Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-12 (section)

==== 12.5.8.4 Migrations and Displacements ====

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Migration and displacements are multi-causal phenomena, and climate may exacerbate political, social, economic or other environmental drivers ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Kaenzig--2014|Kaenzig and Piguet, 2014]] ; [[#Brandt--2016|Brandt et al., 2016]] ; Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017; [[#Sudmeier-Rieux--2017|Sudmeier-Rieux et al., 2017]] ; [[#Radel--2018|Radel et al., 2018]] ; [[#Heslin--2019|Heslin et al., 2019]] ; [[#Hoffmann--2020|Hoffmann et al., 2020]] ; [[#Silva%20Rodríguez%20de%20San%20Miguel--2021|Silva Rodríguez de San Miguel et al., 2021]] ). Many case studies have been conducted on the region, but data to assess and monitor precisely the effects of climate- and weather-related disasters in migration and displacements from a broad perspective remain inaccurate (Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017; [[#Abeldaño%20Zuñiga--2020|Abeldaño Zuñiga and Fanta Garrido, 2020]] ). The most common climatic drivers include tropical storms and hurricanes, heavy rains, floods and droughts ( [[#Kaenzig--2014|Kaenzig and Piguet, 2014]] ). Positive climatic conditions also can facilitate migration ( [[#Gray--2013|Gray and Bilsborrow, 2013]] ). Peru, Colombia and Guatemala are among the countries with the largest average displacements caused by hydro-meteorological causes; Brazil had 295,000 people displaced because of disasters in 2019 (Global Internal Displacement Database, https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data ).

These processes can be interpreted as impacts on vulnerable peoples, but also as adaptation strategies to manage risks and reduce exposure when people continue with their lives, temporarily or permanently, in a different but stable situationor when family members send remittances to those that remain in the affected areas ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-7#7.4.3.2|Section 7.4.3.2]] ; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). The remittances create opportunities for adaptive capacity building because they reduce some vulnerabilities in the form of infrastructures, agricultural supplies, food, education or health, as in northern CA (NU [[#CEPAL--2018|CEPAL, 2018]] ). Anyhow, migration as adaptation is not available to everyone ( [[#Kaenzig--2014|Kaenzig and Piguet, 2014]] ), and the idea has also been contested because it may not help to overcome structural problems or point to in situ options ( [[#Radel--2018|Radel et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ruiz-de-Oña--2019|Ruiz-de-Oña et al., 2019]] ). The causal processes are complex. Surveys of migrants usually find that the main reported reason for migration is to find a job or to increase household income ( [[#Wrathall--2016|Wrathall and Suckall, 2016]] ; [[#OIM--2017|OIM, 2017]] ; [[#Radel--2018|Radel et al., 2018]] ), but the underlying reason for the lack of a job or income is rarely examined and at times may be related to climatic hazards.

Migration most often originates in rural areas, with people moving to other rural or urban areas within their home countries (Table Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE 1 in Chapter 7). In the Amazon, approximately 80% of the population are concentrated in cities due to rural–urban migrations in search of better income, livelihoods and services, in cases associated with extreme floods and droughts ( [[#Pinho--2015|Pinho et al., 2015]] ). In Ecuador, environmental variables are most likely to enhance international than internal migration ( [[#Gray--2013|Gray and Bilsborrow, 2013]] ). Hurricanes have been seen as positive triggers for international migration in CA ( [[#Spencer--2018|Spencer and Urquhart, 2018]] ). The highlands of Peru see different patterns, including daily circular migration to combine the scarce income from agricultural production with urban income, rather than abandoning farm land ( [[#Milan--2014|Milan and Ho, 2014]] ; [[#Zimmerer--2014|Zimmerer, 2014]] ; [[#Bergmann--2021|Bergmann et al., 2021]] ).

Migration to cities can mean opportunities for migrants and for urban areas, but it can also worsen existing problems, as urban poor people can become even more exposed and vulnerable, and the pressure on urban capacities may not be well absorbed ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Chisari--2016|Chisari and Miller, 2016]] ; [[#Gemenne--2020|Gemenne et al., 2020]] ). Internal migration to cities is likely to exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities related to inequality, poverty, indigence and informal activities and housing ( [[#Warn--2014|Warn and Adamo, 2014]] ). Immigration can make cities/residents more vulnerable to climate-change risks (Sections 12.5.5 and 12.5.7). Groups such as children, Indigenous Peoples and the poor are usually among the most vulnerable in migrations and displacements, which poses challenges to national policies and international aid ( [[#Sedeh--2014|Sedeh, 2014]] ; [[#Gamez--2016|Gamez, 2016]] ; [[#Ulla--2016|Ulla, 2016]] ; Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017; [[#Ramos--2017|Ramos and de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville, 2017]] ; [[#Amar-Amar--2019|Amar-Amar et al., 2019]] ; [[#Gemenne--2020|Gemenne et al., 2020]] ). In migration or displacement driven by climate effects, women are prone to lose their leadership, autonomy and voice, especially in new organisational structures imposed by authorities. This is especially the case in temporary accommodation camps created after disasters, exacerbating existing differentiated vulnerabilities ( [[#Aldunce%20Ide--2020|Aldunce Ide et al., 2020]] ). International migration has become more dangerous and difficult as border controls have become stricter, but programmes such as one to help temporary agricultural workers from Guatemala to Canada have proven successful ( [[#Gabriel--2018|Gabriel and Macdonald, 2018]] ). At the same time, emigration may lead to the loss of IKLK for adaptation ( [[#Moreno--2020b|Moreno et al., 2020b]] ).

Some areas are more likely to generate climatic migration: the Andes, the dry areas of Amazonia, northern Brazil and northern countries in CA ( ''high confidence'' ). Northeastern Brazil will lose population that will move to the south, deepening existing inequalities ( [[#Oliveira--2020|Oliveira and Pereda, 2020]] ). In a study of eight countries around the world, including Guatemala and Peru, a link was found between rainfall variability and food insecurity, which could lead to migration in areas of high prevalence of rainfed agriculture and low diversification ( [[#Warner--2014|Warner and Afifi, 2014]] ). In CA, younger individuals are more likely to migrate in response to hurricanes and especially to droughts ( [[#Baez--2017|Baez et al., 2017]] ).

The perception of gradual changes lowers the likelihood of internal migration, while sudden-onset events increase movement ( [[#Koubi--2016|Koubi et al., 2016]] ). On the other hand, it has been seen that extreme events like floods or droughts can hinder population mobility, immobilising them in their localities ( [[#Thiede--2016|Thiede et al., 2016]] ). These immobilised populations are supposed to face a double set of risks: they are unable to move away from environmental threats, and their lack of capital makes them especially vulnerable to environmental changes ( [[#Black--2011|Black et al., 2011]] ). In CSA, migrating to the US is becoming dangerous and expensive because that country is restricting entry; these trends expose local populations to the risk of becoming immobile in the near future in a place where they are extremely vulnerable ( [[#Ruano--2014|Ruano and Milan, 2014]] ; [[#McLeman--2019|McLeman, 2019]] ). A survey in Guatemala found no correlation between migration to the US and severe food insecurity in households, but the correlation became significant if the level of food insecurity was moderate, suggesting that families in extreme hardship did not have the resources to migrate ( [[#Aguilar--2019|Aguilar et al., 2019]] ). At the same time, some populations just have chosen not to move, as in Peru, where immobility among dissatisfied people is more likely to be caused by attachment to place than resource constraints ( [[#Adams--2016|Adams, 2016]] ; [[#Correia--2017|Correia and Ojima, 2017]] ). Some populations have chosen to adapt relying on their IKLK ( [[#Boillat--2013|Boillat and Berkes, 2013]] ).

Migration is often the last resort for rural communities facing water stress problems ( [[#Magrin--2014|Magrin et al., 2014]] ; [[#Ruano--2014|Ruano and Milan, 2014]] ). In Bolivia, glacial retreat has not triggered new migration flows and had a limited impact on the existing migratory patterns ( [[#Kaenzig--2015|Kaenzig, 2015]] ). In SA, climatic variability increases the likelihood of interprovince migration, rather than trapping populations. In a study of interprovincial migration motivated by temperature, an exception arose in Bolivia, and even if that could suggest an immobilised population ( [[#Thiede--2016|Thiede et al., 2016]] ), it is not clear whether they want to stay and adapt. In some cases, people want to move but wait for relocation until after the climate-related disasters have subsided (Priotto and Salvador Aruj, 2017).

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