Editing IPCC:AR6/SROCC/Chapter-3 (section)

== 3.5 Human Responses to Climate Change in Polar Regions ==

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=== 3.5.1 The Polar Context for Responding ===

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Human responses to climate change in the Arctic and Antarctica are shaped by their unique physical, ecological, social, cultural and political conditions. Extreme climatic conditions, remoteness from densely populated regions, limited human mobility, short seasons of biological productivity, high costs in monitoring and research, sovereignty claims to lands and waters by southern-based governments, a rich diversity of indigenous cultures and institutional arrangements that in some cases recognise indigenous rights and support regional and international cooperation in governance are among the many factors that impede and or facilitate adaptation.

The social and cultural differences are an especially noteworthy factor in assessing polar responses. Approximately four million people currently reside in the Arctic with about three quarters residing in urban areas, and approximately 10% being Indigenous (AHDR, 2014). Regions of the Arctic differ widely in population, ranging from 94% of Iceland’s population living in urban environments to 68% of Nunavut’s population living in rural areas. And while there has been a general movement to greater urbanisation in the Arctic (AHDR, 2014), that trend is not true for all regions (Heleniak, 2014). About 4400 people reside in Antarctic in the summer and about 1100 in the winter, predominantly based at research stations of which approximately 40 are occupied year-round (The World Factbook, 2016).

For most Arctic Indigenous peoples, human responses to climate change are viewed as a matter of cultural survival (Greaves, 2016) (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1). However, Indigenous people are not homogenous in their perspectives. While in some cases Indigenous people are negatively impacted by sectoral activities such as mining and oil and gas development (Nymand and Fondahl, 2014), in other cases they benefit financially (Shadian, 2014), setting up dilemmas and potential internal conflicts (Huskey, 2018; Southcott and Natcher, 2018) ''(high confidence).'' Geopolitical complexities also confound responses.

Together these conditions make for complexity and uncertainty in human decision making, be it at the household and community levels to the international level. Adding to uncertainty in human choice related to climate change is the interaction of climate with other forces for change, such as globalisation and land and sea-use change. These interactions necessitate that responses to climate change consider cumulative effects as well as context-specific pathways for building resilience (Nymand and Fondahl, 2014; ARR, 2016).

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=== 3.5.2 Responses of Human Sectors ===

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The sections below assess human responses to climate change in polar regions by examining various sectors of human-environment activity (i.e., social-ecological subsystems), reviewing their respective systems of governance related to climate change, and considering possible resilience pathways. Table 3.4 summarises the consequences, interacting drivers, responses and assets for responding to climate change by social-ecological subsystems (i.e., sectors) of Arctic and Antarctic regions. An area of response not elaborated in this assessment is geoengineered sea ice remediation to support local-to-regional ecosystem restoration and which may also affect climate via albedo changes. There is an emerging body of literature on this topic (e.g., Berdahl et al., 2014; Desch et al., 2017; Field et al., 2018), which at present is too limited to allow assessing dimensions of feasibility, benefits and risks, and governance.

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==== 3.5.2.1 Commercial Fisheries ====

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Responses addressing changes in the abundance and distribution of fish resources (Section 3.2.4.1) differ by region. In some polar regions, strategies of adaptive governance, biodiversity conservation, scenario planning and the precautionary approach are in use (NPFMC, 2018). Further development of coordinated monitoring programs (Cahalan et al., 2014; Ganz et al., 2018), data sharing, social learning and decision support tools that alert managers to climate change impacts on species and ecosystems would allow for appropriate and timely responses including changes in overall fishing capacity, individual stock quotas, shifts between different target species, opening/closure of different geographic areas and balance between different fishing fleets (Busch et al., 2016; NPFMC, 2019; see Section 3.5.4). Scenario planning, adaptive management and similar efforts will contribute to the resilience and conservation of these social-ecological systems ( ''medium confidence'' ).

Five Arctic States, known as ‘Arctic 5’ (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States) have sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting resources within their 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the High Arctic and manage their resources within their own regulatory measures. A review of future harvest in the European Arctic (Haug et al., 2017) points towards high probability of increased northern movement of several commercial fish species (Section 3.3.3.1, Box 3.4), but only to the shelf slope for the demersal species. This shift suggests increased northern fishing activity, but within the EEZs and present management regimes (Haug et al., 2017) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

In 2009, a new Marine Resources Act entered into force for Norway’s EEZ. This act applies to all wild living marine resources, and states that its purpose is to ensure sustainable and economically profitable management of resources. Conservation of biodiversity is described as an integral part of its sustainable fisheries management and it is mandatory to apply “an ecosystem approach, taking into account habitats and biodiversity” (Gullestad et al., 2017). In addition to national management, the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission provides cooperative management of the most important fish stocks in the Barents and Norwegian Seas. The stipulation of the total quota for the various joint fish stocks is a key element, as is more long-term precautionary harvesting strategies, better allowing for responses to climate change ( ''medium confidence'' ). A scenario-based approach to identify management strategies that are effective under changing climate conditions is being explored for the Barents Sea (Planque et al., 2019).

In the US Arctic, an adaptive management approach has been introduced that utilises future ecological scenarios to develop strategies for mitigating the future risks and impacts of climate change (NPFMC, 2018). The fisheries of the southeastern Bering Sea are managed through a complex suite of regulations that includes catch shares (Ono et al., 2017), habitat protections, restrictions on forage fish, bycatch constraints (DiCosimo et al., 2015) and community development quotas. This intricate regulatory framework has inherent risks and benefits to fishers and industry by limiting flexibility (Anderson et al., 2017b). To address these challenges, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council recently adopted a Fishery Ecosystem Plan that includes a multi-model climate change action module (Punt et al., 2016; Holsman et al., 2017; Zador et al., 2017; Holsman et al., 2019). Despite this complex ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management, it may not be possible to prevent projected declines of some high value species at high rates of global warming (Ianelli et al., 2016).

In the US portion of the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas EEZ, fishing is prohibited until sufficient information is obtained to sustainably manage the resource (Wilson and Ormseth, 2009). In the Canadian sector of the Beaufort Sea, commercial fisheries are currently only small-scale and locally operated. However, with decreasing ice cover and potential interest in expanding fisheries, the Inuvialuit subsistence fishers of the western Canadian Arctic developed a new proactive ecosystem-based Fisheries Management Framework (Ayles et al., 2016). Also in Western Canada, the commercial fishery for Arctic char ( ''Salvenius alpinus'' ) in Cambridge Bay is co-managed by local Inuit organisations and Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO, 2014).

The high seas region of the CAO is per definition outside of any nation’s EEZ. Recent actions of the international community show that a precautionary approach to considerations of CAO fisheries has been adopted ( ''high confidence'' ) and that expansion of commercial fisheries into the CAO will be constrained until sufficient information is obtained to manage the fisheries according to an ecosystem approach to fisheries management ( ''high confidence'' ). The Arctic 5 officially adopted the precautionary approach to fishing in 2015 by signing the Oslo Declaration concerning the prevention of unregulated fishing in the CAO. The declaration established a moratorium to limit potential expansion of CAO commercial fishing until sufficient information, also on climate change impacts, is available to manage it sustainably. The Arctic 5 and several other nations subsequently agreed to a treaty (the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement) that imposed a 16-year moratorium on commercial fishing in the CAO.

CCAMLR is responsible for the conservation of marine resources south of the Antarctic Polar Front (CCAMLR, 1982), and has ecosystem-based fisheries management embedded within its convention (Constable, 2011). This includes the CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program, which aims to monitor important land-based predators of krill to detect the effects of the krill fishery on the ecosystem. Currently, there is no formal mechanism for choosing which data are needed in a management procedure for krill or how to include such data. However, this information will be important in enabling CCAMLR fisheries management to respond to the effects of climate change on krill and krill predators in the future.

Commercial fisheries management responses to climate change impacts in the Southern Ocean may need to address the displacement of fishing effort due to poleward shifts in species distribution (Pecl et al., 2017) (Box 3.4) ( ''low confidence'' ). Fisheries in the Southern Ocean are relatively mobile and are potentially able to respond to range shifts in target species, which is in contrast to small-scale coastal fisheries in other regions. Management responses will also need to adapt to the effects of future changes in sea ice extent and duration on the spatial distribution of fishing operations (ATCM, 2017; Jabour, 2017) (Section 3.2.4).

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==== 3.5.2.2 Arctic Subsistence Systems ====

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Subsistence users have responded to climate change by adapting their wildfood production systems and engaging in the climate policy processes at multiple levels of governance. The limitations of many formal institutions, however, suggest that in order to achieve greater resilience of subsistence systems with climate change, transformations in governance are needed to provide greater power sharing, including more resources for engaging in climate change studies and regional-to-national policy making (see 3.2.4.1.1, 3.4.3.2.2, 3.4.3.3.1, 3.4.3.3.2, 3.4.3.3.3, 3.5.3).

Adaptation by subsistence users to climate change falls into several categories. In some cases harvesters are shifting the timing of harvesting and the selection of harvest areas due to changes in seasonality and access to traditional use areas (AMAP, 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r2000|2000]]</sup> ; AMAP, 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r2001|2001]]</sup> ; AMAP, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2002|2002]]</sup> ). Changes in the navigability of rivers (i.e., shallower) and more open (i.e., dangerous) seas have resulted in harvesters changing harvesting gear, such as shifting from propeller to jet-propelled boats or all-terrain vehicles, and to larger ocean-going vessels for traditional whaling (Brinkman et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2003|2003]]</sup> ). In many cases, using different gear results in an increase in fuel costs (e.g., jet boats are about 30% less efficient). Unsafe ice conditions have resulted in greater risks of travel on rivers and the ocean in the frozen months. In Savoonga, Alaska, whalers reported limitations in harvesting larger bowhead because of thin ice conditions that do not allow for safe haul outs, and as a result, community residents now anticipate a greater dependence on western Alaska’s reindeer as a source of meat in the future (Rosales and Chapman, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2004|2004]]</sup> ). Harvesters have also responded with switching of harvested species and in some cases doing without (AMAP, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2005|2005]]</sup> ). In many cases, adaption has allowed for continued provisioning of wildfoods in spite of climate change impacts (BurnSilver et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2006|2006]]</sup> ; AMAP, 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r2007|2007]]</sup> ; Fauchald et al., 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r2008|2008]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

The impacts of climate change have also required adaptation to the non-harvesting aspects of wildfood production, such as an abandonment of traditional food storage and drying practices (e.g., ice cellars) and an increased use of household and community freezers (AMAP, 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r2009|2009]]</sup> ). In several cases there has been an increased emphasis on community self-reliance, such as use of household and community gardens for food production (Loring et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2010|2010]]</sup> ). In the future, agriculture may be more possible with improved conditions at the southern limit of the Arctic, and could supplement hunting and fishing (AMAP, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2011|2011]]</sup> ).

Climate change may in the future bring both new harvestable fish, birds, mammals and berry producing plants to the north, and reduced populations and or access to currently harvested species (AMAP, 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r2012|2012]]</sup> ; AMAP, 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r2013|2013]]</sup> ; AMAP, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2014|2014]]</sup> ). Adaptive co-management and stronger links of local-to-regional level management with national to international level agreements necessitate consideration for sustainable harvest of new resources, as well as securing sustainable harvest or even full protection of dwindling or otherwise vulnerable populations. In these cases, adaptive co-management could be an efficient tool to achieve consensus on population goals, including international cooperation and agreements regarding migratory species shared between more countries (Kocho-Schellenberg and Berkes, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2015|2015]]</sup> ) (Section 3.5.4.3).

While there has been involvement of subsistence users in monitoring and research on climate change (Section 3.5.4.1.1), resource management regimes that regulate harvesting are largely dictated by science-based paradigms that give limited legitimacy to the knowledge and suggested preferences of subsistence users (Section 3.5.4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1).

The social costs and social learning associated with responding to climate change are often related. Involvement in adaptive co-management comes with high transaction costs (e.g., greater demands on overburdened indigenous leaders, added stress of communities living with limited resources) (Forbes et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2016|2016]]</sup> ). In some cases, co-management has given communities a greater voice in decision making, but when ineffective, these arrangements can perpetuate dominant paradigms of resource management (AMAP, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2017|2017]]</sup> ). The perceived risks of climate change can at the same time reinforce cultural identify and motivate greater political involvement, which in turn, gives indigenous leaders experience as agents of change in policy making. Penn et al. (2016) <sup>[[#fn:r2018|2018]]</sup> pointed to these conflicting forces, arguing the need for a greater focus on community capacity and cumulative effects.

Greater involvement of indigenous subsistence users in Canada occurs at the national and regional levels through the structures and provisions of indigenous settlement agreements (e.g., 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement), fish and wildlife co-management agreements (e.g., Porcupine Caribou Management Agreement of 1986), and through various boundary organisations (e.g., CircumArctic Rangifer Monitoring and Assessment Network). Home rule in Greenland, established in 1979, gives the Naalakkersuisut (government of Greenland) authority on most domestic matters of governance.

Indigenous leaders are responding to the risks of climate change by engaging in political processes at multiple levels and through different venues. However, indigenous involvement in IPCC assessments remains limited (Ford et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2019|2019]]</sup> ). At the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the discursive space for incorporating perspectives of Indigenous peoples on climate change adaptation has expanded since 2010, which is reflected in texts and engagement with most activity areas (Ford et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2020|2020]]</sup> ) and by the establishment of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform Facilitative Working Group in December 2018. Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council, which sit as ‘Permanent Participants’ of the Arctic Council, are involved in many of its working groups and partake also at the political level (Section 3.5.3.2.1).

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==== 3.5.2.3 Arctic Reindeer Herding ====

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Herders’ responses to climate change have varied by region and respective herding practices, and in some cases are constrained by limited access to pastures (Klokov, 2012; Forbes et al., 2016; Uboni et al., 2016; Mallory and Boyce, 2017). These conditions are exacerbated in some cases by high numbers of predators (Lavrillier and Gabyshev, 2018). In Fennoscandia, husbandry practices of reindeer by some (mostly Sami) include supplemental feeding, which provide a buffer for unfavourable conditions. In Alaska, reindeer herding is primarily free range, where herders must manage herd movements in the event of icing events and the potential loss of reindeer because the movements of caribou herds (wild reindeer), both of which are partially driven by climate. For Nenets of the Yamal, Russia, resilience in herding has been facilitated through herders’ own agency and, to some extent, the willingness of the gas industry to observe non-binding guidelines that provide for herders’ continued use of traditional migrations routes (Forbes et al., 2015). In response to climate change (i.e., icing events and early spring runoffs blocking migration), the only way of avoiding high deer mortality is to change migration routes or take deer to other pastures. In practice, however, the full set of challenges has meant more Yamal herders opting out of the traditional collective migration partially or entirely to manage their herds privately. The reason to have private herds is one of adaptive advantage; smaller, privately owned herds are nimbler in the face of rapid changes in land cover and the expansion of infrastructure (Forbes, 2013). The same logic has more recently been applied by some herders in the wake of recent rain-on-snow events (Section 3.4.3.2.2) (Forbes et al., 2016). In all these regions, restrictions affecting the movement of reindeer to pastures are expected to negatively interact with the effects of climate and affect the future sustainability of herding systems ( ''high confidence'' ).

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==== 3.5.2.4 Tourism ====

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The growth of the polar tourism market is, in part, a response to climate change, as travellers seek ‘last-chance’ opportunities, which, in turn, is creating new challenges in governance (Section 3.2.4.2). Polar-class expedition cruise vessels are now, for the first time, being purposefully built for recreational Arctic sea travel. The anticipated near- and long-term growth of Arctic tourism, especially with small vessels (yachts) (Johnston et al., 2017), points to a deficiency in current regulations and policies to address human safety, environmental risks and cultural impacts. Industry growth also points to the need for operators, governments, destination communities and others to identify and evaluate adaptation strategies, such as disaster relief management plans, updated navigation technologies for vessels, codes of conduct for visitors and improved maps (Pizzolato et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2030|2030]]</sup> ) and to respond to perceptions of tourism by residents of local destinations (Kaján, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2031|2031]]</sup> ; Stokke and Haukeland, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2032|2032]]</sup> ). Efforts were initiated with stakeholders in Arctic Canada to identify strategies that would lower risks (Pizzolato et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2033|2033]]</sup> ); a next step to lower risks and build resilience is to further develop those strategies (AMAP, 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r2034|2034]]</sup> ; AMAP, 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r2035|2035]]</sup> ; AMAP, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2036|2036]]</sup> ). Opportunities for tourism vessels in the Arctic to contribute to international research activities (‘ships of opportunity’) may improve sovereignty claims in some regions, contribute to science and enhance education of the public (Stewart et al., 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2037|2037]]</sup> ; Arctic Council, 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r2038|2038]]</sup> ; Stewart et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2039|2039]]</sup> ; de la Barre et al., 2016).

Tourism activities in the Antarctic are conducted in accordance with the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, which establishes general environmental principles, environmental assessment requirements, a scheme of establishing protected areas and restrictions on waste disposal. Site-specific management tools are in place. While there are varying views amongst Antarctic Treaty Parties on the best management regulations for Antarctic tourism, these Parties continue to work to manage tourism activity, including growth in numbers of visitors. In addition to the Protocol, mandatory measures have been agreed to manage aspects of tourism activity. Industry self-regulation supplements these requirements, coordinated by the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, which has worked with Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to manage changes in operations and their impact on ice-free areas (ATCM, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2040|2040]]</sup> ).

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==== 3.5.2.5 Arctic Non-Renewable Extractive Industries ====

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Climate change has resulted a limited response by non-renewable resource extraction industries and agencies in the Arctic to changes in sea ice, thawing permafrost, spring runoffs, and resultant timing of exploration, construction and use of ice roads, and infrastructure design (AHDR, 2014). In some regions, climate change has offered new development opportunities, although off-shore prospects remaining cost prohibitive given current world markets (Petrick et al., 2017) ''.'' (In the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty, exploitation of mineral resources is prohibited by the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.)

Climate change in some Arctic regions is facilitating easier access to natural resources (Section 3.5.2.3), which may generate financial capital for Arctic residents and their governments, including Indigenous peoples but also greater exposure to risks such as oil spills and increases in noise. Receding sea ice and glaciers has opened new possibilities for development, such as areas of receding glaciers of eastern Greenland (Smits et al., 2017). As mineral development commenced in Greenland, its home rule government developed environmental impact assessment protocols to provide for improved public participation (Forbes et al., 2015). Indigenous peoples are considered as non-state actors and in many, but not all cases, promote environmental protection in support of the sustainability of their traditional livelihoods. This protection is at times in opposition to the industrial development business sector, which is well-funded and lobbies strongly. Bilateral agreements for resource development in the Arctic are typically state dominated and controlled, and are negotiated with powerful non-state actors, such as state-dominated companies (Young, 2016). Among the non-state actors, new networks and economic forums have been established (Wehrmann, 2016). One example is the Arctic Economic Council, created by the Arctic Council during 2013–2015 as an independent organisation that facilitates Arctic business-to-business activities and supports economic development.

Several regional governments are assessing the long-term viability of ice roads, historically used for accessing mineral development sites, as well as some Arctic human settlements. In Northwest Territories, Canada, several ice roads are being replaced with all-season roads, with other replacements proposed. Assessing future conditions is key for planning and initiating new projects (Hori et al., 2018; Kiani et al., 2018) but is often constrained by uncertainties of available climate models (Mullan et al., 2017).

On the North Slope of Alaska, oil and gas development is now undergoing new expansion, while industry concurrently faces increasing challenges of climate change, such as shorter and warmer winters, the main season for oil exploration and production (Lilly, 2017). The method for building of ice roads on the North Slope has been somewhat modified to account for warmer temperatures during construction. There are also knowledge gaps in understanding implications of seismic studies with climate change on the landscape (Dabros et al., 2018). The issue of cumulative effects also raises questions of current practice of environmental impact assessment to evaluate potential cumulative effects (Kirkfeldt et al., 2016).

Lilly (2017) reported that optimising Alaska North Slope transportation networks during winter field operations is critical in managing increasing resource development and could potentially provide a better framework for environmentally responsible development. Better understanding of environmental change is also important in ensuring continued oil field operations with protection of natural resources. Improved forecasting of short-term conditions (i.e., snow, soil temperatures, spring runoffs) could allow management agencies to respond to conditions more proactively and give industry more time to plan winter mobilisation, such as construction of ice roads ( ''low confidence'' ).

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'''Figure 3.12'''

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'''Changes in public infrastructure damage costs in cumulative USD by 2100 in Alaska under different emission scenarios (Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP)). The inset showing airports, railroads, and pipelines has a different in scale than roads, buildings, and the total. Bars over open circles represent climate-related costs of impact with no engineering adaptation measures, whereas bars […]'''
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[[File:87c080149da0fe281332c1688bd7a5c7 IPCC-SROCC-CH_3_12.jpg]]

Changes in public infrastructure damage costs in cumulative USD by 2100 in Alaska under different emission scenarios (Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP)). The inset showing airports, railroads, and pipelines has a different in scale than roads, buildings, and the total. Bars over open circles represent climate-related costs of impact with no engineering adaptation measures, whereas bars over check-marked circles represent the costs following savings from engineering adaptation (figure modified from Melvin et al., 2017).

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==== 3.5.2.6 Infrastructure ====

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Reducing and avoiding the impacts of climate change on infrastructure will require special attention to engineering, land use planning, maintenance operations, local culture and private and public budgeting (AMAP, 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r2054|2054]]</sup> ; AMAP, 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r2055|2055]]</sup> ; AMAP, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2056|2056]]</sup> ). In some cases, relocation of human settlements will be required, necessitating more formal methods of assessing relocation needs and identifying sources of funding to support relocations (Cross-Chapter Box 9) ( ''high confidence'' ).

A discussion of the relocation of Alaska’s coastal villages is found in Cross-Chapter Box 9. Alaskan coastal communities are not the only settlements potentially requiring relocation. Subsidence due to thawing permafrost and river and delta erosion makes other rural communities of Alaska and Russia vulnerable, potentially requiring relocation in the future (Bronen, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2057|2057]]</sup> ; Romero Manrique et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2058|2058]]</sup> ). These situations raise issues of environmental justice and human rights (Bronen, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2059|2059]]</sup> ), and illustrate the limits of incremental adaptation when transformation change is needed (Kates et al., 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2060|2060]]</sup> ). In other cases, cultural resources in the form of historic infrastructure are being threatened and require mitigation (Radosavljevic et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2061|2061]]</sup> ). Responsibility for funding has been a key issue in the relocation process (Iverson, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2062|2062]]</sup> ) as well as the overall role of government and local communities in relocation planning (Marino, 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2063|2063]]</sup> ; Romero Manrique et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2064|2064]]</sup> ). The Alaska Denali Commission, an independent federal agency designed to provide critical utilities, infrastructure and economic support throughout Alaska, is now serving as the lead coordinating organisation for Alaska village relocations and managing federal funding allocations. Several efforts have also been undertaken to provide assessment frameworks and protocols for settlement relocation as an adaptive resource (Bronen, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2065|2065]]</sup> ; Ristroph, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2066|2066]]</sup> ) .

While there has been discussion of future ‘climigration’ in rural Alaska (Bronen and Chapin, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2067|2067]]</sup> ; Matthews and Potts, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2068|2068]]</sup> ), a study of Alaska rural villages threated by climate change showed no outmigration response (Hamilton et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2069|2069]]</sup> ). Several factors explain the lack of outmigration, including an unwillingness to move, attachment to place, people’s inability to relocate, the effectiveness of alternative ways of achieving acceptable outcomes and methods of buffering through subsidies (Huntington et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2070|2070]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

The current pan-Arctic trend of urbanisation (AHDR, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2071|2071]]</sup> ) , suggests that climate change responses related to infrastructure in towns and cities of the North will require significant adaptation in designs and increases in spending (Streletskiy et al., 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2072|2072]]</sup> ). These costs do not include costs related to flooding and other stressors associated with warming or additional costs of commercial and industrial operations. Engineers in countries with permafrost are actively working to adapt the design of structures to degrading permafrost conditions (Dore et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2073|2073]]</sup> ) and the effects of a warming climate, for example the Cold Climate Housing Research Center of Alaska.

An analysis of the costs of total damages from climate change to public infrastructure in Alaska show the financial benefits of proactive adaptation (Melvin et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2074|2074]]</sup> ) (Figure 3.12). In addition to global carbon emission mitigation, hardening and redesigning of infrastructure can reduce costs of future climate-related impacts. For example, retrofitting and redesigning of infrastructure in order to handle increased precipitation and warmer temperatures can reduce climate-related costs by 50%, from USD 5.5 to 2.9 billion under RCP8.5 by 2100. The cost savings of retrofitting and redesigning infrastructure is even higher than the savings from carbon mitigation, where impact costs are estimated at USD 4.2 billion under RCP4.5 by 2100. Engineering adaptation provide proportionally similar cost savings no matter which emission scenario was used.

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==== 3.5.2.7 Marine Transportation ====

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Increases in Arctic marine transportation create impacts and risks for ecosystems and people, such as an increased likelihood of accidents, the introduction of invasive species, oil spills, waste discharges, detrimental impacts on animals, habitat and subsistence activities (Sections 3.2.4.3, 3.4.3.3.2). There has been a rise in geopolitical debate regarding national and international level regulations and policies, and maritime infrastructure to support Arctic shipping development (Heininen and Finger, 2017; AMAP, 2018; Drewniak et al., 2018; Nilsson and Christensen, 2019). Without further action leading to adequate implementation of well-developed management plans and region-specific regulations, anticipated future increases in Arctic shipping will pose a greater risk to people and ecosystems ( ''high confidence'' ).

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine and atmospheric pollution by ships, including in the Arctic and Antarctic. There are a number of mechanisms standardising regulation and governance, such as the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships; the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea; the International Convention on Standards of Training, and the Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, and the newly implemented International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, or Polar Code (IMO, 2017).

The Polar Code of 2017 sets new standards for vessels travelling in polar areas to mitigate environmental damage and improve safety (IMO, 2017). The Polar Code, however, currently excludes fishing vessels and vessels on government service, thereby excluding many shipping activities, particularly in the Antarctic region (IMO, 2017). Many ships travelling these waters will therefore continue to pose risks to the environment and to themselves, as they are not regulated under the Polar Code ''(high confidence).'' The Polar Code does not enhance enforcement capabilities or include environmental protection provisions to address a number of particular polar region-specific risks such as black carbon, ballast water and heavy fuel oil transport and use in the Arctic (Anderson, 2012; Sakhuja, 2014; IMO, 2017). However, both Russian and Canadian legislation provide the possibility for stricter shipping provisions in ice-covered waters. The IMO has prohibited the use of heavy fuel oil in the Antarctic.

States can individually or cooperatively pursue the establishment of Special Areas and Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas at the IMO with a view to protect ecologically unique or vulnerable and economically or culturally important areas in national and international waters from risks and impacts of shipping, including through routing, discharge and equipment measures. Continued, and in some areas, greater, international cooperation on shipping governance can facilitate addressing emerging climate change issues (Arctic Council, 2015a; ARR, 2016; PEW Charitable Trust, 2016; Chénier et al., 2017; IMO, 2017) ( ''high confidence'' ). Cooperation of the member states of the Arctic Council resulted in the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic and in the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. These agreements can, if adequately implemented, reduce risks from increased Arctic shipping ( ''medium confidence'' ), however, developing more effective measures is needed as preparedness and response gaps still exist, for example, for the central Arctic Ocean.

Industry has responded to the increase in shipping activity by investing in development of shipping designs for travel in mixed-ice environments (Stephenson et al., 2011; Stephenson et al., 2013). These increases in investments are occurring in spite of the limited total savings when comparing shorter travel to increased CO 2 emissions (Lindstad et al., 2016). In anticipation of spills, research in several regions has explored oil spill response viability and new methods of oil spill response for the Arctic environment (Bullock et al., 2017; Dilliplaine, 2017; Holst-Andersen et al., 2017; Lewis and Prince, 2018) ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' A comparative risk assessment for spills has been developed for the Arctic waters (Robinson et al., 2017) and Statoil has developed and uses risk assessment decision-support tools for environmental management, together with environmental monitoring (Utvik and Jahre-Nilsen, 2016). These tools facilitate the assessment of Arctic oil-spill response capability, ice detection in low visibility, improved management of sea ice and icebergs, and numerical modelling of icing and snow as risk mitigation.

<div id="section-3-5-2-8-arctic-human-health-and-well-being"></div>

<span id="arctic-human-health-and-well-being"></span>
==== 3.5.2.8 Arctic Human Health and Well Being ====

<div id="section-3-5-2-8-arctic-human-health-and-well-being-block-1"></div>

At present health adaptation to climate change is generally under-represented in policies, planning, and programming (AHDR, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2092|2092]]</sup> ). For instance, all initiatives of the Fifth National Communications of Annex I parties to the UNFCCC affect health vulnerability, however, only 15% of initiatives had an explicit human health component described (Lesnikowski et al., 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2093|2093]]</sup> ). The Arctic is no exception to this global trend. Despite the substantial health risks associated with climate change in the Arctic, health adaptation responses remain sparse and piecemeal (Lesnikowski et al., 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2094|2094]]</sup> ; Panic and Ford, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2095|2095]]</sup> ; Ford et al., 2014b <sup>[[#fn:r2096|2096]]</sup> ; Loboda, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2097|2097]]</sup> ), with the health sector substantially under-represented in adaptation initiatives compared to other sectors (Pearce et al., 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2098|2098]]</sup> ; Ford et al., 2014b <sup>[[#fn:r2099|2099]]</sup> ; National Research Council, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2100|2100]]</sup> ). Furthermore, the geographic distribution of publicly available documentation on adaptation initiatives is skewed in the Arctic, with more than three-quarters coming from Canada and USA (Ford et al., 2014a <sup>[[#fn:r2101|2101]]</sup> ; Loboda, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2102|2102]]</sup> ).

Many Arctic health adaptation efforts by governments have been groundwork actions, focused increasing awareness of the health impacts of climate change and conducting vulnerability assessments (Lesnikowski et al., 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2103|2103]]</sup> ; Panic and Ford, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2104|2104]]</sup> ; Austin et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2105|2105]]</sup> ). For instance, in Canada this effort has included training, information resources, frameworks, general outreach and education and dissemination of information to decision makers (Austin et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2106|2106]]</sup> ). Finland’s national adaptation strategy outlines various anticipatory and reactive measures for numerous sectors, including health (Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala, 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r2107|2107]]</sup> ). In Alaska, the Arctic Investigations Program responds to infectious disease via advancing molecular diagnostics, integrating data from electronic health records and environmental observing networks, as well as improving access to in-home water and sanitation services. Furthermore, circumpolar efforts are also underway, including a circumpolar working group with experts from public health to assess climate-sensitive infectious diseases, and to identify initiatives that reduce the risks of disease (Parkinson et al., 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2108|2108]]</sup> ). Importantly, health adaptation is occurring at the local scale in the Arctic (Ford et al., 2014a <sup>[[#fn:r2109|2109]]</sup> ; Ford et al., 2014b <sup>[[#fn:r2110|2110]]</sup> ). Adaptation at the local-scale is broad, ranging from community freezers to increase food security, to community-based monitoring programs to detect and respond to climate health events, to Elders mentoring youth in cultural activities to promote mental health when people are ‘stuck’ in the communities due to unsafe travel conditions (Pearce et al., 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r2111|2111]]</sup> ; Brubaker et al., 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2112|2112]]</sup> ; Harper et al., 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2113|2113]]</sup> ; Brubaker et al., 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2114|2114]]</sup> ; Douglas et al., 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2115|2115]]</sup> ; Austin et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2116|2116]]</sup> ; Bunce et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2117|2117]]</sup> ; Cunsolo et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2118|2118]]</sup> ) ( ''high confidence'' ). Several regional and national-level initiatives on food security (ICC, 2012), as well as research reporting high levels of household food insecurity (Kofinas et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2119|2119]]</sup> ; Watts et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2120|2120]]</sup> ) have prompted greater concerns for climate change (Loring et al., 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2121|2121]]</sup> ; Beaumier et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2122|2122]]</sup> ; Islam and Berkes, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2123|2123]]</sup> ). A new initiative to operationalise One Health concepts and approaches under the AC’s Sustainable Development Working Group has gained momentum since 2015 (Ruscio et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2124|2124]]</sup> ). One Health approaches seek to link human, animal, and environmental health, using interdisciplinary and participatory methods that can draw on indigenous knowledge and local knowledge (Dudley et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2125|2125]]</sup> ). Thus far, the initiative has supported new regional-to-international networks, and proposals for its expansion. In the future, the ability to manage, respond, and adapt to climate-related health challenges will be a defining issue for the health sector in the Arctic (Ford et al., 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r2126|2126]]</sup> ; Durkalec et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2127|2127]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

<div id="section-3-5-2-8-arctic-human-health-and-well-being-block-2"></div>

<span id="section-3"></span>
<!-- START TABLE -->
'''Table 3.4:''' Response of key human sectors /systems to climate change in polar regions. Table 3.4 summarises the consequences, interacting drivers, responses, and assets of climate change responses by select human sectors (i.e., social-ecological systems) of Arctic and Antarctic regions. Also noted are anticipated future conditions and level of certainty and other drivers of change that may interact with climate and affect outcomes. Implications to world demands on natural resources, innovation and development of technologies, population trends and economic growth are likely to affect all systems, as is the Paris Agreement (AMAP, 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r2128|2128]]</sup> ). In several cases, drivers of change interacting with climate change are regionally specific and not easily captured. In many cases there is limited information on human responses to climate change in the Russian Arctic.

<!-- TABLE -->
{| class="wikitable"
|-
| ''Sector /System''
| ''Consequence of climate change ''
| ''Documented responses ''
| ''Key assets and strategies of adaptive and transformative capacity''
| ''Anticipated future conditions/level of certainty''
| ''Other forces for change that may interact with climate and affect outcomes''
|-
| '''Commercial Fisheries '''
| Consequences are multi-dimensional, including impacts to abundance and distribution of different target species differently, by region. Changes in coastal ecosystems affecting fisheries productivity
| Implementation of adaptive management practices to assess stocks, change allocations as needed, and address issues of equity
| Implementation of adaptive management that is closely linked to monitoring, research, and public participation in decisions
| Displacement of fishing effort will impact fishing operations in the eastern Bering Sea and Barents Sea as well as the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources area
| Changes in human preference, demand and markets, changes in gear, changes in policies affecting property rights. Changes due to offshore development and transportation
|-
| '''Subsistence (marine and terrestrial)'''
| Changes in species distribution and abundance (not all negative); impediments to access of harvesting areas; safety; changes in seasonality; reduced harvesting success and process of food production (processing, food storage; quality); threats to culture and food security
| Change in gear, timing of hunting, species switching; mobilisation to be involved in political action
| Systems of adaptive co-management that allow for species switching, changes in harvesting methods and timing, secure harvesting rights
| Less access to some areas, more in others. Changes in distribution and abundance of resources. More restrictions with regulations related to species at risk.
Adaptation at the individual, household, and community levels may be seriously restricted by conditions where there is poverty ''(high confidence'' )

| Changes in cost of fuel, land use affecting access, food preferences, harvesting rights; international agreements to protect vulnerable species
|-
| '''Reindeer Herding'''
| Rain-on-snow events causing high mortality of herds; shrubification of tundra pasture lowering forage quality
| Changes in movement patterns of herders; policies to ensure free-range movements; supplemental feeding.
| Flexibility in movement to respond to changes in pastures, secure land use rights and adaptive management. Continued economic viability and cultural tradition.
| Increased frequency of extreme events and changing forage quality adding to vulnerabilities of reindeer and herders ( ''medium confidence'' )
| Change in market value of meat; overgrazing; land use policies affecting access to pasture and migration routes, property rights
|-
| '''Tourism (Arctic and Antarctic)'''
| Warmer conditions, more open water, public perception of ‘last chance’ opportunities
| Increased visitation, (quantity and quality) increase in off-season tourism to polar regions
| Policies to ensure safety, cultural integrity, ecological health, adequate quarantine procedures
| Increased risk of introduction of alien species and direct effects of tourists on wildlife
| Travel costs. Shifting tourism market, more enterprises
|-
| '''Non-Renewable Resource Extraction (Arctic only)'''
| Reduced sea ice and glaciers offering some new opportunities for development; changes in hydrology (spring runoff), thawing permafrost, and temperature affect production levels, ice roads, flooding events, and infrastructure
| Some shifts in practices, greater interest in offshore and on-land development opportunities in some regions
| Modification of practices and use of climate change scenario analysis
| Increased cost of operations in areas of permafrost thawing; more accessible areas in open waters and receding glaciers
| Changes in policies affecting extent of sea and land use area, new extraction technologies (e.g., fracking), changes in markets (e.g., price of barrel of oil)
|-
| '''Infrastructure '''
'''-urban and rural human settlements, year-round '''

| Thawing permafrost affecting stability of ground; coastal erosion
| Damaged and loss of infrastructure, increase in operating costs
| Resources for assessments, mitigation, and where needed, relocation
| Increasing cost to maintain infrastructure and greater demand for technological solutions to mitigate issues. Shortening windows of operation for use of ice roads; construction of all-season roads
| Weak regional and national economies, other disasters that divert resources, disinterest by southern-based law makers
|-
| '''Marine Transportation'''
| Open seas allowing for more vessels; greater constraints in use of ice roads
| Increased shipping, tourism, more private vessels. Increased risk of hazardous waste and oil spills and accidents requiring search and rescue.
| Strong international cooperation leading to agreed-upon and enforced policies that maintain standards for safety; well-developed response plans with readiness by agents in some regions
| Continued increases in shipping traffic with increased risks of accidents
| Political conflict in other areas that impeded acceptance of policies for safety requirements, timing, and movements. Changing insurance premiums
|-
| '''Human Health'''
| Threats to food security, potential threats to physical and psychological well being
| Greater focus on food security research; programs that address fundamental health issues
| Human and financial resources to support public programs in hinterland regions; cultural awareness of health issues as related to climate change
| Greater likelihood of illnesses, food insecurity, cost of health care
| A reduction (of increase) in public resources to support health services to rural community populations, research that links ecological change to human health
|-
| '''Coastal settlements (see Cross-Chapter Box 9)'''
| Change in extent of sea ice with more storm surges, thawing of permafrost, and coastal erosion
| Maintenance of erosion mitigation; relocation planning, some but incomplete allocation for funding
| Local leadership and community initiatives to initiate and drive processes, responsive agencies, established processes for assessments and planning, geographic options
| Increasing number of communities needing relocation, rising costs for mitigating erosion issues.
| Limitations of government budgets, other disasters that may take priority for spending, deficiencies in policies for addressing mitigation and relocation
|}
<!-- END TABLE -->

<span id="governance"></span>
=== 3.5.3 Governance ===

<div id="section-3-5-3-1local-to-national-governance"></div>

<span id="local-to-national-governance"></span>
==== 3.5.3.1 Local to National Governance ====

<div id="section-3-5-3-1local-to-national-governance-block-1"></div>

Responses to climate change at and across local, regional and national levels occur directly and indirectly through a broad range of governance activities, such as land and sea use planning and regulations, economic development strategies, tax incentives for use of alternative energy technologies, permitting processes, resource management and national security. Increasingly, climate change is considered in environmental assessments and proposals for resource planning of polar regions.

A comprehensive literature review of 157 discrete cases of Arctic adaptation initiatives by Ford et al. (2014b) found that adaptation is primarily local and motivated by reducing risks and their related vulnerabilities ( ''high confidence'' ). Several elements for successful climate change adaptation planning at the local level have previously been identified: formal analytical models need to be relevant to the concerns and needs of stakeholders, experts should be made sensitive to community perspectives, information should be packaged and communicated in ways that are accessible to non-experts and processes of engagement that foster creative problem solving be used. Furthermore, success of local government involvement in adaptation planning has been closely linked to transnational municipal networks that foster social learning and in which local governments assume a role as key players (Sheppard et al., 2011; Fünfgeld, 2015) ( ''medium confidence'' ). While transnational networks can be a catalyst for action and promoting innovation, there remain outstanding challenges in measuring the effectiveness of these networks (Fünfgeld, 2015).

Adaptation through formal institutions by Indigenous people is enabled through self-government, land claims and co-management institutions (Baird et al., 2016; Huet et al., 2017). However, organisational capacity is often a limiting factor in involvement (AHDR, 2014; Ford et al., 2014b; Forbes et al., 2015) ( ''high confidence'' ). Interactions across scales are also dependent on the extent to which various stakeholders are perceived as legitimate in their perceptions and recommendations, an issue related to the use of local knowledge and indigenous knowledge in governance (Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1) (AHDR, 2014; Ford et al., 2014b; Forbes et al., 2015) ( ''high confidence'' ).

At a more regional level, Alaska’s ‘Climate Action for Alaska’ was reconstituted in 2017 and is now actively linking local concerns with state-level policies and funding, as well as setting targets for future reductions in the state’s carbon emission. The role of cross-scale boundary organisations in climate change adaptation planning, and how central government initiatives can ultimately translate into ‘hybrid’ forms of adaptation at the local level that allow for actions that are sensitive to local communities has proven important in Norway (Dannevig and Aall, 2015).

At the national level, Norway, Sweden and Finland have engaged in the European Climate Adaptation Platform (Climate-ADAPT), a partnership that aims to support Europe in adapting to climate change by helping users to access and share data and information on expected climate change in Europe, current and future vulnerability of regions and sectors, national and transnational adaptation strategies and actions, adaptation case studies and potential adaptation options, and tools that support adaptation planning. Level of participation by country and the extent to which national level efforts are linked with regional and local adaptation varies. The Canadian government’s actions on climate change have been among the most extensive of the Arctic nations, including funding of ArcticNet, a Network of Centres of Excellence, and consideration of climate change by The Northern Contaminants and Nutrition North Canada programs .

<div id="section-3-5-3-2international-climate-governance-and-law-implications-for-international-cooperation"></div>

<span id="international-climate-governance-and-law-implications-for-international-cooperation"></span>
==== 3.5.3.2 International Climate Governance and Law: Implications for International Cooperation ====

<div id="section-3-5-3-2international-climate-governance-and-law-implications-for-international-cooperation-block-1"></div>

The way states and institutions manage international cooperation on environmental governance is changing in response to climate change in the polar regions. Rather than treating regional impacts of climate change and their governance in isolation (i.e., purely with a regional lens), the need to cooperate in a global multi-regulatory fashion across several levels of governance is increasingly realised (Stokke, 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2141|2141]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2142|2142]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

In both polar regions, cooperative approaches to regional governance have been developed to allow for the participation of non-state actors. In some cases, regimes allow for a substantial level of participation by specific groups of the civil society (Jabour, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2143|2143]]</sup> ; Keil and Knecht, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2144|2144]]</sup> ) . For example, in the Antarctic Treaty System, the Antarctic Treaty Parties included the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research into their Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. In the Arctic, the status of Permanent Participants has enabled the effective participation of Indigenous Peoples in the work of the Council (Pincus and Ali, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2145|2145]]</sup> ). Climate change has contributed to modifying the balance between the interests of state and non-state actors, leading to changing forms of cooperation (Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2146|2146]]</sup> ). While such changes and modifications occur in both the Arctic and Antarctic, the role of states has remained present in all the regimes and sectors of human responses (Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2147|2147]]</sup> ; Jabour, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2148|2148]]</sup> ).

Addressing the risks of climate change impacts in polar regions also requires linking levels of governance and sector governance across local to global scales, considering impacts and human adaptation (Stokke, 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2149|2149]]</sup> ; Berkman and Vylegzhanin, 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r2150|2150]]</sup> ; Tuori, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2151|2151]]</sup> ; Young, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2152|2152]]</sup> ; Koivurova, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2153|2153]]</sup> ; Prior, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2154|2154]]</sup> ; Shibata, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2155|2155]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2156|2156]]</sup> ) ( ''high confidence'' ). Despite established cooperation in international polar region governance, several authors have come to the conclusion that the current international legal framework is inadequate when applying a precautionary approach at the regional level ( ''medium confidence'' ). For example, several studies have shown that the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, which applies only to the North East Atlantic, and that provides a framework for implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), are insufficient to deal with risks when applying a precautionary approach (Jakobsen, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2157|2157]]</sup> ; Hossain, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2158|2158]]</sup> ).

In the Arctic, responses to climate change do not only lead to international governance cooperation but also to competition in access to natural resources, especially hydrocarbons. With ice retreating and thinning, and improved access to natural resources, coastal states are increasingly recurring to the option to invoke Article 76 of the UNCLOS (Art. 76 UNCLOS; Verschuuren, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2159|2159]]</sup> ) and seek to demonstrate with scientific data, submitted to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf, and within a set timeline, that their continental shelf is extended. In that case they can enjoy sovereign rights beyond the EEZ. It is ''very unlikely'' that this new trend from states to refer to Article 76 will lead to future (military) conflicts (Berkman and Vylegzhanin, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2160|2160]]</sup> ; Kullerud et al., 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2161|2161]]</sup> ; Stokke, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2162|2162]]</sup> ; Verschuuren, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2163|2163]]</sup> ), although the issue cannot be totally dismissed (Kraska, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2164|2164]]</sup> ; Åtland, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2165|2165]]</sup> ; Huebert, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2166|2166]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2167|2167]]</sup> ; Barret, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2168|2168]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2169|2169]]</sup> ).

In the Antarctic, cooperation in general does occur via UNCLOS, the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the Polar Code. Global environmental and climate regimes that are implemented and managed through regional regimes (such as the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement) are also relevant for the Antarctic Treaty and its Protocol on Environmental Protection, which requires, amongst other issues, a minimisation of adverse environmental impacts. Cooperation in the Antarctic also occurs through the the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources . Climate change and its consequences for the marine environment are a central issue for this Convention because it challenges ways to regulate and manage fisheries and designate and manage Marine Protected Areas. Nevertheless, CCAMLR has not agreed to any climate change program and at its most recent meeting, there was again no agreement to do so (Brooks et al. (2018) <sup>[[#fn:r2170|2170]]</sup> , CCAMLR Report on the 37th Meeting of the Commission, CCAMLR (2018)).

<div id="section-3-5-3-2international-climate-governance-and-law-implications-for-international-cooperation-block-2"></div>

<span id="formal-arrangements-polar-conventions-and-institutions"></span>
===== 3.5.3.2.1 Formal arrangements: polar conventions and institutions =====

''The Arctic Council''

International cooperation on issues related to climate change in the Arctic mainly occurs at the Arctic Council (herein ‘the Council’), and consequently in important areas of its mandate: the (marine) environment and scientific research (Morgera and Kulovesi, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2171|2171]]</sup> ; Tesar et al., 2016a <sup>[[#fn:r2172|2172]]</sup> ; Wehrmann, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2173|2173]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2174|2174]]</sup> ). The Council is composed of eight Arctic States and six Permanent Participants representing organisations of Arctic Indigenous peoples. Observers status is open to: non-Arctic states, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations, global and regional non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Council is an example of cooperation through soft law, a unique institutional body that does not possess a legal personality and is neither an international law nor a completely state-centric institution. However, it is acting state-centric and increasingly operating in a context of the Arctic affected by a changing climate, globalisation and transnationalism (Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2175|2175]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2176|2176]]</sup> ; Pincus and Speth, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2177|2177]]</sup> ) ''(medium confidence'' ). In 2013, China, South Korea, Italy, Japan, India and Singapore joined France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK as Observers states to the Arctic Council; Switzerland was granted Observer status in 2017. Non-Arctic States are stimulating the Council towards adopting a new approach for Arctic governance that would leave greater space for their participation.

Despite lacking the role to enact hard law, three binding agreements were negotiated under the auspices of the Council (in its task forces), the latest of which is the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, which is an indication that the Council is preparing a regulatory role to respond to climate change in the Arctic using hard-law instruments (Morgera and Kulovesi, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2178|2178]]</sup> ; Shapovalova, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2179|2179]]</sup> ). Through organising the Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane (Morgera and Kulovesi, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2180|2180]]</sup> ), the Council has catalysed action on short-lived climate forcers as the task force was followed by the adoption in 2015 of the Arctic Council Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reductions. In this non-legally binding agreement, Arctic States lay out a common vision for national and collective action to accelerate decline in black carbon and methane emissions (Shapovalova, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2181|2181]]</sup> ). The Council thereby moved from merely assessing problems to attempting to solve them (Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2182|2182]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2183|2183]]</sup> ; Koivurova and Caddell, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2184|2184]]</sup> ). While mitigation of global emissions from fossil fuels requires global cooperation, progress with anthropogenic emissions of short-term climate forcers (such as black carbon and methane) may be achieved through smaller groups of countries (Aakre et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2185|2185]]</sup> ). However, even though the Council has also embraced the Ecosystem Approach, it does not have a mandate to manage climate-related risks and impacts, or apply a precautionary approach, on fisheries issues.

Several studies have shown that the Council has the potential to enhance internal coherence in the current, fragmented landscape of multi-regulatory governance by providing integrated leadership. However, it is ''about'' ''as likely as not'' that the Council could play a strong role in combatting global climate problems and operating successfully within the climate transnational context unless it goes through restructuring and reconfiguration (Stokke, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2186|2186]]</sup> ; Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2187|2187]]</sup> ; Pincus and Speth, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2188|2188]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2189|2189]]</sup> ; Tesar et al., 2016a <sup>[[#fn:r2190|2190]]</sup> ; Wehrmann, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2191|2191]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2192|2192]]</sup> ; Koivurova and Caddell, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2193|2193]]</sup> ).

The future of the governance of the changing Arctic Ocean, including the role of the Council will also depend on the implications of the development for a new agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdictions under the UNCLOS (Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2194|2194]]</sup> ; De Lucia, 2017; Nengye et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2195|2195]]</sup> ; Koivurova and Caddell, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2196|2196]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

''The Antarctic Treaty System''

The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is the collective term for the Antarctic Treaty and related agreements. The ATS regulates international relations with respect to Antarctica. 54 countries have acceded to the Treaty and 29 of them participate in decision making as Consultative Parties. 27 countries are Party to the CCAMLR, and 40 have ratified the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. The importance of understanding, mitigating and adapting to the impacts of changes to the Southern Ocean and Antarctic cryosphere has been realised by all of the major bodies responsible for governance in the Antarctic region (south of 60°S). The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties agreed that a Climate Change Response Work Programme would address these matters (ATCM, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2197|2197]]</sup> ). This led to the establishment of the Subsidiary Group of the Committee for Environmental Protection on Climate Change Response (ATCM, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2198|2198]]</sup> ). By contrast, consensus is currently limiting work programme-level responses to climate change by CCAMLR (2017a), while opportunities exist to incorporate climate concerns into mechanisms for implementation and monitoring aimed to conserve ecosystems and the environment (Brooks et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2199|2199]]</sup> )

<div id="section-3-5-3-2international-climate-governance-and-law-implications-for-international-cooperation-block-3"></div>

<span id="informal-arrangements"></span>
===== 3.5.3.2.2 Informal arrangements =====

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, through the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) and its Subsidiary Group of the Committee for Environmental Protection on Climate Change Response, continue to work closely with the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs, the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators and other NGOs to understand, mitigate and adapt to impacts associated with changes to the Southern Ocean and Antarctic cryosphere. Understanding, mitigating and adapting to climate change are among the key priorities identified for research in the region (Kennicutt et al., 2014a <sup>[[#fn:r2200|2200]]</sup> ; Kennicutt et al., 2014b <sup>[[#fn:r2201|2201]]</sup> ) and nationally funded bilateral and multilateral projects are underway.

<div id="section-3-5-3-2international-climate-governance-and-law-implications-for-international-cooperation-block-4"></div>

<span id="role-of-informal-actors"></span>
===== 3.5.3.2.3 Role of informal actors =====

Several studies show that informal actors of the Arctic can influence decision making process of the Council and shift the Council towards more cooperation with different actors to enhance the co-production of knowledge (Duyck, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2202|2202]]</sup> ; Makki, 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2203|2203]]</sup> ; Keil and Knecht, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2204|2204]]</sup> ). Recently, non-state observers at the Council, such as the World Wide Fund for Nature  and the Circumpolar Conservation Union have played a role in raising awareness on climate change responses and contributing to the work of the Council’s Working Groups and Expert Groups (Keil and Knecht, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2205|2205]]</sup> ).

Within the Antarctic Treaty System, several non-state actors play a major role in providing advice and influencing the governance of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Among the most prominent actors are formal observers such as the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, and invited experts such as the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators and the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition. At meetings of CCAMLR, the Scientific Committee’s 2009 report on Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment (Turner et al., 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2206|2206]]</sup> ) precipitated an Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on Climate Change in 2010 (Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts, 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r2209|2209]]</sup> ). The outcomes of the meeting led the Antarctic Treaty’s Committee for Environmental Protection to develop a Climate Change Response Work Programme (ATCM, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2210|2210]]</sup> )

<div id="section-3-5-3-2international-climate-governance-and-law-implications-for-international-cooperation-block-5"></div>

<span id="table-3.5"></span>
<!-- START IMG -->
<!-- TABLE IMG -->
<!-- IMG TITLE -->
'''Table 3.5'''
<!-- IMG CAPTION -->
Summary of the assessment of practices, tools and strategies that can contribute to climate resilient pathways. Practices are shown with the potential extent of their contribution to resilience building, considering also seven general strategies (Biggs et al., 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2207|2207]]</sup> ; Quinlan et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2208|2208]]</sup> ; Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1). Also shown is the current level of their application in polar regions and key conditions facilitating implementation.
<!-- IMG FILE -->
[[File:0c22ef5cf12e0b1df3b86e48bbbb56fb table3.5.png]]

<!-- END IMG -->
<span id="towards-resilient-pathways"></span>
=== 3.5.4 Towards Resilient Pathways ===

<div id="section-3-5-4towards-resilient-pathways-block-1"></div>

This section presents the status of practices, tools and strategies currently employed in the Arctic and or Antarctica that can potentially contribute to climate resilient pathways. Seven general strategies for building resilience have been recognised: i) maintain diversity and redundancy, ii) manage connectivity, iii) manage slow variables and feedbacks, iv) foster an understanding of social-ecological systems as complex adaptive systems, v) encourage learning and experimentation, vi) broaden participation, and vii) promote polycentric governance systems (Biggs et al., 2012; Quinlan et al., 2016) (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1).

The practices listed below are not inclusive of the many resilience-building efforts underway in the polar regions. Those described are well represented in the literature and have shown sufficient utility to merit further use (ARR, 2016; AMAP, 2017a; AMAP, 2017b; AMAP, 2018) ( ''high confidence'' ). Some require more refinement while others are well developed. The following sections assess the extent to which these practices operationalise resilience-building through knowledge co-production, the linking of knowledge with decision making, and implementation of resilience-based ecosystem management, considering also their application level and key facilitating conditions; a summary is presented in Table 3.5.

<div id="section-3-5-4-1knowledge-co-production-and-integration"></div>

<span id="knowledge-co-production-and-integration"></span>
==== 3.5.4.1 Knowledge Co-production and Integration ====

<div id="section-3-5-4-1knowledge-co-production-and-integration-block-1"></div>

The co-production of knowledge and transdisciplinary research are currently contributing to the understanding of polar climate change through the use of a diversity of cultural, geographic, and disciplinary perspectives that provide a holistic framing of problems and possible solutions (Miller and Wyborn, 2018; Robards et al., 2018) ( ''high confidence'' ).

Several factors are important in successful knowledge co-production, including use of social-ecological frameworks, engagement of a broad set actors with diverse epistemological orientations, a ‘team science’ approach to studies, strong leadership, attention to process (vs. only products) and mutual respect for cultural differences (Meadow et al., 2015; National Research Council, 2015; Petrov et al., 2016) ( ''high confidence'' ). Knowledge co-production involving Indigenous peoples comes with its own set of challenges (Armitage et al., 2011; Robards et al., 2018). While advancements have been made, the practice of knowledge co-production would benefit from further experimentation and innovation in methodologies and better training of researchers (van der Hel, 2016; Vlasova and Volkov, 2016; Berkes, 2017) ( ''medium confidence'' ). Three aspects of knowledge co-production are highlighted below.

<div id="section-3-5-4-1knowledge-co-production-and-integration-block-2"></div>

<span id="community-based-monitoring"></span>
===== 3.5.4.1.1 Community-based monitoring =====

Community-based monitoring (CBM) in the Arctic has emerged as a practice of great interest because of its potential to link western ways of knowing with local knowledge and indigenous knowledge (Retter et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2015a; Johnson et al., 2015b; Kouril et al., 2016; AMAP, 2017a; Williams et al., 2018). In several CBM programs, innovative approaches using the internet, mobile phones, hand-held information devices, and camera-equipped GPS units are capturing, documenting and communicating local observations of change (Brubaker et al., 2011; Brubaker et al., 2013). The integration of community observations with instrument-based observations and its use in research has proven challenging, with technical and cultural issues (Griffith et al., 2018). Execution of CBM programs in the Arctic has also proven to be labour intensive and difficult to sustain, requiring long-term financial support, agreements specifying data ownership, sufficient human capital, and in some cases, the involvement of boundary organisations that provide technical support (Pulsifer et al., 2012; Eicken et al., 2014) and link CBM with governance (CAFF, 2015b; Robards et al., 2018). As is the case in all knowledge production, power relationships (i.e., who decides what is a legitimate observation, who has access to resources for involvement and who benefits) have been challenging where the legitimacy of local knowledge and indigenous knowledge is questioned (e.g., Pristupa et al., 2018). There is ''high agreement'' and ''limited evidence'' that CBM facilitates knowledge co-production and resilience building. More analyses of Arctic communities and their institutional capabilities related to CBM are needed to evaluate the potential of these observation systems, and experimentation and innovation may help determine how CBM can more effectively inform decision making beyond the community (Johnson et al., 2015a; Johnson et al., 2015b) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

<div id="section-3-5-4-1knowledge-co-production-and-integration-block-3"></div>

<span id="understanding-regime-shifts"></span>
===== 3.5.4.1.2 Understanding regime shifts =====

Regime shifts are especially important in polar regions where there are limited data and where rapid directional change suggests the possibility of crossing thresholds that may dramatically alter the flow of ecosystem services (ARR, 2016). Better understanding of the thresholds and dynamics of regime shifts (i.e., SES state changes) is especially important for resilience building (ARR, 2016; Biggs et al., 2018; Rocha et al., 2018) ( ''high confidence'' ). While polar regime shifts have been documented (Biggs et al., 2018), most are poorly understood and rarely predictable (Rocha et al., 2018) ( ''high confidence'' ). Moreover, the focus on Arctic regime shifts to date has been on almost entirely on biophysical state changes that impact social systems. A limited number of studies have examined social regime shifts and fewer the feedbacks of social regimes shifts on ecosystems (Gerlach et al., 2017). Future needs for advancing knowledge of regime shifts include: 1) continued and refined updating of details on past regimes shifts, 2) structured comparative analysis of these phenomena to ascertain common patterns and variation, 3) greater investment in research resources on potential large-scale regime shifts, and 4) great attention on how social and economic change may affect ecosystems (ARR, 2016; Biggs et al., 2018).

<div id="section-3-5-4-1knowledge-co-production-and-integration-block-4"></div>

<span id="indicators-of-resilience-and-adaptive-capacity"></span>
===== 3.5.4.1.3 Indicators of resilience and adaptive capacity =====

Well-crafted and effectively communicated indicators of polar geophysical, ecological and human systems have the potential to make complex issues more easily understood by society, including local residents and policy makers seeking to assess the implication of climate change (Petrov et al., 2016; Carson and Sommerkorn, 2017) ( ''medium confidence'' ). Having indicators of change is no guarantee they will be used; access to information, awareness of changing conditions, and the motivation to act are also important (e.g., van der Linden et al., 2015).

Indicators of the state of polar geophysical systems, biodiversity, ecosystems and human well-being are monitored as part of polar programs. For example, indicators are reported by the Arctic Council working groups Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme and Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (e.g., Odland et al., 2016; CAFF, 2017; Box et al., 2019), the International Arctic Social Science Association (e.g., AHDR, 2014), the CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Programme (e.g., Reid et al., 2005) and the Southern Ocean Observing System (e.g., Meredith et al., 2013).

There is limited development of indicators of social-ecological resilience (Jarvis et al., 2013; Carson and Sommerkorn, 2017). As well, indicators of human adaptive capacity are typically based on qualitative case studies with limited quantitative data, and thus have limited comparability and generalisability (Ford and King, 2013; Petrov et al., 2016; Berman et al., 2017) ( ''high confidence'' ). The identification and on-going use of indicators of social-ecological resilience are theoretically best achieved through highly participatory processes that engage stakeholders of a locale, with those processes potentially resulting in self-reflection and actions that improve adaptive capacity (Quinlan et al., 2016; Carson and Sommerkorn, 2017), however, this is untested empirically ( ''low confidence'' ).

<div id="section-3-5-4-2linking-knowledge-with-decision-making"></div>

<span id="linking-knowledge-with-decision-making"></span>
==== 3.5.4.2 Linking Knowledge with Decision Making ====

<div id="section-3-5-4-2linking-knowledge-with-decision-making-block-1"></div>

While there is a growing expectation in polar (and other) regions for a more deliberate strategy to link science with social learning and policy making about climate change (and other matters) through iterative interactions of researchers, managers and other stakeholders, meeting that expectation is confounded by several deeply rooted issues (Armitage et al., 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2258|2258]]</sup> ; ARR, 2016; Tesar et al., 2016b <sup>[[#fn:r2259|2259]]</sup> ; Baztan et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2260|2260]]</sup> ; Forbis Jr and Hayhoe, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2261|2261]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

In spite of the development of practices like those described above and the establishment of many co-managed arrangements in polar regions, scientists and policy makers often work in separate spheres of influence, tend to maintain different values, interests, concerns, responsibilities and perspectives, and gain limited exposure to the other’s knowledge system (see Liu et al., 2008; Armitage et al., 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2262|2262]]</sup> ). Information exchange flows unequally, as officials struggle with information overload and proliferating institutional voices, and where local residents are mistrusting of scientists (Powledge, 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2263|2263]]</sup> ). Inherent tensions between science-based assessment and interest-based policy, and many existing institutions often prevent direct connectivity . Further, the longstanding science mandate to remain ‘policy neutral’ typically leads to norms of constrained interaction (Neff, 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2264|2264]]</sup> ) ( ''high confidence'' ).

Creating pathways towards greater climate resilience will therefore depend, in part, on a redefined ‘actionable science’ that creates bridges supporting better decisions through more rigorous, accessible, and engaging products, while shaping a narrative that instils public confidence (Beier et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2265|2265]]</sup> ; Fleming and Pyenson, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2266|2266]]</sup> ) ( ''high confidence'' ). Stakeholders of polar regions are increasingly using a suite of creative tools and practices for moving from theory to practice in resilience building by informing decision making and fostering long-term planning (Baztan et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2267|2267]]</sup> ). As noted above, these practices include participatory scenario planning, forecasting for stakeholders, and use structured decision making, solution visualisation tools and decision theatres (e.g., Schartmüller et al., 2015; Kofinas et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2268|2268]]</sup> ; Garrett et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2269|2269]]</sup> ; Holst-Andersen et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2270|2270]]</sup> ; Camus and Smit, 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r2271|2271]]</sup> ). The extent to which these practices can contribute to resilience building in the future will depend, in part, on the willingness of key actors such as scientists, to provide active decision-support services, more often than mere decision-support products (Beier et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2272|2272]]</sup> ). While progress has been made in linking science with policy, more enhanced data collaboration at every scale, more strategic social engagement, communication that both informs decisions and improves climate literacy and explicit creation of consensus documents that provide interpretive guidance about research implications and alternative choices will be important ( ''high confidence'' ).

<div id="section-3-5-4-2linking-knowledge-with-decision-making-block-2"></div>

<span id="participatory-scenario-analysis-and-planning"></span>
===== 3.5.4.2.1 Participatory scenario analysis and planning =====

Participatory scenario analysis is a quickly evolving and widely used practice in polar regions, and has proven particularly useful for supporting climate adaptation at multiple scales when it uses a social-ecological perspective (ARR, 2016; AMAP, 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r2273|2273]]</sup> ; Crépin et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2274|2274]]</sup> ; Planque et al., 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r2275|2275]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence).'' While there are technical dimensions in scenario analysis and planning (e.g., the building of useful simulation models that capture and communicate nuanced social-ecological system dynamics such as long-fuse big bang processes, pathological dynamics, critical thresholds, and unforeseen processes (Crépin et al., 2017), there are also creative aspects, such as the use of art to help in the visualisation of possible future (e.g., Planque et al., 2019).

Participatory scenario analysis has been applied to various problem areas related to climate change responses in the polar regions. Applications demonstrate the utility of the practice for identifying possible local futures that consider climate change or socioeconomic pathways (e.g., in Alaska, Ernst and van Riemsdijk, 2013; and in Eurasian reindeer-herding systems, van Oort et al., 2015; Nilsson et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2276|2276]]</sup> ) and interacting drivers of change (e.g., in Antarctica; Liggett et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2277|2277]]</sup> ). Scenario analysis proved helpful for stakeholders with different expertise and perspectives to jointly develop scenarios to inform ecosystem-based management strategies and adaptation options (e.g., in the Barents region; Nilsson et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2278|2278]]</sup> ; Planque et al., 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r2279|2279]]</sup> ) and to identify research needs (e.g., in Alaska; Vargas-Moreno et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2280|2280]]</sup> ), including informing and applying climate downscaling efforts (e.g., in Alaska; Ernst and van Riemsdijk, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2281|2281]]</sup> ).

A review of scenario analysis in the Arctic, however, found that while the practice is widespread and many are using best practice methods, less than half scenarios programs incorporated climate projections and that those utilising a backcasting approach had higher local participation than those only using forecasting (Flynn et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2282|2282]]</sup> ). It noted that integrating different knowledge systems and attention to cultural factors influence program utility and acceptance. Planque et al. (2019) <sup>[[#fn:r2283|2283]]</sup> also found that most participating stakeholders had limited experience using scenario analysis, suggesting the importance of process methods for engaging stakeholders when exploring possible, likely, and desirable futures. The long-term utility of this practice in helping stakeholders engage with each other to envision possible futures and be forward thinking in decision making will depend on the science of climate projections, further development of decision support systems to inform decision makers, attention to cultural factors and worldview, as well as refinement of processes that facilitate participants’ dialogue ( ''medium confidence'' ).

<div id="section-3-5-4-2linking-knowledge-with-decision-making-block-3"></div>

<span id="structured-decision-making"></span>
===== 3.5.4.2.2 Structured decision making =====

Structured decision making (SDM) is an emerging practice used with stakeholders to identify alternative actions, evaluate trade-offs, and inform decisions in complex situations (Gregory et al., 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2284|2284]]</sup> ). Few SDM processes have been undertaken in polar regions, with most as exploratory demonstration projects led by researchers. These have included indigenous residents and researchers identifying trade-offs and actions related to subsistence harvesting in a changing environment (Christie et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2285|2285]]</sup> ) stakeholder interviews to show how a ‘triage method’ can link community monitoring with community needs and wildlife management priorities (Wheeler et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2286|2286]]</sup> ), and the application of multi-criteria decision analysis to address difficult decisions related to mining opportunities in Greenland (Trump et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2287|2287]]</sup> ). The Decision Theater North at the University of Alaska is also being explored as an innovative method of decision support (Kofinas et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2288|2288]]</sup> ). SDM may have potential in creating climate resilience pathways in polar regions ( ''low confidence'' ), but there is currently limited experience with its application.

<div id="section-3-5-4-3-resilience-based-ecosystem-stewardship"></div>

<span id="resilience-based-ecosystem-stewardship"></span>
==== 3.5.4.3 Resilience-based Ecosystem Stewardship ====

<div id="section-3-5-4-3-resilience-based-ecosystem-stewardship-block-1"></div>

Renewable resource management and biodiversity conservation that seek to maintain resources in historic levels and reduce uncertainty before taking action remains the dominant paradigm in polar regions (Chapin III et al., 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2289|2289]]</sup> ; Forbes et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2290|2290]]</sup> ). The effectiveness of this approach, however, is increasingly challenged as the ranges and populations of species and state of ecosystems are being affected by climate change (Chapin III et al., 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r2291|2291]]</sup> ; Chapin III et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2292|2292]]</sup> ). Three practices that build and maintain social-ecological resilience in the face of climate change include Adaptive Ecosystem Governance, Spatial Planning for Biodiversity, and Linking Management of Ecosystem Services with Human Livelihoods.

<div id="section-3-5-4-3-resilience-based-ecosystem-stewardship-block-2"></div>

<span id="adaptive-ecosystem-governance"></span>
===== 3.5.4.3.1 Adaptive ecosystem governance =====

‘Adaptive Ecosystem Governance’ differs from conventional resource management or integrated ecosystem management (Chapin III et al., 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2293|2293]]</sup> ; Chapin III et al., 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r2294|2294]]</sup> ; Chapin III et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2295|2295]]</sup> ), with a strong focus on trajectories of change (i.e., emergence), implying that maintaining ecosystems in a state of equilibrium is not possible (Biggs et al., 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2296|2296]]</sup> ; ARR, 2016). This approach strengthens response options by maintaining or increasing resource diversity (to support human adaptation) and biological diversity (to support ecosystem adaptation) (Biggs et al., 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2297|2297]]</sup> ; Chapin III et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2298|2298]]</sup> ; Quinlan et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2299|2299]]</sup> ) ( ''high confidence'' ). Adaptive ecosystem governance emphasises iterative social learning processes of observing, understanding and acting with collaborative partnerships, such as adaptive co-management arrangements currently used in regions of the Arctic (Armitage et al., 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2300|2300]]</sup> ; Dale and Armitage, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2301|2301]]</sup> ; Chapin III et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2302|2302]]</sup> ; Arp et al., 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r2303|2303]]</sup> ). This approach is also currently realised through adaptive management of Arctic fisheries in Alaska that combines annual measures and within-season provisions informed by assessments of future ecosystem trends (Section 3.5.2.1), and the use of simulation models with Canadian caribou co-management boards to assess the cumulative effects of proposed land use change with climate change (Gunn et al., 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2304|2304]]</sup> ; Russell, 2014a <sup>[[#fn:r2305|2305]]</sup> ; Russell, 2014b <sup>[[#fn:r2306|2306]]</sup> ). Linking these regional efforts to pan-polar programs can enhance resilience building cross multiple scales (e.g., Gunn et al., 2013) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

<div id="section-3-5-4-3-resilience-based-ecosystem-stewardship-block-3"></div>

<span id="spatial-planning-for-biodiversity"></span>
===== 3.5.4.3.2 Spatial planning for biodiversity =====

Shifts in the distribution, abundance and human use of species and populations due to climate-induced cryosphere and ocean change, concurrent with land use changes, increase the risks to ecosystem health and biodiversity (Kaiser et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2307|2307]]</sup> ). Building resilience in these challenging conditions follows from spatial planning for biodiversity that links multiple scales and considers how impacts to ecosystems may materialise in social-ecological systems elsewhere (Bengtsson et al., 2003 <sup>[[#fn:r2308|2308]]</sup> ; Cumming, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2309|2309]]</sup> ; Allen et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2310|2310]]</sup> ). Developing pathways for spatial resilience in polar regions involves systematic planning and designating networks of protected areas to protect connected tracts of representative habitats, and biologically and ecologically significant features (Ban et al., 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2311|2311]]</sup> ). Protected area networks that combine both spatially rigid and spatially flexible regimes with climate refugia can support ecological resilience to climate change by maintaining connectivity of populations, foodwebs, and the flow of genes across scales (McLeod et al., 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2312|2312]]</sup> ). This approach reduces direct pressures on biodiversity, and thus gives biological communities, populations and ecosystems the space to adapt (Nyström and Folke, 2001 <sup>[[#fn:r2313|2313]]</sup> ; Hope et al., 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2314|2314]]</sup> ; Thomas and Gillingham, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2315|2315]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ). Networks of protected areas are now being planned (Solovyev et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2316|2316]]</sup> ) and implemented (Juvonen and Kuhmonen, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2317|2317]]</sup> ) in the marine and terrestrial Arctic, respectively; expanding the terrestrial protected area network in Antarctica is discussed (Coetzee et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2318|2318]]</sup> ). The planning of protected area networks in polar regions is currently an active topic of international collaboration in both polar regions (Arctic Council, 2015b <sup>[[#fn:r2319|2319]]</sup> ; CCAMLR, 2016a <sup>[[#fn:r2320|2320]]</sup> ; Wenzel et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2321|2321]]</sup> ). Designating marine protected area networks contributes to achieving Sustainable Development Goal 14 and the Aichi Targets of the CBD but is often contested due to competing interests for marine resources.

<div id="section-3-5-4-3-resilience-based-ecosystem-stewardship-block-4"></div>

<span id="linking-eosystem-services-with-human-livelihoods"></span>
===== 3.5.4.3.3 Linking eosystem services with human livelihoods =====

Incorporating measures of ecosystem services into assessments is key in integrating environmental, economic, and social policies that build resilience to climate change in polar regions (CAFF, 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r2322|2322]]</sup> ; Malinauskaite et al., 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r2323|2323]]</sup> ; Sarkki and Acosta García, 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r2324|2324]]</sup> ) ( ''high confidence'' ). Currently, there is limited recognition of the wide range of benefits people receive from polar ecosystems and a lack of management tools that demonstrate their benefits in decision-making processes (CAFF, 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r2325|2325]]</sup> ). The concept of ecosystem services is increasingly used in the Arctic, yet there continues to be significant knowledge gaps in mapping, valuation, and the study of the social implications of changes in ecosystem services. There are few Arctic examples of the application of ecosystem services in management (Malinauskaite et al., 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r2326|2326]]</sup> ). A strategy of ecosystem stewardship, therefore, is to maintain a continued flow of ecosystem services, recognising how their benefits provide incentives for preserving biodiversity, while also ensuring options for sustainable development and ecosystem-based adaptation (Chapin III et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2327|2327]]</sup> ; Guerry et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2328|2328]]</sup> ; Díaz et al., 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r2329|2329]]</sup> ). Arctic stewardship opportunities at landscape, seascape, and community scales to a great extent lie in supporting culturally engrained (often traditional indigenous) values of respect for land and animals, and reliance on the local environment through the sharing of knowledge and power between local users of renewable resources and agencies responsible for managing resources (Mengerink et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2330|2330]]</sup> ) ( ''high confidence'' ). In the Antarctic, ecosystem stewardship is dependent on international formally-defined and informally-enacted cooperation, and the recognition of its service to the global community (Section 3.5.3.2).

<span id="synopsis"></span>