplus savings into productive investment. However, ‘business as usual’ implies temperature increases over 3°C, implying great future uncertainty, instability and climate damage. An alternative way to restore confidence is to steer investment towards a productive and balanced portfolio of sustainable physical capital, human capital, social capital, intangible capital and natural capital assets ( [[#Zenghelis--2020|Zenghelis et al., 2020]] ), consistent with global goals on climate change. Finally, any recovery package, including climate-friendly recovery, is unlikely to be implemented unless it also addresses existing societal and political concerns—such as poverty alleviation, inequality and social inclusion—which vary from country to country.

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