Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-7 (section)

=== 7.4.4 Migration and Adaptation in the Context of Climate Change ===

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==== 7.4.4.1 Linkages between Migration, Adaptation and Household Resilience ====

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AR5 (Chapter 17) concluded that migration is often, though not in all situations, a potential form of adaptation initiated by households. ''Subsequent research indicates that the circumstances under which migration occurs and the degree of agency under which household migration decisions are made are important determinants of whether migration outcomes are successful in terms of advancing the well-being of the household and providing benefits to sending and receiving communities'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''( [[#Adger--2015|Adger et al., 2015]] ; [[#Cattaneo--2019|Cattaneo et al., 2019]] ; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7)'' . Evidence from refugee studies and general migration research indicates that higher agency migration, in which migrants have mobility options, allows migrants greater opportunities for integrating into labour markets at the destination, makes it easier to remit money home and generally creates conditions for potential benefits for migrant households and for sending and receiving communities ( [[#International%20Organization%20for%20Migration--2019|International Organization for Migration, 2019]] ). Bilateral agreements that facilitate labour migration have been identified as being especially urgently needed for Pacific small island states ( [[#Weber--2017|Weber, 2017]] ).

''Adaptive migration and the implied assumption that people can or should simply move out of harm’s way is not a substitute for investment in adaptive capacity-building'' ( ''high agreement'' ) ''( [[#Bettini--2016|Bettini and Gioli, 2016]] )'' . Climate-related migration, and especially involuntary displacement, often occurs only after ''in situ'' adaptation options have been exhausted and/or where government actions are inadequate ( [[#Adger--2015|Adger et al., 2015]] ; [[#Ocello--2015|Ocello et al., 2015]] ; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). The threshold at which household adaptation transitions from ''in situ'' measures to migration is highly context specific and reflects the degree of exposure to specific climate risks, mobility options and the socioeconomic circumstances of the household and local community ( [[#McLeman--2017|McLeman, 2017]] ; [[#Adams--2019|Adams and Kay, 2019]] ; Semenza and [[#Ebi--2019|Ebi, 2019]] ; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). A consistent theme in the research literature reviewed for all sections of this chapter is that proactive investments in health, social and physical infrastructure, including those not aimed specifically at climate risks, build societal adaptive capacity and household resilience. In turn, expanding the range of adaptation options available to households increases the likelihood that, when migration does occur, it does so under conditions of high agency that lead to greater chances of success. In communities where climate-related migration and/or relocation is occurring or may occur, policymaking and planning benefits from understanding the cultural, social and economic needs of exposed populations and helps in the identification of responses and policies that build resilience (Hino et al. 2017)

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==== 7.4.4.2 Climate, Migration and Linkages to Labour Markets and Social Networks ====

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''Adaptive climate-related migration is often closely related to wage-seeking labour migration'' ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' Due to the circumstances under which they move, climate-related migrants’ destinations, labour market choices and returns from migration may be more heavily constrained than those of other labour migrants ( [[#Jessoe--2018|Jessoe et al., 2018]] ; [[#Wrathall--2016|Wrathall and Suckall, 2016]] ).Within low- and middle-income countries, rural–urban migrant networks are important channels for remittances that may help build socioeconomic resilience to climate hazards in sending areas ( [[#Porst--2020|Porst and Sakdapolrak, 2020]] ), with higher levels of wage-seeking labour participation observed in climate-sensitive locales in south Asia ( [[#Maharjan--2020|Maharjan et al., 2020]] ). Local-level research in China and south Asia shows, however, that the potential for remittances to generate improvements in household level adaptive capacity is highly context specific, has significant gender dimensions and depends on such factors as the nature of the hazard, the distance migrated and the length of time over which remittances are received ( [[#Banerjee--2019a|Banerjee et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Banerjee--2019b|Banerjee et al., 2019b]] ). Social networks are a key asset in helping climate migrants overcome financial and structural impediments to their mobility, but these have their limits, particularly with respect to international migration (Semenza and [[#Ebi--2019|Ebi, 2019]] ). Since AR5, greater restrictions have emerged on movement between many low- and high-income countries (not including those necessitated by public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic), a trend that, if it continues, would generate additional constraints on destination choices for future climate migrants ( [[#McLeman--2019|McLeman, 2019]] ). Transnational diasporic connections are a potential asset for building resilience in migrant-sending communities highly exposed to climatic risks, with migrants’ remittances potentially providing resources for long-term resilience building, recovery from extreme events and reducing income inequality ( [[#Bragg--2018|Bragg et al., 2018]] ; [[#Mosuela--2015|Mosuela et al., 2015]] ; [[#Obokata--2018|Obokata and Veronis, 2018]] ; [[#Shayegh--2017|Shayegh, 2017]] ; Semenza and [[#Ebi--2019|Ebi, 2019]] ). Safe and orderly labour migration is consequently a potentially beneficial component of wider cross-sectoral approaches to building adaptive capacity and supporting sustainable development in regions highly exposed to climate risks ( [[#McLeman--2019|McLeman, 2019]] ).

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==== 7.4.4.3 Attitudes Towards Climate Migration ====

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''The success of climate-related migration as an adaptive response is shaped by how migrants are perceived and how policy discussions are framed'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' The possibility that climate change may enlarge international migrant flows has in some policy discussions been interpreted as a potential threat to the security of destination countries ( [[#Sow--2016|Sow et al., 2016]] ; [[#Telford--2018|Telford, 2018]] ), but there is little empirical evidence in peer-reviewed literature assessed for this chapter of climate migrants posing significant threats to security at state or international levels. There is also an inconsistency between framing in some policy discussions of undocumented migration (climate-related and other forms) as being ‘illegal’ and the objectives of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees ( [[#McLeman--2019|McLeman, 2019]] ). Although climate-related migrants are not officially recognised as refugees under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, terms such as ‘climate refugees’ are common in popular media and some policy discussions ( [[#Høeg--2018|Høeg and Tulloch, 2018]] ; [[#Wiegel--2019|Wiegel et al., 2019]] ). The framing of migration policy discussions is relevant, for example, in discussing climate adaptation options for Pacific Island Countries, where there is considerable disagreement over policies that range from a ‘migration with dignity’ approach that would liberalise labour migration in the Pacific region to those that see migration as a last resort option to be avoided as much as possible ( [[#McNamara--2015|McNamara, 2015]] ; [[#Farbotko--2019|Farbotko and McMichael, 2019]] ; [[#Oakes--2019|Oakes, 2019]] ; [[#Remling--2020|Remling, 2020]] ). A more beneficial policy framing in terms of ensuring that future migration contributes to climate resilience and sustainable development has been established since AR5 within the framework of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (see [[#7.4|Section 7.4.7.7]] ).

''Attitudes of residents in migrant-receiving areas with respect to climate-related migration warrant consideration when formulating adaptation policy'' ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' Existing research is modest and difficult to generalise with respect to the impacts of climate-related migration and displacement on social dynamics and stability in receiving destinations, with outcomes being tied to the attitudes and social acceptance of receiving communities and efforts to integrate migrant arrivals into the community (Koubi and Nguyen, 2020). Research from Kenya and Vietnam shows that residents of receiving communities view environmental drivers as being legitimate reasons for people to move and consequently tend not to stigmatise such migrants ( [[#Spilker--2020|Spilker et al., 2020]] ). In these examples, urban residents viewed environmental motivations as being comparable to economic reasons for migrating and did not see climate-related migrants as posing any particular risks for receiving communities. However, case studies from India suggest that a lack of recognition by local authorities of climatic factors being legitimate drivers of rural–urban migration may lead to discrimination against migrants in terms of access to housing and other social protections, thereby undermining household resilience ( [[#Chu--2018|Chu and Michael, 2018]] ).

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==== 7.4.4.4 Planned Relocation and Managed Retreats ====

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''There is high agreement among existing studies that immobile populations often have high vulnerability and/or high long-term exposure to climate hazards, and that non-climatic political, economic and social factors within countries may strongly constrain mobility ( [[#Zickgraf--2019|Zickgraf, 2019]] ; [[#Ayeb-Karlsson--2020|Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2020]] ; [[#Cundill--2021|Cundill et al., 2021]] ).'' Section 7.2.6.2 highlighted the particular vulnerability of immobile populations in the face of growing climatic risks. However, research suggests governments should be slow to label such populations as being ‘trapped’ or to actively promote relocations in the absence of local agreement that ''in situ'' adaptation options have been exhausted ( [[#Adams--2016|Adams, 2016]] ; [[#Farbotko--2019|Farbotko and McMichael, 2019]] ). In the case of indigenous settlements, efforts made to incorporate traditional knowledge in decision-making and planning increase the potential for longer-term success (Manrique, 2018). Considerable health implications can emerge within populations that are relocated as part of a planned retreat, and represent an important consideration for planners that requires greater research ( [[#Dannenberg--2019|Dannenberg et al., 2019]] ). Organised relocations are not inherently transformative in their outcomes but, depending on the circumstances under which they occur and on how issues of equity and respect for the rights of those affected are implemented, relocation could potentially represent a positive transformation ( [[#Siders--2021|Siders et al., 2021]] ).

''Disruptive and expensive relocations of low-lying coastal settlements in many regions would become increasingly necessary in coming decades under high levels of warming'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''.'' Organised relocations require long-term innovation, planning and cooperation on the part of governments, institutions, affected populations and civil society ( [[#Hauer--2017|Hauer, 2017]] ; [[#Hino--2017|Hino et al., 2017]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2021|Haasnoot et al., 2021]] ; [[#Moss--2021|Moss et al., 2021]] ). Recent examples illustrate the substantial financial costs of organised relocations, ranging from USD 10,000 per person in examples from Fiji to USD 100,000 per person in coastal Louisiana, USA ( [[#Hino--2017|Hino et al., 2017]] ). Organised relocations are politically and emotionally charged, may not necessarily be seen as desirable by exposed populations and are most successful when approached proactive and strategically to avoid increasing the socioeconomic vulnerability of those who are relocated ( [[#Jamero--2017|Jamero et al., 2017]] ; [[#Wilmsen--2015|Wilmsen and Webber, 2015]] ; [[#Chapin--2016|Chapin et al., 2016]] ; [[#McNamara--2018|McNamara et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hauer--2019|Hauer et al., 2019]] ; [[#Bertana--2020|Bertana, 2020]] ). Key considerations for protecting the rights and well-being of people who might need to be resettled include proactive communication with and participation of the affected communities, availability of compensation, livelihood protection and ensuring there is permanence and security of tenure at the relocation destination ( [[#Tadgell--2018|Tadgell et al., 2018]] ). Availability of funds for resettlement, how to manage relocation from communally owned lands, how to value privately owned land to be abandoned and the potential for loss and damage claims are just some of the many potential complications ( [[#Marino--2018|Marino, 2018]] ; [[#McNamara--2018|McNamara et al., 2018]] ). As a proactive option, researchers in Bangladesh have suggested the creation of ‘migrant-friendly towns’ to provide options for autonomous relocation from hazardous areas (Khan and Huq, 2021).

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