Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-12 (section)

==== 12.5.8.1 Public Policies, Social Movements and Participation ====

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Public policies related to adaptation must be seen in the wider context of environmental policies and governance, as they usually address climatic processes in synergy with other environmental and socioeconomic drivers ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Ding--2017|Ding et al., 2017]] ; [[#Aldunce%20Ide--2020|Aldunce Ide et al., 2020]] ; [[#Comisión%20Europea--2020|Comisión Europea, 2020]] ; [[#Lampis--2020|Lampis et al., 2020]] ; [[#Scoville-Simonds--2020|Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020]] ). However, some people point to education, sanitation or social assistance, among other sectors ( [[#Bonatti--2019|Bonatti et al., 2019]] ). In Brazil, for example, it would be difficult to clearly separate climate-change adaptation and urban policies ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#PBMC--2016|PBMC, 2016]] ; [[#Barbi--2017|Barbi and da Costa Ferreira, 2017]] ; [[#Marques%20Di%20Giulio--2017|Marques Di Giulio et al., 2017]] ; [[#Empresa%20de%20Pesquisa%20Energética--2018|Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2018]] ; [[#Checco--2019|Checco and Caldas, 2019]] ; [[#Canil--2020|Canil et al., 2020]] ).

Many public policies related to climate change have become symbolic, in conflict with prevailing economic policies and practices ( ''medium confidence: low evidence, high agreement'' ). Urban adaptation plans can be in conflict with other policies, and there may exist insufficient support in multiple areas such as social attitudes and behaviour, knowledge, education and human capital, finance, governance, institutions and policy ( [[#Villamizar--2017|Villamizar et al., 2017]] ; [[#Koch--2018|Koch, 2018]] ). Some policies around climate-related displacements and migrants have been considered in NDCs (Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017; [[#Yamamoto--2018|Yamamoto et al., 2018]] ; [[#de%20Salles%20Cavedon-Capdeville--2020|de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville et al., 2020]] ).

Because there are asymmetries among populations regarding the vulnerability and benefits of adaptation, along the lines of gender, age, socioeconomic conditions and ethnicity, it has been noticed that adaptation policies and programmes must be adequate to diverse conditions and actors ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Kaijser--2014|Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014]] ; [[#Walshe--2016|Walshe and Argumedo, 2016]] ; [[#Baucom--2017|Baucom and Omelsky, 2017]] ; [[#Harvey--2018|Harvey et al., 2018]] ).

Effective adaptation and mitigation depend on policies and measures at multiple scales, especially when it comes to the involvement of more exposed and vulnerable people. The participation of experts, communities and citizens has shown to be effective ( [[#FAO%20and%20Fundación%20Futuro%20Latinoamericano--2019|FAO and Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano, 2019]] ), particularly through partnerships between grassroots organisations and impoverished communities, providing valued expertise and capacities to support the implementation of government climate resilience strategies (World Bank Group, 2015). More inclusive planning processes correspond to higher climate equity and justice outcomes in the short term, but an emphasis on building dedicated multi-sector governance institutions may also enhance long-term programmes’ stability while ensuring civil society has a voice in adaptation planning and implementation ( [[#Chu--2016|Chu et al., 2016]] ). Some local organisations and people have succeeded when they were in charge of their own resiliency efforts, where international projects and protocols proved less effective ( [[#Doughty--2016|Doughty, 2016]] ). Some decentralised governmental programmes have tried to increase public responsiveness to the adaptation needs of the people, but such programmes have proven to be only mildly successful and provoke the mobilisation of communities against existing governance structures ( [[#Thompson--2016|Thompson, 2016]] ).

IKLK participation is thought to be more considered in adaptation policies because it yields good results ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Nagy--2014b|Nagy et al., 2014b]] ; [[#Jurt--2015|Jurt et al., 2015]] ; [[#Arias--2016|Arias et al., 2016]] ; [[#Stensrud--2016|Stensrud, 2016]] ). IK has been adaptive for long periods in the Andes ( [[#Cuvi--2018|Cuvi, 2018]] ), but there might be limits to adaptation in the face of present climatic and other environmental and socioeconomic drivers ( [[#Postigo--2019|Postigo, 2019]] ). Approaches integrating IK with more formal sciences, to address research and policies, have improved adaptation processes, but they carry their own complications ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Doswald--2014|Doswald et al., 2014]] ; [[#Metternicht--2014|Metternicht et al., 2014]] ; [[#Tengö--2014|Tengö et al., 2014]] ; [[#Drenkhan--2015|Drenkhan et al., 2015]] ; [[#Keenan--2015|Keenan, 2015]] ; [[#Lasage--2015|Lasage et al., 2015]] ; [[#Camacho%20Guerreiro--2016|Camacho Guerreiro et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hurlbert--2016|Hurlbert and Gupta, 2016]] ; [[#Roco--2016|Roco et al., 2016]] ; [[#Santos--2016|Santos et al., 2016]] ; [[#Walshe--2016|Walshe and Argumedo, 2016]] ; [[#Uribe%20Rivera--2017|Uribe Rivera et al., 2017]] ; [[#Kasecker--2018|Kasecker et al., 2018]] ; [[#Cuesta--2019|Cuesta et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ulloa--2019|Ulloa, 2019]] ; [[#Ariza-Montobbio--2020|Ariza-Montobbio and Cuvi, 2020]] ). More interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research will help to better understand and manage the relationships among governance, implementation, management priorities, wealth distribution and trade-offs between adaptation, mitigation and the SDGs.

Representations of climate change can also emerge as critiques and resistances that reveal that climate-change-labelled politics or interventions have posed even greater risks or do not address poverty issues ( ''medium confidence: medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Lampis--2013|Lampis, 2013]] ; [[#Pokorny--2013|Pokorny et al., 2013]] ; [[#Ojeda--2014|Ojeda, 2014]] ). Indigenous and social movements have joined with climate justice activists, calling for action to address climate change ( [[#Hicks--2016|Hicks and Fabricant, 2016]] ; [[#Ruiz-Mallén--2017|Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2017]] ; [[#Charles--2021|Charles, 2021]] ). The Bolivian Platform against Climate Change, a coalition of civil society and social movement organisations working to address the effects of global warming in Bolivia and to influence the broader global community, reflects an innovative dimension that, though at times conflictual, has shown how increasing climate variability hinders the right of Indigenous Peoples to the conservation of their culture and practices and illustrates how grassroots movements are increasingly taking over climate-change policy in the region ( [[#Hicks--2016|Hicks and Fabricant, 2016]] ). Social movements have engaged with international networks, such as Blokadia, which surged after COP 23, whose claims try to go beyond the protection of the environment and delve into issues of democracy and resource control ( [[#Martínez-Alier--2018|Martínez-Alier et al., 2018]] ).

Many social movements address adaptation to climate change. Some engage and participate in policy and planning, often producing good results at the local level. In contrast, top-down approaches without citizen or community participation have shown to be less effective ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Krellenberg--2014|Krellenberg and Katrin, 2014]] ; [[#Nagy--2014b|Nagy et al., 2014b]] ; [[#Stein--2014|Stein and Moser, 2014]] ; [[#Ruiz-Mallén--2015|Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2015]] ; [[#Sherman--2015|Sherman et al., 2015]] ; [[#Waylen--2015|Waylen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bizikova--2016|Bizikova et al., 2016]] ; [[#Chelleri--2016|Chelleri et al., 2016]] ; [[#Merlinsky--2016|Merlinsky, 2016]] ; [[#Villamizar--2017|Villamizar et al., 2017]] ).

Some conflicts in which the direct biophysical impacts of climate change play a major role can unleash social protests and strengthen social movements ( [[#12.6.4|Section 12.6.4]] ). In Cartagena, since 2010, the increase in precipitation has increasingly impacted the ''barrio'' Policarpa, promoprting residents to call for solutions to the problems caused by the coupled effect of flooding and industrial pollution. Also, in El Cambray II, in Guatemala City, in 2015 a nearby hill collapsed, causing the deaths of 280 people, 70 missing and the destruction of hundreds of homes. The affected community entered into a conflict with the municipality demanding resettlement and a reform of land-use planning ( [[#Stein%20Heinemann--2018|Stein Heinemann, 2018]] ).

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