Editing IPCC:AR6/SROCC/Chapter-4 (section)

===== 4.4.2.2.6 Governance of hard and sediment-based protection =====

Reviews and comparative case studies confirm findings of AR5 that governance challenges are amongst the most common hindrance to implementing coastal measures (Ekstrom and Moser, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1621|1621]]</sup> ; Hinkel et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1622|1622]]</sup> ). One main issue to resolve is conflicting stakeholder interests. This includes conflicts between those favouring protection and those being negatively affected by adaptation measures. In Catalonia, for example, the tourism sector welcomes beach nourishment because it provides direct benefits, whereas those dependent upon natural resources (e.g., fishermen) are increasingly in opposition because they fear that sand mining destroys coastal habitat and livelihood prospects (González-Correa et al., 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r1623|1623]]</sup> ).

There is also conflict related to the distribution of public money between communities receiving public support for adaptation and non-coastal communities who pay for this support through taxes (Elrick-Barr et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1624|1624]]</sup> ). Generally, access to financial resources for adaptation, including from public sources, development and climate finance or capital markets, frequently constrain adaptation (Ekstrom and Moser, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1625|1625]]</sup> ; Hinkel et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1626|1626]]</sup> ). For example, homeowners are often not willing to pay taxes or levies for public protection or sediment-base measures even if they directly benefit, as found, for example in communities on the US east coast where beach nourishment is used to maintain recreational and tourism amenities (Mullin et al., 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1627|1627]]</sup> ). In many parts of the world, coastal adaptation governance is further complicated by existing conflicts over resources. For example, illegal coastal sand mining is currently a major driver of coastal erosion in many parts of the developing world (Peduzzi, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1628|1628]]</sup> ). Examples of this can be found in Ghana (Addo, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1629|1629]]</sup> ) and the Comoros (Betzold and Mohamed, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1630|1630]]</sup> ).

An associated governance challenge is ensuring the effective maintenance of coastal protection. Ineffective maintenance has contributed to many coastal disasters in the past, such as in New Orleans (Andersen, 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r1631|1631]]</sup> ). AR5 highlighted that effective maintenance is challenging in a small island context due to a lack of adequate funds, policies and technical skills (Nurse et al., 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1632|1632]]</sup> ). In some countries in which coastal defence systems have a long history, effective governance arrangements for maintenance, such as the Water Boards in the Netherlands, have emerged. In Bangladesh, where Dutch-like polders were introduced in the 1960s, maintenance has been a challenge due to shifts in multi-level governance structures associated with independence, national policy priorities and donor involvement (Dewan et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1633|1633]]</sup> ).

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