Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-5 (section)

== 5.7 Enabling conditions and knowledge gaps ==

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To achieve mitigation and adaptation to climate change in food systems, enabling conditions are needed to scale up the adoption of effective strategies (such as those described in Sections 5.3 to 5.6 and Chapter 6). These enabling conditions include multi-level governance and multi-sector institutions (Supplementary Material Section SM5.7) and multiple policy pathways (Sections 5.7.1 and 5.7.2). In this regard, the subnational level is gaining relevance both in food systems and climate change. Just Transitions are needed to address both climate change and food security (Section 5.7.3). Mobilisation of knowledge, education, and capacity will be required (Section 5.7.4) to fill knowledge gaps (Section 5.7.5).

Effective governance of food systems and climate change requires the establishment of institutions responsible for coordinating among multiple sectors (education, agriculture, environment, welfare, consumption, economic, health), levels (local, regional, national, global) and actors (governments, CSO, public sector, private sector, international bodies). Positive outcomes will be engendered by participation, learning, flexibility, and cooperation. See Supplementary Material SM5.7 for further discussion.

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=== 5.7.1 Enabling policy environments ===

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The scope for responses to make sustainable land use inclusive of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and the policies to implement them, are covered in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. Here we highlight some of the major policy areas that have shaped the food system, and might be able to shape responses in future. Although two families of policy – agriculture and trade – have been instrumental in shaping the food system in the past (and potentially have led to conditions that increase climate vulnerability) (Benton and Bailey 2019), a much wider family of policy instruments can be deployed to reconfigure the food system to deliver healthy diets in a sustainable way.

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==== 5.7.1.1 Agriculture and trade policy ====

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'''Agriculture.''' The thrust of agricultural policies over the last 50 years has been to increase productivity, even if at the expense of environmental sustainability (Benton and Bailey 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1230|1230]]</sup> ). For example, in 2007–2009, 46% of OECD support for agriculture was based on measures of output (price support or payments based on yields), 37% of support was based on the current or historical area planted, herd size (or correlated measures of the notional costs of farming), and 13% was payments linked to input prices. In a similar vein, non-OECD countries have promoted productivity growth for their agricultural sectors.

'''Trade.''' Along with agricultural policy to grow productivity, the development of frameworks to liberalise trade (such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – GATT – Uruguay Round, now incorporated into the World Trade Organization) have been essential in stimulating the growth of a globalised food system. Almost every country has a reliance on trade to fulfil some or all of its local food needs, and trade networks have grown to be highly complex (Puma et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1231|1231]]</sup> ; MacDonald et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1232|1232]]</sup> ; Fader et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1233|1233]]</sup> and Ercsey-Ravasz et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1467|1467]]</sup> ). This is because many countries lack the capacity to produce sufficient food due to climatic conditions, soil quality, water constraints, and availability of farmland (FAO 2015b <sup>[[#fn:r1234|1234]]</sup> ). In a world of liberalised trade, using comparative advantage to maximise production in high-yielding commodities, exporting excess production, and importing supplies of other goods supports economic growth.

City states as well as many small island states, do not have adequate farmland to feed their populations, while Sub-Saharan African countries are projected to experience high population growth as well as to be negatively impacted by climate change, and thus will likely find it difficult to produce all of their own food supplies (Agarwal et al. 2002 <sup>[[#fn:r1235|1235]]</sup> ). One study estimates that some 66 countries are currently incapable of being self-sufficient in food (Pradhan et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1236|1236]]</sup> ). Estimates of the proportion of people relying on trade for basic food security vary from about 16% to about 22% (Fader et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1237|1237]]</sup> ; Pradhan et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1238|1238]]</sup> ), with this figure rising to between 1.5 and 6 billion people by 2050, depending on dietary shifts, agricultural gains, and climate impacts (Pradhan et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1239|1239]]</sup> ).

Global trade is therefore essential for achieving food and nutrition security under climate change because it provides a mechanism for enhancing the efficiency of supply chains, reducing the vulnerability of food availability to changes in local weather, and moving production from areas of surplus to areas of deficit (FAO 2018d <sup>[[#fn:r1240|1240]]</sup> ). However, the benefits of trade will only be realised if trade is managed in ways that maximise broadened access to new markets while minimising the risks of increased exposure to international competition and market volatility (Challinor et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1241|1241]]</sup> ; Brown et al. 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r1242|1242]]</sup> ).

As described in Section 5.8.1, trade acts to buffer exposure to climate risks when the market works well. Under certain conditions – such as shocks, or the perception of a shock, coupled with a lack of food stocks or lack of transparency about stocks (Challinor et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1243|1243]]</sup> ; Marchand et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1244|1244]]</sup> ) – the market can fail and trade can expose countries to food price shocks.

Furthermore, Clapp (2016) showed that trade, often supported by high levels of subsidy support to agriculture in some countries, can depress world prices and reduce incomes for other agricultural exporters. Lower food prices that result from subsidy support may benefit urban consumers in importing countries, but at the same time they may hurt farmers’ incomes in those same countries. The outmigration of smallholder farmers from the agriculture sector across the Global South is significantly attributed to these trade patterns of cheap food imports (Wittman 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1245|1245]]</sup> ; McMichael 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1246|1246]]</sup> ; Akram-Lodhi et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1247|1247]]</sup> ). Food production and trade cartels, as well as financial speculation on food futures markets, affect low-income market-dependent populations.

Food sovereignty is a framing developed to conceptualise these issues (Reuter 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1248|1248]]</sup> ). They directly relate to the ability of local communities and nations to build their food systems, based, among other aspects, on diversified crops and ILK. If a country enters international markets by growing more commodity crops and reducing local crop varieties, it may get economic benefits, but may also expose itself to climate risks and food insecurity by increasing reliance on trade, which may be increasingly disrupted by climate risks. These include a local lack of resilience from reduced diversity of products, but also exposure to food price spikes, which can become amplified by market mechanisms such as speculation.

In summary, countries must determine the balance between locally produced versus imported food (and feed) such that it both minimises climate risks and ensures sustainable food security. There is ''medium evidence'' that trade has positive benefits but also creates exposure to risks (Section 5.3).

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==== 5.7.1.2 Scope for expanded policies ====

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There are a range of ways that policy can intervene to stimulate change in the food system – through agriculture, research and development, food standards, manufacture and storage, changing the food environment and access to food, changing practices to encourage or discourage trade (Table 5.6). Novel incentives can stimulate the market, for example, through reduction in waste or changes in diets to gain benefits from a health or sustainability direction. Different contexts with different needs will require different set of policies at local, regional and national levels. See Supplementary Material Section SM5.7 for further discussion on expanded policies.

In summary, although agriculture is often thought to be shaped predominantly by agriculture and trade policies, there are over twenty families of policy areas that can shape agricultural production directly or indirectly (through environmental regulations or through markets, including by shaping consumer behaviour). Thus, delivering outcomes promoting climate change adaptation and mitigation can arise from policies across many departments, if suitably designed and aligned.

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'''Table 5.6'''

<span id="potential-policy-families-for-food-related-adaptation-and-mitigation-of-climate-change.-the-column-scale-refers-to-scale-of-implementation-international-i-national-n-sub-national-regional-r-and-local-l."></span>
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'''Potential policy ‘families’ for food-related adaptation and mitigation of climate change. The column ‘scale’ refers to scale of implementation: International (I), national (N), sub-national-regional (R), and local (L).'''
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[[File:645f507558b2f2917e4fd1b0a1e14646 table-5.6-a.png]] [[File:059596f453f508b1550909222f9d302f table-5.6-b.png]]

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==== 5.7.1.3 Health-related policies and cost savings ====

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The co-benefits arising from mitigating climate change through changing dietary patterns, and thus demand, have potentially important economic impacts ( ''high confidence'' ). The gross value added from agriculture to the global economy (GVA) was 1.9 trillion USD2013 (FAO 2015c <sup>[[#fn:r1249|1249]]</sup> ), from a global agriculture economy (GDP) of 2.7 trillion USD2016. In 2013, the FAO estimated an annual cost of 3.5 trillion USD for malnutrition (FAO 2013a <sup>[[#fn:r1250|1250]]</sup> ).

However, this is likely to be an underestimate of the economic health costs of current food systems for several reasons: (i) lack of data – for example there is little robust data in the UK on the prevalence of malnutrition in the general population (beyond estimates of obesity and surveys of malnourishment of patients in hospital and care homes, from which estimates over 3 million people in the UK are undernourished (BAPEN 2012); (ii) lack of robust methodology to determine, for example, the exact relationship between over-consumption of poor diets, obesity and non-communicable diseases like diabetes, cardiovascular disease, a range of cancers or Alzheimer’s disease (Pedditizi et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1251|1251]]</sup> ), and (iii) unequal healthcare spending around the world.

In the USA, the economic cost of diabetes, a disease strongly associated with obesity and affecting about 23 million Americans, is estimated at 327 billion USD2017 (American Diabetes Association 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1252|1252]]</sup> ), with direct healthcare costs of 9600 USD per person. By 2025, it is estimated that, globally, there will be over 700 million people with diabetes (NCD-RisC 2016b <sup>[[#fn:r1253|1253]]</sup> ), over 30 times the number in the USA. Even if a global average cost of diabetes per capita were a quarter of that in the USA, the total economic cost of diabetes would be approximately the same as global agricultural GDP. Finally, (iv) the role of agriculture in causing ill-health beyond dietary health, such as through degrading air quality (e.g., Paulot and Jacob 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1254|1254]]</sup> ).

Whilst data of the healthcare costs associated with the food system and diets are scattered and the proportion of costs directly attributable to diets and food consumption is uncertain, there is potential for more preventative healthcare systems to save significant costs that could incentivise agricultural business models to change what is grown, and how. The potential of moving towards more preventative healthcare is widely discussed in health economics literature, particularly in order to reduce the life-style-related (including dietary-related) disease component in aging populations (e.g., Bloom et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1255|1255]]</sup> ).

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==== 5.7.1.4 Multiple policy pathways ====

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As discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7, there is a wide potential suite of interventions and policies that can potentially enhance the adaptation of food systems to climate change, as well as enhance the mitigation potential of food systems on climate change. There is an increasing number of studies that argue that the key to sustainable land management is not in land management practices but in the factors that determine the demand for products from land (such as food). Public health policy, therefore, has the potential to affect dietary choice and thus the demand for different amounts of, and types of, food.

Obersteiner et al. (2016) <sup>[[#fn:r1256|1256]]</sup> show that increasing the average price of food is an important policy lever that, by reducing demand, reduces food waste, pressure on land and water, impacts on biodiversity and through reducing emissions, mitigates climate change and potentially helps to achieve multiple SDGs. Whilst such policy responses – such as a carbon tax applied to goods including food – has the potential to be regressive, affecting the poor differentially (Frank et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1257|1257]]</sup> ; Hasegawa et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1258|1258]]</sup> and Kehlbacher et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1259|1259]]</sup> ), and increasing food insecurity – further development of social safety nets can help to avoid the regressive nature (Hasegawa et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1260|1260]]</sup> ). Hasegawa et al. (2018) <sup>[[#fn:r1261|1261]]</sup> point out that such safety nets for vulnerable populations could be funded from the revenues arising from a carbon tax.

The evidence suggests, as with SR15 (IPCC 2018a <sup>[[#fn:r1262|1262]]</sup> ) and its multiple pathways to climate change solutions, that there is no single solution that will address the problems of food and climate change, but instead there is a need to deploy many solutions, simultaneously adapted to the needs and options available in a given context. For example, Springmann et al. (2018a) indicate that maintaining the food system within planetary boundaries at mid-century, including equitable climate, requires increasing the production (and resilience) of agricultural outputs (i.e., closing yield gaps), reducing waste, and changes in diets towards ones often described as flexitarian (low-meat dietary patterns that are in line with available evidence on healthy eating). Such changes can have significant co-benefits for public health, as well as facing significant challenges to ensure equity (in terms of affordability for those in poverty).

Significant changes in the food system require them to be acceptable to the public (‘public license’), or they will be rejected. Focus groups with members of the public around the world, on the issue of changing diets, have shown that there is a general belief that the government plays a key role in leading efforts for change in consumption patterns (Wellesley et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1263|1263]]</sup> ). If governments are not leading on an issue, or indicating the need for it through leading public dialogue, it signals to their citizens that the issue is unimportant or undeserving of concern.

In summary, there is significant potential ( ''high confidence'' ) that, through aligning multiple policy goals, multiple benefits can be realised that positively impact public health, mitigation and adaptation (e.g., adoption of healthier diets, reduction in waste, reduction in environmental impact). These benefits may not occur without the alignment across multiple policy areas ( ''high confidence'' ).

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=== 5.7.2 Enablers for changing markets and trade ===

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‘Demand’ for food is not an exogenous variable to the food system but is shaped crucially by its ability to produce, market, and supply food of different types and prices. These market dynamics can be influenced by a variety of factors beyond consumer preferences (e.g., corporate power and marketing, transparency, the food environment more generally), and the ability to reshape the market can also depend on its internal resilience and/or external shocks (Challinor et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1264|1264]]</sup> ; Oliver et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1265|1265]]</sup> ).

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==== 5.7.2.1 Capital markets ====

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Two areas are often discussed regarding the role of capital markets in shaping the food system. First, investment in disruptive technologies might stimulate climate-smart food systems (WEF/ McKinsey &amp; Company 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1266|1266]]</sup> and Bailey and Wellesley 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1267|1267]]</sup> ), including alternative proteins, such as laboratory or ‘clean meat’ (which has significant ability to impact on land-use requirements) (Alexander et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1268|1268]]</sup> ) (Section 5.5.1.6). An innovation environment through which disruptive technology can emerge typically requires the support of public policy, whether in directly financing small and emerging enterprises, or funding research and development via reducing tax burdens.

Second, widespread adoption of (and perhaps underpinned by regulation for) natural capital accounting as well as financial accounting are needed. Investors can then be aware of the risk exposure of institutions, which can undermine sustainability through externalising costs onto the environment. The prime example of this in the realm of climate change is the Carbon Disclosure Project, with around 2500 companies voluntarily disclosing their carbon footprint, representing nearly 60% of the world’s market capital (CDP 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1269|1269]]</sup> ).

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==== 5.7.2.2 Insurance and re-insurance ====

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The insurance industry can incentivise actors’ behaviour towards greater climate mitigation or adaptation, including building resilience. For example, Lloyd’s of London analysed the implications of extreme weather for the insurance market, and conclude that the insurance industry needs to examine their exposure to risks through the food supply chain and develop innovative risk-sharing products that can make an important contribution to resilience of the global food system (Lloyd’s 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1270|1270]]</sup> ).

Many of these potential areas for enabling healthy and sustainable food systems are also knowledge gaps, in that, whilst the levers are widely known, their efficacy and the ability to scale-up, in any given context, are poorly understood.

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=== 5.7.3 Just Transitions to sustainability ===

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Research is limited on how land-use transitions would proceed from ruminant production to other socio-ecological farming systems. Ruminants have been associated with humans since the early development of agriculture, and the role of ruminants in many agricultural systems and smallholder communities is substantial. Ruminant production systems have been adapted to a wide range of socioeconomic and environmental conditions in crop, forestry, and food processing settings (Čolović et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1271|1271]]</sup> ), bioenergy production (de Souza et al. 2019), and food waste recycling (Westendorf 2000 <sup>[[#fn:r1272|1272]]</sup> ). Pasture cultivation in succession to crops is recognised as important to management of pest and diseases cycles and to improve soil carbon stocks and soil quality (Carvalho and Dedieu 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1273|1273]]</sup> ). Grazing livestock is important as a reserve of food and economic stocks for some smallholders (Ouma et al. 2003 <sup>[[#fn:r1274|1274]]</sup> ).

Possible land-use options for transitions away from livestock production in a range of systems include (a) retain land but reduce investments to run a more extensive production system; (b) change land use by adopting a different production activity; (c) abandon land (or part of the farm) to allow secondary vegetation regrowth (Carvalho et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1275|1275]]</sup> and Laue and Arima 2016); and (d) invest in afforestation or reforestation (Baynes et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1276|1276]]</sup> ). The extensification option could lead to increases rather than decreases in GHG emissions related to reduction in beef consumption. Large-scale abandonment, afforestation, or reforestation would probably have more positive environmental outcomes, but could result in economic and social issues that would require governmental subsidies to avoid decline and migration in some regions (Henderson et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1277|1277]]</sup> ).

Alternative economic use of land, such as bioenergy production, could balance the negative socioeconomic impact of reducing beef output, reduce the tax values needed to reduce consumption, and avoid extensification of ruminant production systems (Wirsenius et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1278|1278]]</sup> ). However, the analysis of the transition of land use for ruminants to other agricultural production systems is still a literature gap (Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 6).

Finally, it is important to recognise that, while energy alternatives produce the same function for the consumer, it is questionable that providing the same nutritional value through an optimised mix of dietary ingredients provides the same utility for humans. Food has a central role in human pleasure, socialisation, cultural identity, and health (Röös et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1279|1279]]</sup> ), including some of the most vulnerable groups, so Just Transitions and their costs need to be taken into account. Pilot projects are important to provide greater insights for large-scale policy design, implementation, and enforcement.

In summary, more research is needed on how land-use transitions would proceed from ruminant production to other farming systems and affect the farmers and other food system actors involved. There is ''limited evidence'' on what the decisions of farmers under lower beef demand would be.

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=== 5.7.4 Mobilising knowledge ===

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Addressing climate change-related challenges and ensuring food security requires all types of knowledge (formal/non-formal, scientific/ indigenous, women, youth, technological). Miles et al. (2017) stated that a research and policy feedback that allows transitions to sustainable food systems must take a whole system approach. Currently, in transmitting knowledge for food security and land sustainability under climate change there are three major approaches: (i) public technology transfer with demonstration (extension agents); (ii) public and private advisory services (for intensification techniques) and; (iii) non-formal education with many different variants such as farmer field schools, rural resource centres; facilitation extension where front-line agents primarily work as ‘knowledge brokers’ in facilitating the teaching-learning process among all types of farmers (including women and rural young people), or farmer-to-farmer, where farmers act themselves as knowledge transfer and sharing actors through peer processes.

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==== 5.7.4.1 Indigenous and local knowledge ====

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Recent discourse has a strong orientation towards scaling-up innovation and adoption by local farmers. However, autonomous adaptation, indigenous knowledge and local knowledge are both important for agricultural adaptation (Biggs et al.2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1280|1280]]</sup> )(Section5.3).These involve the promotion of farmer participation in governance structures, research, and the design of systems for the generation and dissemination of knowledge and technology, so that farmers’ needs and knowledge can be taken into consideration. Klenk et al. (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r1281|1281]]</sup> found that mobilisation of local knowledge can inform adaptation decision-making and may facilitate greater flexibility in government-funded research. As an example, rural innovation in terrace agriculture developed on the basis of a local coping mechanism and adopted by peasant farmers in Latin America may serve as an adaptation option or starting place for learning about climate change responses (Bocco and Napoletano 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1282|1282]]</sup> ). Clemens et al. (2015) <sup>[[#fn:r1283|1283]]</sup> found that an open dialogue platform enabled horizontal exchange of ideas and alliances for social learning and knowledge-sharing in Vietnam. Improving local technologies in a participatory manner, through on-farm experimentation, farmer-to- farmer exchange, consideration of women and youths, is also relevant in mobilising knowledge and technologies.

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Citizen science has been tested as a useful tool with potential for biodiversity conservation (Schmitz et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1284|1284]]</sup> ) and mobilising knowledge from society. In food systems, knowledge-holders (e.g., farmers and pastoralists) are trained to gather scientific data in order to promote conservation and resource management (Fulton et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1285|1285]]</sup> ) or to conserve and use traditional knowledge in developed countries relevant to climate change adaptation and mitigation through the use of ICT (Calvet-Mir et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1286|1286]]</sup> ).

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==== 5.7.4.3 Capacity building and education ====

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Mobilising knowledge may also require significant efforts on capacity building and education to scale up food system responses to climate change. This may involve increasing the capacity of farmers to manage current climate risks and to mitigate and adapt in their local contexts, and of citizens and consumers to understand the links between food demand and climate change emissions and impacts, as well as policy makers to take a systemic view of the issues. Capacity building may also require institutional change. For example, alignment of policies towards sustainable and healthy food systems may require building institutional capacity across policy silos.

As a tool for societal transformation, education is a powerful strategy to accelerate changes in the way we produce and consume food. Education refers to early learning and lifelong acquisition of skills for higher awareness and actions for solving food system challenges (FAO 2005 <sup>[[#fn:r1287|1287]]</sup> ). Education also entails vocational training, research and institutional strengthening (Hollinger 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1288|1288]]</sup> ). Educational focus changes according to the supply side (e.g., crop selection, input resource management, yield improvement, and diversification) and the demand since (nutrition and dietary health implications). Education on food loss and waste spans both the supply and demand sides.

In developing countries, extension learning such as farmer field schools – also known asrural resources centers – are established to promote experiential learning on improved production and food transformation (FAO 2016c <sup>[[#fn:r1289|1289]]</sup> ). In developed countries, education campaigns are being undertaken to reduce food waste, improve diets and redefine acceptable food (e.g., “less than perfect” fruits and vegetables), and ultimately can contribute to changes in the structure of food industries (Heller 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1290|1290]]</sup> ; UNCCD 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1291|1291]]</sup> ).

The design of new education modules from primary to secondary to tertiary education could help create new jobs in the realm of sustainability (e.g., certification programmes). For example, one area could be educating managers of recycling programmes for food-efficient cities where food and organic waste are recycled to become fertilisers (Jara-Samaniego et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1292|1292]]</sup> ). Research and education need to be coordinated so that knowledge gaps can be filled and greater trust established in shifting behaviour of individuals to be more sustainable. Education campaigns can also influence policy and legislation, and help to advance successful outcomes for climate change mitigation and adaptation regarding supply-side innovations, technologies, trade, and investment, and demand-side evolution of food choices for health and sustainability, and greater gender equality throughout the entire food system (Heller 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1293|1293]]</sup> ).

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=== 5.7.5 Knowledge gaps and key research areas ===

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Knowledge gaps around options and solutions and their (co-)benefits and trade-offs are increasingly important now that implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures is scaling up.

Research is needed on how a changing climate and interventions to respond to it will affect all aspects of food security, including access, utilisation and stability, not just availability. Knowledge gaps across all the food security pillars are one of the barriers hindering mitigation and adaptation to climate change in the food system and its capacity to deliver food security. The key areas for climate change, food systems, and food security research are enlisted below.

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==== 5.7.5.1 Impacts and adaptation ====

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'''Climate Services (food availability).''' Agriculture and food security is a priority area for the Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCS) a programme of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The GFCS enables vulnerable sectors and populations to better manage climate variability and adapt to climate change (Hansen et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1294|1294]]</sup> ). Global precipitation datasets and remote sensing technologies can be used to detect local to regional anomalies in precipitation as a tool for devising early-warning systems for drought-related impacts, such as famine (Huntington et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1295|1295]]</sup> ).

'''Crop and livestock genetics (food availability, utilisation). ''' Advances in plant breeding are crucial for enhancing food security under changing climate for a wide variety of crops including fruits and vegetables as well as staples. Genetics improvement is needed in order to breed crops and livestock that can both reduce GHG emissions, increase drought and heat tolerance (e.g., rice), and enhance nutrition and food security (Nankishore and Farrell 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1296|1296]]</sup> ; Kole et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1297|1297]]</sup> ). Many of these characteristics already exist in traditional varieties, including orphan crops and indigenous and local breeds, so research is needed to recuperate such varieties and evaluate their potential for adaptation and mitigation.

Phenomics-assisted breeding appears to be a promising tool for deciphering the stress responsiveness of crop and animal species (Papageorgiou 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1298|1298]]</sup> ; Kole et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1299|1299]]</sup> ; Lopes et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1300|1300]]</sup> ; Boettcher et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1301|1301]]</sup> ). Initially discovered in bacteria and archaea, CRISPR–Cas9 is an adaptive immune system found in prokaryotes and since 2013 has been used as a genome editing tool in plants. The main use of CRISPR systems is to achieve improved yield performance, biofortification, biotic and abiotic stress tolerance, with rice (Oryza sativa) being the most studied crop (Gao 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1302|1302]]</sup> and Ricroch et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1303|1303]]</sup> ).

'''Climate impact models (food availability).''' Understanding the full range of climate impacts on staple crops (especially those important in developing countries, such as fruits and vegetables) is missing in the current climate impact models. Further, the CO2 effects on nutrition quality of different crops are just beginning to be parameterised in the models (Müller et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1304|1304]]</sup> ). Bridging these gaps is essential for projecting future dietary diversity, healthy diets, and food security (Bisbis et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1305|1305]]</sup> ). Crop model improvements are needed for simulation of evapotranspiration to guide crop water management in future climate conditions (Cammarano et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1306|1306]]</sup> ). Similarly, mores studies are needed to understand the impacts of climate change on global rangelands, livestock and aquaculture, which have received comparatively less attention than the impacts on crop production.

'''Resilience to extreme events (food availability, access, utilisation, and stability).''' On the adaptation side, knowledge gaps include impacts of climate shocks (Rodríguez Osuna et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1307|1307]]</sup> ) as opposed to impacts of slow-onset climate change, how climate-related harvest failures in one continent may influence food security outcomes in others, impacts of climate change on fruits and vegetables and their nutrient contents.

<div id="section-5-7-5-2-emissions-and-mitigation"></div>

<span id="emissions-and-mitigation"></span>
==== 5.7.5.2 Emissions and mitigation ====

<div id="section-5-7-5-2-emissions-and-mitigation-block-1"></div>

'''GHG emissions inventory techniques (food utilisation). ''' Knowledge gaps include food consumption-based emissions at national scales, embedded emissions (overseas footprints) of food systems, comparison of GHG emissions per type of food systems (e.g., smallholder and large-scale commercial food systems), and GHG emissions from land-based aquaculture. An additional knowledge gap is the need for more socio-economic assessments of the potential of various integrated practices to deliver the mitigation potential estimated from a biophysical perspective. This needs to be effectively monitored, verified, and implemented, once barriers and incentives to adoption of the techniques, practices, and technologies are considered. Thus, future research needs fill the gaps on evaluation of climate actions in the food system.

'''Food supply chains (food availability).''' The expansion of the cold chain into developing economies means increased energy consumption and GHG emissions at the consumer stages of the food system, but its net impact on GHG emissions for food systems as a whole, is complex and uncertain (Heard and Miller 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1308|1308]]</sup> ). Further understanding of negative side effects in intensive food processing systems is still needed.

Blockchains, as a distributed digital ledger technology which ensures transparency, traceability, and security, is showing promise for easing some global food supply chain management challenges, including the need for documentation of sustainability and the circular economy for stakeholders including governments, communities, and consumers to meet sustainability goals. Blockchain-led transformation of food supply chains is still in its early stages; research is needed on overcoming barriers to adoption (Tripoli and Schmidhuber 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1309|1309]]</sup> ; Casado-Vara et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1310|1310]]</sup> ; Mao et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1311|1311]]</sup> ; Saberi et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1312|1312]]</sup> ).

<div id="section-5-7-5-3-synergies-and-trade-offs"></div>

<span id="synergies-and-trade-offs"></span>
==== 5.7.5.3 Synergies and trade-offs ====

<div id="section-5-7-5-3-synergies-and-trade-offs-block-1"></div>

'''Supply-side and demand-side mitigation and adaptation (food availability, utilisation).''' Knowledge gaps exist in characterising the potential and risks associated with novel mitigation technologies on the supply side (e.g., inhibitors, targeted breeding, cellular agriculture, etc.). Additionally, most integrated assessment models (IAMs) currently have limited regional data on BECCS projects because of little BECCS implementation (Lenzi et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1313|1313]]</sup> ). Hence, several BECCS scenarios rely on assumptions regarding regional climate, soils and infrastructure suitability (Köberle et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1314|1314]]</sup> ) as well as international trade (Lamers et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1315|1315]]</sup> ).

Areas for study include how to incentivise, regulate, and raise awareness of the co-benefits of healthy consumption patterns and climate change mitigation and adaptation; to improve access to healthy diets for vulnerable groups through food assistance programmes; and to implement policies and campaigns to reduce food loss and food waste. Knowledge gaps also exist on the role of different policies, and underlying uncertainties, to promote changes in food habits towards climate resilience and healthy diets.

'''Food systems, land-use change, and telecoupling (food availability, access, utilisation).''' The analytical framework of telecoupling has recently been proposed to address this complexity, particularly the connections, flows, and feedbacks characterising food systems (Friis et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1316|1316]]</sup> ; Easter et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1317|1317]]</sup> ). For example, how will climate-induced shifts in livestock and crop diseases affect food production and consumption in the future. Investigating the social and ecological consequences of these changes will contribute to decision-making under uncertainty in the future. Research areas include food systems and their boundaries, hierarchies, and scales through metabolism studies, political ecology and cultural anthropology.

'''Food-Energy-Water Nexus (food availability, utilisation, stability)''' . Emerging interdisciplinary science efforts are providing new understanding of the interdependence of food, energy, and water systems. These interdependencies are beginning to take into account climate change, food security, and AFOLU assessments (Scanlon et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1318|1318]]</sup> ; Liu et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1319|1319]]</sup> ). These science advances, in turn, provide critical information for coordinated management to improve the affordability, reliability, and environmental sustainability of food, energy, and water systems. Despite significant advances within the past decade, there are still many challenges for the scientific community. These include the need for interdisciplinary science related to the food-energy-water nexus; ground-based monitoring and modelling at local-to-regional scales (Van Gaelen et al. 2017); incorporating human and institutional behaviour in models; partnerships among universities, industry, and government to develop policy-relevant data; and systems modelling to evaluate trade-offs associated with food-energy-water decisions (Scanlon et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1320|1320]]</sup> ).

However, the nexus approach, as a conceptual framework, requires the recognition that, although land and the goods and services it provides is finite, potential demand for the goods and services may be greater than the ability to supply them sustainably (Benton et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1321|1321]]</sup> ). By addressing demand-side issues, as well as supply-side efficiencies, it provides a potential route for minimising trade-offs for different goods and services (Benton et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1322|1322]]</sup> ) (Section 5.6).

<span id="future-challenges-to-food-security"></span>