IPCC:AR6/WGI/Chapter-7 - Revision history

Laura: /* Climate Response */

2026-06-24T10:10:40Z

Climate Response

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	'''The assessed historical and future ranges of GSAT change in this Report are shown to be internally consistent with the Report’s assessment of key physical-climate indicators: greenhouse gas ERFs, ECS and TCR.''' When calibrated to match the assessed ranges within the assessment, physically based emulators can reproduce the best estimate of GSAT change over 1850–1900 to 1995–2014 to within 5% and the ''very likely'' range of this GSAT change to within 10%. Two physically based emulators match at least two-thirds of the Chapter 4-assessed projected GSAT changes to within these levels of precision. When used for multi-scenario experiments, calibrated physically based emulators can adequately reflect assessments regarding future GSAT from Earth system models and/or other lines of evidence (''high confidence''). {Cross-Chapter Box 7.1}		'''The assessed historical and future ranges of GSAT change in this Report are shown to be internally consistent with the Report’s assessment of key physical-climate indicators: greenhouse gas ERFs, ECS and TCR.''' When calibrated to match the assessed ranges within the assessment, physically based emulators can reproduce the best estimate of GSAT change over 1850–1900 to 1995–2014 to within 5% and the ''very likely'' range of this GSAT change to within 10%. Two physically based emulators match at least two-thirds of the Chapter 4-assessed projected GSAT changes to within these levels of precision. When used for multi-scenario experiments, calibrated physically based emulators can adequately reflect assessments regarding future GSAT from Earth system models and/or other lines of evidence (''high confidence''). {Cross-Chapter Box 7.1}

	'''It is now well understood that the Arctic warms more quickly than the Antarctic due to differences in radiative feedbacks and ocean heat uptake between the poles, but that surface warming will eventually be amplified in both the Arctic and Antarctic~~'''~~ (''high confidence~~'' '~~'').''' The causes of this polar amplification are well understood, and the evidence is stronger than at the time of AR5, supported by better agreement between modelled and observed polar amplification during warm paleo time periods (''high confidence'') ''.'' The Antarctic warms more slowly than the Arctic owing primarily to upwelling in the Southern Ocean, and even at equilibrium is expected to warm less than the Arctic. The rate of Arctic surface warming will continue to exceed the global average over this century (''high confidence''). There is also ''high confidence'' that Antarctic amplification will emerge as the Southern Ocean surface warms on centennial time scales, although only ''low confidence'' regarding whether this feature will emerge during the 21st century. {7.4.4}		'''It is now well understood that the Arctic warms more quickly than the Antarctic due to differences in radiative feedbacks and ocean heat uptake between the poles, but that surface warming will eventually be amplified in both the Arctic and Antarctic (''high confidence'').''' The causes of this polar amplification are well understood, and the evidence is stronger than at the time of AR5, supported by better agreement between modelled and observed polar amplification during warm paleo time periods (''high confidence'') ''.'' The Antarctic warms more slowly than the Arctic owing primarily to upwelling in the Southern Ocean, and even at equilibrium is expected to warm less than the Arctic. The rate of Arctic surface warming will continue to exceed the global average over this century (''high confidence''). There is also ''high confidence'' that Antarctic amplification will emerge as the Southern Ocean surface warms on centennial time scales, although only ''low confidence'' regarding whether this feature will emerge during the 21st century. {7.4.4}

	'''The assessed global warming potentials (GWP) and global temperature-change potentials (GTP) for methane and nitrous oxide are slightly lower than in AR5 due to revised estimates of their lifetimes and updated estimates of their indirect chemical effects~~'''~~ (''medium confidence~~'' '~~'').''' The assessed metrics now also include the carbon cycle response for non-CO <sub>2</sub> gases. The carbon cycle estimate is lower than in AR5, but there is ''high confidence'' in the need for its inclusion and in the quantification methodology. Metrics for methane from fossil fuel sources account for the extra fossil CO <sub>2</sub> that these emissions contribute to the atmosphere and so have slightly higher emissions metric values than those from biogenic sources (''high confidence''). {7.6.1}		'''The assessed global warming potentials (GWP) and global temperature-change potentials (GTP) for methane and nitrous oxide are slightly lower than in AR5 due to revised estimates of their lifetimes and updated estimates of their indirect chemical effects (''medium confidence'').''' The assessed metrics now also include the carbon cycle response for non-CO <sub>2</sub> gases. The carbon cycle estimate is lower than in AR5, but there is ''high confidence'' in the need for its inclusion and in the quantification methodology. Metrics for methane from fossil fuel sources account for the extra fossil CO <sub>2</sub> that these emissions contribute to the atmosphere and so have slightly higher emissions metric values than those from biogenic sources (''high confidence''). {7.6.1}

	'''New emissions metric approaches such as GWP* and the combined-GTP (CGTP) are designed to relate emissions rates of short-lived gases to cumulative emissions of CO~~'''~~ <sub>2</sub> ~~'''~~. These metric approaches are well suited to estimate the GSAT response from aggregated emissions of a range of gases over time, which can be done by scaling the cumulative CO~~'''~~ <sub>2</sub> ~~'''~~equivalent emissions calculated with these metrics by the transient climate response to cumulative emissions of CO~~'''~~ <sub>2</sub> ~~'''~~.''' For a given multi-gas emissions pathway, the estimated contribution of emissions to surface warming is improved by using either these new metric approaches or by treating short- and long-lived GHG emissions pathways separately, as compared to approaches that aggregate emissions of GHGs using standard GWP or GTP emissions metrics. By contrast, if emissions are weighted by their 100-year GWP or GTP values, different multi-gas emissions pathways with the same aggregated CO <sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions rarely lead to the same estimated temperature outcome (''high confidence''). {7.6.1, Box 7.3}		'''New emissions metric approaches such as GWP* and the combined-GTP (CGTP) are designed to relate emissions rates of short-lived gases to cumulative emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>. These metric approaches are well suited to estimate the GSAT response from aggregated emissions of a range of gases over time, which can be done by scaling the cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions calculated with these metrics by the transient climate response to cumulative emissions of CO <sub>2</sub>.''' For a given multi-gas emissions pathway, the estimated contribution of emissions to surface warming is improved by using either these new metric approaches or by treating short- and long-lived GHG emissions pathways separately, as compared to approaches that aggregate emissions of GHGs using standard GWP or GTP emissions metrics. By contrast, if emissions are weighted by their 100-year GWP or GTP values, different multi-gas emissions pathways with the same aggregated CO <sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions rarely lead to the same estimated temperature outcome (''high confidence''). {7.6.1, Box 7.3}

	'''The choice of emissions metric affects the quantification of net zero GHG emissions and therefore the resulting temperature outcome after net zero emissions are achieved.''' In general, achieving net zero CO <sub>2</sub> emissions and declining non-CO <sub>2</sub> radiative forcing would be sufficient to prevent additional human-caused warming. Reaching net zero GHG emissions as quantified by GWP-100 typically results in global temperatures that peak and then decline after net zero GHGs emissions are achieved, though this outcome depends on the relative sequencing of mitigation of short-lived and long-lived species. In contrast, reaching net zero GHG emissions when quantified using new emissions metrics such as CGTP or GWP* would lead to approximate temperature stabilization (''high confidence''). {7.6.2}		'''The choice of emissions metric affects the quantification of net zero GHG emissions and therefore the resulting temperature outcome after net zero emissions are achieved.''' In general, achieving net zero CO <sub>2</sub> emissions and declining non-CO <sub>2</sub> radiative forcing would be sufficient to prevent additional human-caused warming. Reaching net zero GHG emissions as quantified by GWP-100 typically results in global temperatures that peak and then decline after net zero GHGs emissions are achieved, though this outcome depends on the relative sequencing of mitigation of short-lived and long-lived species. In contrast, reaching net zero GHG emissions when quantified using new emissions metrics such as CGTP or GWP* would lead to approximate temperature stabilization (''high confidence''). {7.6.2}
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	<span id="introduction-conceptual-framework-and-advances-since-the-fifth-assessment-report"></span>		<span id="introduction-conceptual-framework-and-advances-since-the-fifth-assessment-report"></span>

	== 7.1 Introduction, Conceptual Framework, and Advances Since the Fifth Assessment Report ==		== 7.1 Introduction, Conceptual Framework, and Advances Since the Fifth Assessment Report ==

Laura: /* Climate Feedbacks and Sensitivity */

2026-06-24T10:07:14Z

Climate Feedbacks and Sensitivity

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	<div id="h2-3-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>		<div id="h2-3-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

	'''The net effect of changes in clouds in response to global warming is to amplify human-induced warming, that is, the net cloud feedback is positive~~'''~~ (''high confidence~~'' '~~''). Compared to AR5, major advances in the understanding of cloud processes have increased the level of confidence and decreased the uncertainty range in the cloud feedback by about 50%.''' An assessment of the low-altitude cloud feedback over the subtropical oceans, which was previously the major source of uncertainty in the net cloud feedback, is improved owing to a combined use of climate model simulations, satellite observations, and explicit simulations of clouds, altogether leading to strong evidence that this type of cloud amplifies global warming. The net cloud feedback, obtained by summing the cloud feedbacks assessed for individual regimes, is 0.42 [–0.10 to +0.94] W m <sup>–2</sup> °C <sup>–1</sup> . A net negative cloud feedback is ''very unlikely'' (''high confidence''). {7.4.2, Figure 7.10, Table 7.10}		'''The net effect of changes in clouds in response to global warming is to amplify human-induced warming, that is, the net cloud feedback is positive (''high confidence''). Compared to AR5, major advances in the understanding of cloud processes have increased the level of confidence and decreased the uncertainty range in the cloud feedback by about 50%.''' An assessment of the low-altitude cloud feedback over the subtropical oceans, which was previously the major source of uncertainty in the net cloud feedback, is improved owing to a combined use of climate model simulations, satellite observations, and explicit simulations of clouds, altogether leading to strong evidence that this type of cloud amplifies global warming. The net cloud feedback, obtained by summing the cloud feedbacks assessed for individual regimes, is 0.42 [–0.10 to +0.94] W m <sup>–2</sup> °C <sup>–1</sup> . A net negative cloud feedback is ''very unlikely'' (''high confidence''). {7.4.2, Figure 7.10, Table 7.10}

	'''The combined effect of all known radiative feedbacks (physical, biogeophysical, and non-CO''' <sub>2</sub> ~~'''~~biogeochemical) is to amplify the base climate response, also known as the Planck temperature response~~'''~~ (''virtually certain~~'' '~~'').''' Combining these feedbacks with the base climate response, the net feedback parameter based on process understanding is assessed to be –1.16 [–1.81 to –0.51] W m <sup>–2</sup> °C <sup>–1</sup> , which is slightly less negative than that inferred from the overall ECS assessment. The combined water-vapour and lapse-rate feedback makes the largest single contribution to global warming, whereas the cloud feedback remains the largest contribution to overall uncertainty. Due to the state-dependence of feedbacks, as evidenced from paleoclimate observations and from models, the net feedback parameter will increase (become less negative) as global temperature increases. Furthermore, on long time scales the ice-sheet feedback parameter is ''very likely'' positive, promoting additional warming on millennial time scales as ice sheets come into equilibrium with the forcing (''high confidence''). {7.4.2, 7.4.3, 7.5.7}		'''The combined effect of all known radiative feedbacks (physical, biogeophysical, and non-CO''' <sub>2</sub> biogeochemical) is to amplify the base climate response, also known as the Planck temperature response (''virtually certain'').''' Combining these feedbacks with the base climate response, the net feedback parameter based on process understanding is assessed to be –1.16 [–1.81 to –0.51] W m <sup>–2</sup> °C <sup>–1</sup> , which is slightly less negative than that inferred from the overall ECS assessment. The combined water-vapour and lapse-rate feedback makes the largest single contribution to global warming, whereas the cloud feedback remains the largest contribution to overall uncertainty. Due to the state-dependence of feedbacks, as evidenced from paleoclimate observations and from models, the net feedback parameter will increase (become less negative) as global temperature increases. Furthermore, on long time scales the ice-sheet feedback parameter is ''very likely'' positive, promoting additional warming on millennial time scales as ice sheets come into equilibrium with the forcing (''high confidence''). {7.4.2, 7.4.3, 7.5.7}

	'''Radiative feedbacks, particularly from clouds, are expected to become less negative (more amplifying) on multi-decadal time scales as the~~'''~~ ''spatial pattern~~'' '~~''of surface warming evolves, leading to an ECS that is higher than was inferred in AR5 based on warming over the instrumental record. This new understanding, along with updated estimates of historical temperature change, ERF, and Earth’s energy imbalance, reconciles previously disparate ECS estimates~~'''~~ (''high confidence~~'' '~~'').''' However, there is currently insufficient evidence to quantify a ''likely'' range of the magnitude of future changes to current climate feedbacks. Warming over the instrumental record provides robust constraints on the lower end of the ECS range (''high confidence''), but owing to the possibility of future feedback changes it does not, on its own, constrain the upper end of the range, in contrast to what was reported in AR5. {7.4.4, 7.5.2, 7.5.3}		'''Radiative feedbacks, particularly from clouds, are expected to become less negative (more amplifying) on multi-decadal time scales as the ''spatial pattern'' of surface warming evolves, leading to an ECS that is higher than was inferred in AR5 based on warming over the instrumental record. This new understanding, along with updated estimates of historical temperature change, ERF, and Earth’s energy imbalance, reconciles previously disparate ECS estimates (''high confidence'').''' However, there is currently insufficient evidence to quantify a ''likely'' range of the magnitude of future changes to current climate feedbacks. Warming over the instrumental record provides robust constraints on the lower end of the ECS range (''high confidence''), but owing to the possibility of future feedback changes it does not, on its own, constrain the upper end of the range, in contrast to what was reported in AR5. {7.4.4, 7.5.2, 7.5.3}

	'''Based on multiple lines of evidence the best estimate of ECS is 3°C, the~~'''~~ ''likely~~'' '~~''range is 2.5°C to 4°C, and the~~'''~~ ''very likely~~'' '~~''range is 2°C to 5°C. It is~~'''~~ ''virtually certain~~'' '~~''that ECS is larger than 1.5°C.''' Substantial advances since AR5 have been made in quantifying ECS based on feedback process understanding, the instrumental record, paleoclimates and emergent constraints. There is a high level of agreement among the different lines of evidence. All lines of evidence help rule out ECS values below 1.5°C, but currently it is not possible to rule out ECS values above 5°C. Therefore, the 5°C upper end of the ''very likely'' range is assessed to have ''medium confidence'' and the other bounds have ''high confidence'' . {7.5.5}		'''Based on multiple lines of evidence the best estimate of ECS is 3°C, the ''likely'' range is 2.5°C to 4°C, and the ''very likely'' range is 2°C to 5°C. It is ''virtually certain'' that ECS is larger than 1.5°C.''' Substantial advances since AR5 have been made in quantifying ECS based on feedback process understanding, the instrumental record, paleoclimates and emergent constraints. There is a high level of agreement among the different lines of evidence. All lines of evidence help rule out ECS values below 1.5°C, but currently it is not possible to rule out ECS values above 5°C. Therefore, the 5°C upper end of the ''very likely'' range is assessed to have ''medium confidence'' and the other bounds have ''high confidence'' . {7.5.5}

	'''Based on process understanding, warming over the instrumental record, and emergent constraints, the best estimate of TCR is 1.8°C, the~~'''~~ ''likely~~'' '~~''range is 1.4°C to 2.2°C and the~~'''~~ ''very likely~~'' '~~''range is 1.2°C to 2.4°C~~'''~~ (''high confidence~~'' '~~'').''' {7.5.5}		'''Based on process understanding, warming over the instrumental record, and emergent constraints, the best estimate of TCR is 1.8°C, the ''likely'' range is 1.4°C to 2.2°C and the ''very likely'' range is 1.2°C to 2.4°C (''high confidence'').''' {7.5.5}

	'''On average, Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6) models have higher mean ECS and TCR values than the Phase 5 (CMIP5) generation of models. They also have higher mean values and wider spreads than the assessed best estimates and~~'''~~ ''very likely~~'' '~~''ranges within this Report.''' These higher ECS and TCR values can, in some models, be traced to changes in extra-tropical cloud feedbacks that have emerged from efforts to reduce biases in these clouds compared to satellite observations (''medium confidence''). The broader ECS and TCR ranges from CMIP6 also lead the models to project a range of future warming that is wider than the assessed warming range, which is based on multiple lines of evidence. However, some of the high-sensitivity CMIP6 models are less consistent with observed recent changes in global warming and with paleoclimate proxy data than models with ECS within the ''very likely'' range. Similarly, some of the low-sensitivity models are less consistent with the paleoclimate data. The CMIP models with the highest ECS and TCR values provide insights into low-likelihood, high-impact outcomes, which cannot be excluded based on currently available evidence (''high confidence''). {4.3.1, 4.3.4, 7.4.2, 7.5.6}		'''On average, Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6) models have higher mean ECS and TCR values than the Phase 5 (CMIP5) generation of models. They also have higher mean values and wider spreads than the assessed best estimates and ''very likely'' ranges within this Report.''' These higher ECS and TCR values can, in some models, be traced to changes in extra-tropical cloud feedbacks that have emerged from efforts to reduce biases in these clouds compared to satellite observations (''medium confidence''). The broader ECS and TCR ranges from CMIP6 also lead the models to project a range of future warming that is wider than the assessed warming range, which is based on multiple lines of evidence. However, some of the high-sensitivity CMIP6 models are less consistent with observed recent changes in global warming and with paleoclimate proxy data than models with ECS within the ''very likely'' range. Similarly, some of the low-sensitivity models are less consistent with the paleoclimate data. The CMIP models with the highest ECS and TCR values provide insights into low-likelihood, high-impact outcomes, which cannot be excluded based on currently available evidence (''high confidence''). {4.3.1, 4.3.4, 7.4.2, 7.5.6}

	<span id="climate-response"></span>		<span id="climate-response"></span>

	=== Climate Response ===		=== Climate Response ===

Laura: /* Effective Radiative Forcing */

2026-06-24T10:05:29Z

Effective Radiative Forcing

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	'''Anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and their precursors contribute an ERF of 3.84 [3.46 to 4.22] W m''' –2 '''over the industrial era (1750–2019). Most of this total ERF, 3.32 [3.03 to 3.61] W m''' –2 ''', comes from the wel''' '''l-m''' '''ixed greenhouse gases, with changes in ozone and stratospheric water vapour (from methane oxidation) contributing the remainder.''' The ERF of greenhouse gases is composed of 2.16 [1.90 to 2.41] W m <sup>–2</sup> from carbon dioxide, 0.54 [0.43 to 0.65] W m <sup>–2</sup> from methane, 0.41 [0.33 to 0.49] W m <sup>–2</sup> from halogenated species, and 0.21 [0.18 to 0.24] W m <sup>–2</sup> from nitrous oxide. The ERF for ozone is 0.47 [0.24 to 0.71] W m <sup>–2</sup> . The estimate of ERF for ozone has increased since AR5 due to revised estimates of precursor emissions and better accounting for effects of tropospheric ozone precursors in the stratosphere. The estimated ERF for methane has slightly increased due to a combination of increases from improved spectroscopic treatments being somewhat offset by accounting for adjustments (''high confidence''). {7.3.2, 7.3.5}		'''Anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and their precursors contribute an ERF of 3.84 [3.46 to 4.22] W m''' –2 '''over the industrial era (1750–2019). Most of this total ERF, 3.32 [3.03 to 3.61] W m''' –2 ''', comes from the wel''' '''l-m''' '''ixed greenhouse gases, with changes in ozone and stratospheric water vapour (from methane oxidation) contributing the remainder.''' The ERF of greenhouse gases is composed of 2.16 [1.90 to 2.41] W m <sup>–2</sup> from carbon dioxide, 0.54 [0.43 to 0.65] W m <sup>–2</sup> from methane, 0.41 [0.33 to 0.49] W m <sup>–2</sup> from halogenated species, and 0.21 [0.18 to 0.24] W m <sup>–2</sup> from nitrous oxide. The ERF for ozone is 0.47 [0.24 to 0.71] W m <sup>–2</sup> . The estimate of ERF for ozone has increased since AR5 due to revised estimates of precursor emissions and better accounting for effects of tropospheric ozone precursors in the stratosphere. The estimated ERF for methane has slightly increased due to a combination of increases from improved spectroscopic treatments being somewhat offset by accounting for adjustments (''high confidence''). {7.3.2, 7.3.5}

	'''Aerosols contribute an ERF of –1.3 [–2.0 to –0.6] W m~~'''~~ –2 ~~'''~~over the industrial era (1750–2014)~~'''~~ (''medium confidence~~'' '~~''). The ERF due to aerosol–cloud interactions (ERFaci) contributes most to the magnitude of the total aerosol ERF~~'''~~ (''high confidence~~'' '~~'') and is assessed to be –1.0 [–1.7 to –0.3] W m~~'''~~ –2 (''medium confidence~~'' '~~''), with the remainder due to aerosol–radiation interactions (ERFari), assessed to be –0.3 [–0.6 to 0.0] W m~~'''~~ –2 (''medium confidence~~'' '~~'').''' There has been an increase in the estimated magnitude but a reduction in the uncertainty of the total aerosol ERF relative to AR5, supported by a combination of increased process-understanding and progress in modelling and observational analyses. ERF estimates from these separate lines of evidence are now consistent with each other, in contrast to AR5, and support the assessment that it is ''virtually certain'' that the total aerosol ERF is negative. Compared to AR5, the assessed magnitude of ERFaci has increased, while the magnitude of ERFari has decreased ''.'' The total aerosol ERF over the period 1750–2019 is less certain than the headline statement assessment. It is also assessed to be smaller in magnitude at –1.1 [–1.7 to –0.4] W m <sup>–2</sup> , primarily due to recent emissions changes (''medium confidence''). {7.3.3, 7.3.5, 2.2.6}		'''Aerosols contribute an ERF of –1.3 [–2.0 to –0.6] W m –2 over the industrial era (1750–2014) (''medium confidence''). The ERF due to aerosol–cloud interactions (ERFaci) contributes most to the magnitude of the total aerosol ERF (''high confidence'') and is assessed to be –1.0 [–1.7 to –0.3] W m –2 (''medium confidence''), with the remainder due to aerosol–radiation interactions (ERFari), assessed to be –0.3 [–0.6 to 0.0] W m –2 (''medium confidence'').''' There has been an increase in the estimated magnitude but a reduction in the uncertainty of the total aerosol ERF relative to AR5, supported by a combination of increased process-understanding and progress in modelling and observational analyses. ERF estimates from these separate lines of evidence are now consistent with each other, in contrast to AR5, and support the assessment that it is ''virtually certain'' that the total aerosol ERF is negative. Compared to AR5, the assessed magnitude of ERFaci has increased, while the magnitude of ERFari has decreased ''.'' The total aerosol ERF over the period 1750–2019 is less certain than the headline statement assessment. It is also assessed to be smaller in magnitude at –1.1 [–1.7 to –0.4] W m <sup>–2</sup> , primarily due to recent emissions changes (''medium confidence''). {7.3.3, 7.3.5, 2.2.6}

	<div id="Climate" class="h2-container"></div>		<div id="Climate" class="h2-container"></div>

	<span id="climate-feedbacks-and-sensitivity"></span>		<span id="climate-feedbacks-and-sensitivity"></span>

	=== Climate Feedbacks and Sensitivity ===		=== Climate Feedbacks and Sensitivity ===

Laura: /* Earth’s Energy Budget */

2026-06-24T10:04:18Z

Earth’s Energy Budget

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	'''Since AR5, the accumulation of energy in the Earth system, quantified by changes in the global energy inventory for all components of the climate system, has become established as a robust measure of the rate of global climate change on interannual-to-decadal time scales.''' Compared to changes in global surface air temperature (GSAT), the global energy inventory exhibits less variability, which can mask underlying climate trends. Compared to AR5, there is increased confidence in the quantification of changes in the global energy inventory due to improved observational records and closure of the sea level budget. Energy will continue to accumulate in the Earth system until at least the end of the 21st century, even under strong mitigation scenarios, and will primarily be observed through ocean warming and associated with continued sea level rise through thermal expansion (''high confidence''). {7.2.2, Box 7.2, Table 7.1, Cross-Chapter Box 9.1, Table 9.5, 9.2.2, 9.6.3}		'''Since AR5, the accumulation of energy in the Earth system, quantified by changes in the global energy inventory for all components of the climate system, has become established as a robust measure of the rate of global climate change on interannual-to-decadal time scales.''' Compared to changes in global surface air temperature (GSAT), the global energy inventory exhibits less variability, which can mask underlying climate trends. Compared to AR5, there is increased confidence in the quantification of changes in the global energy inventory due to improved observational records and closure of the sea level budget. Energy will continue to accumulate in the Earth system until at least the end of the 21st century, even under strong mitigation scenarios, and will primarily be observed through ocean warming and associated with continued sea level rise through thermal expansion (''high confidence''). {7.2.2, Box 7.2, Table 7.1, Cross-Chapter Box 9.1, Table 9.5, 9.2.2, 9.6.3}

	'''The global energy inventory increased by 282 [177 to 387] Zettajoules (ZJ; 10~~'''~~ 21 ~~'''~~Joules) for the period ~~19''' '''71–200''' '''6~~ and 152 [100 to 205] ZJ for the period 2006–2018.''' This corresponds to an Earth energy imbalance of 0.50 [0.32 to 0.69] W m <sup>–2</sup> for the period 1971–2006, increasing to 0.79 [0.52 to 1.06] W m <sup>–2</sup> for the period 2006–2018, expressed per unit area of Earth’s surface. Ocean heat uptake is by far the largest contribution and accounts for 91% of the total energy change. Compared to AR5, the contribution from land heating has been revised upwards from about 3% to about 5%. Melting of ice and warming of the atmosphere account for about 3% and 1% of the total change respectively. More comprehensive analysis of inventory components and cross-validation of global heating rates from satellite and in situ observations lead to a strengthened assessment relative to AR5 (''high confidence''). {Box 7.2, 7.2.2, Table 7.1, 7.5.2.3}		'''The global energy inventory increased by 282 [177 to 387] Zettajoules (ZJ; 10<sup>21</sup> Joules) for the period 1971–2006 and 152 [100 to 205] ZJ for the period 2006–2018.''' This corresponds to an Earth energy imbalance of 0.50 [0.32 to 0.69] W m <sup>–2</sup> for the period 1971–2006, increasing to 0.79 [0.52 to 1.06] W m <sup>–2</sup> for the period 2006–2018, expressed per unit area of Earth’s surface. Ocean heat uptake is by far the largest contribution and accounts for 91% of the total energy change. Compared to AR5, the contribution from land heating has been revised upwards from about 3% to about 5%. Melting of ice and warming of the atmosphere account for about 3% and 1% of the total change respectively. More comprehensive analysis of inventory components and cross-validation of global heating rates from satellite and in situ observations lead to a strengthened assessment relative to AR5 (''high confidence''). {Box 7.2, 7.2.2, Table 7.1, 7.5.2.3}

	'''Improved quantification of effective radiative forcing, the climate system radiative response, and the observed energy increase in the Earth system for the period 1971–2018 demonstrate improved closure of the global energy budget compared to AR5.''' Combining the ''likely'' range of ERF with the central estimate of radiative response gives an expected energy gain of 340 [47 to 662] ZJ. Combining the ''likely'' range of climate response with the central estimate of ERF gives an expected energy gain of 340 [147 to 527] ZJ. Both estimates are consistent with an independent observation-based assessment of the global energy increase of 284 [96 to 471] ZJ, (''very likely'' range) expressed relative to the estimated 1850–1900 Earth energy imbalance (''high confidence''). {7.2.2, Box 7.2, 7.3.5, 7.5.2}		'''Improved quantification of effective radiative forcing, the climate system radiative response, and the observed energy increase in the Earth system for the period 1971–2018 demonstrate improved closure of the global energy budget compared to AR5.''' Combining the ''likely'' range of ERF with the central estimate of radiative response gives an expected energy gain of 340 [47 to 662] ZJ. Combining the ''likely'' range of climate response with the central estimate of ERF gives an expected energy gain of 340 [147 to 527] ZJ. Both estimates are consistent with an independent observation-based assessment of the global energy increase of 284 [96 to 471] ZJ, (''very likely'' range) expressed relative to the estimated 1850–1900 Earth energy imbalance (''high confidence''). {7.2.2, Box 7.2, 7.3.5, 7.5.2}

	'''Since AR5, additional evidence for a widespread decline (or dimming) in solar radiation reaching the surface is found in the observational records between the 1950s and 1980s, with a partial recovery (brightening) at many observational sites thereafter~~'''~~ (''high confidence~~'' '~~'').''' These trends are neither a local phenomenon nor a measurement artefact (''high confidence''). Multi-decadal variation in anthropogenic aerosol emissions are thought to be a major contributor (''medium confidence''), but multi-decadal variability in cloudiness may also have played a role. The downward and upward thermal radiation at the surface has increased in recent decades, in line with increased greenhouse gas concentrations and associated surface and atmospheric warming and moistening (''medium confidence''). {7.2.2}		'''Since AR5, additional evidence for a widespread decline (or dimming) in solar radiation reaching the surface is found in the observational records between the 1950s and 1980s, with a partial recovery (brightening) at many observational sites thereafter (''high confidence'').''' These trends are neither a local phenomenon nor a measurement artefact (''high confidence''). Multi-decadal variation in anthropogenic aerosol emissions are thought to be a major contributor (''medium confidence''), but multi-decadal variability in cloudiness may also have played a role. The downward and upward thermal radiation at the surface has increased in recent decades, in line with increased greenhouse gas concentrations and associated surface and atmospheric warming and moistening (''medium confidence''). {7.2.2}

	<div id="Effective" class="h2-container"></div>		<div id="Effective" class="h2-container"></div>

	<span id="effective-radiative-forcing"></span>		<span id="effective-radiative-forcing"></span>

	=== Effective Radiative Forcing ===		=== Effective Radiative Forcing ===

Laura at 10:02, 24 June 2026

2026-06-24T10:02:48Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:02, 24 June 2026
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	<div id="chapter-authors"></div>		<div id="chapter-authors"></div>

	Coordinating Lead Authors:		'''Coordinating Lead Authors:'''

	Piers Forster (United Kingdom), Trude Storelvmo (Norway)		Piers Forster (United Kingdom), Trude Storelvmo (Norway)

	Lead Authors:		'''Lead Authors:'''

	Kyle Armour (United States of America), William Collins (United Kingdom), Jean-Louis Dufresne (France), David Frame (New Zealand), Daniel J. Lunt (United Kingdom), Thorsten Mauritsen (Sweden/Denmark), Matthew D. Palmer (United Kingdom), Masahiro Watanabe (Japan), Martin Wild (Switzerland), Hua Zhang (China)		Kyle Armour (United States of America), William Collins (United Kingdom), Jean-Louis Dufresne (France), David Frame (New Zealand), Daniel J. Lunt (United Kingdom), Thorsten Mauritsen (Sweden/Denmark), Matthew D. Palmer (United Kingdom), Masahiro Watanabe (Japan), Martin Wild (Switzerland), Hua Zhang (China)

	Contributing Authors:		'''Contributing Authors:'''

	Kari Alterskjær (Norway), Chris Smith (United Kingdom), Govindasamy Bala (India/United States of America), Nicolas Bellouin (United Kingdom/France), Terje Berntsen (Norway), Fábio Boeira Dias (Finland/Brazil), Sandrine Bony (France), Natalie J. Burls (United States of America/South Africa), Michelle Cain (United Kingdom), Catia M. Domingues (Australia, United Kingdom/Brazil), Aaron Donohoe (United States of America), Mark Flanner (United States of America), Jan S. Fuglestvedt (Norway), Lily C. Hahn (United States of America), Glen R. Harris (United Kingdom/New Zealand, United Kingdom), Christopher Jones (United Kingdom), Seiji Kato (United States of America), Jared Lewis (Australia/New Zealand), Zhanqing Li (United States of America), Mike Lockwood (United Kingdom), Norman Loeb (United States of America), Jochem Marotzke (Germany), Malte Meinshausen (Australia/Germany), Sebastian Milinski (Germany), Zebedee R.J. Nicholls (Australia), Ryan S. Padron Flasher (Switzerland/Ecuador, United States of America), Anna Possner (Germany), Cristian Proistosescu (Romania), Johannes Quaas (Germany), Joeri Rogelj (United Kingdom/Belgium), Daniel Rosenfeld (Israel), Bjørn H. Samset (Norway), Abhishek Savita (Australia/India), Jessica Vial (France), Karina von Schuckmann (France/Germany), Mark Zelinka (United States of America), Shuyun Zhao (China)		Kari Alterskjær (Norway), Chris Smith (United Kingdom), Govindasamy Bala (India/United States of America), Nicolas Bellouin (United Kingdom/France), Terje Berntsen (Norway), Fábio Boeira Dias (Finland/Brazil), Sandrine Bony (France), Natalie J. Burls (United States of America/South Africa), Michelle Cain (United Kingdom), Catia M. Domingues (Australia, United Kingdom/Brazil), Aaron Donohoe (United States of America), Mark Flanner (United States of America), Jan S. Fuglestvedt (Norway), Lily C. Hahn (United States of America), Glen R. Harris (United Kingdom/New Zealand, United Kingdom), Christopher Jones (United Kingdom), Seiji Kato (United States of America), Jared Lewis (Australia/New Zealand), Zhanqing Li (United States of America), Mike Lockwood (United Kingdom), Norman Loeb (United States of America), Jochem Marotzke (Germany), Malte Meinshausen (Australia/Germany), Sebastian Milinski (Germany), Zebedee R.J. Nicholls (Australia), Ryan S. Padron Flasher (Switzerland/Ecuador, United States of America), Anna Possner (Germany), Cristian Proistosescu (Romania), Johannes Quaas (Germany), Joeri Rogelj (United Kingdom/Belgium), Daniel Rosenfeld (Israel), Bjørn H. Samset (Norway), Abhishek Savita (Australia/India), Jessica Vial (France), Karina von Schuckmann (France/Germany), Mark Zelinka (United States of America), Shuyun Zhao (China)

	Review Editors:		'''Review Editors:'''

	Robert Colman (Australia), H. Damon Matthews (Canada), Venkatachalam Ramaswamy (United States of America)		Robert Colman (Australia), H. Damon Matthews (Canada), Venkatachalam Ramaswamy (United States of America)

	Chapter Scientists:		'''Chapter Scientists:'''

	Kari Alterskjær (Norway), Chris Smith (United Kingdom)		Kari Alterskjær (Norway), Chris Smith (United Kingdom)
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	<div id="chapter-citation"></div>		<div id="chapter-citation"></div>

	This chapter should be cited as:		'''This chapter should be cited as:'''

	Forster, P., T. Storelvmo, K. Armour, W. Collins, J.-L. Dufresne, D. Frame, D.J. Lunt, T. Mauritsen, M.D. Palmer, M. Watanabe, M. Wild, and H. Zhang, 2021: The Earth’s Energy Budget, Climate Feedbacks, and Climate Sensitivity. In ''Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change'' [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.I. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 923–1054, doi: [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157896.009 10.1017/9781009157896.009] .		Forster, P., T. Storelvmo, K. Armour, W. Collins, J.-L. Dufresne, D. Frame, D.J. Lunt, T. Mauritsen, M.D. Palmer, M. Watanabe, M. Wild, and H. Zhang, 2021: The Earth’s Energy Budget, Climate Feedbacks, and Climate Sensitivity. In ''Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change'' [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.I. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 923–1054, doi: [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157896.009 10.1017/9781009157896.009] .

Laura at 10:02, 24 June 2026

2026-06-24T10:02:09Z

Show changes

Laura at 08:35, 22 May 2026

2026-05-22T08:35:40Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:35, 22 May 2026
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			{{ChapterNavigation
			\| cover = Cover-WGI.jpg
			\| reporturl = IPCC:AR6/WGI
			\| reporttitle = WGI
			\| prevurl = IPCC:AR6/WGI/Chapter-6
			\| nexturl = IPCC:AR6/WGI/Chapter-8
			}}

	<div id="___gatsby"></div>		<div id="___gatsby"></div>

Laura: Laura moved page IPCC:Wg1:Chapter:Chapter-7 to IPCC:AR6/WGI/Chapter-7 without leaving a redirect

2026-05-18T16:17:54Z

Laura moved page IPCC:Wg1:Chapter:Chapter-7 to IPCC:AR6/WGI/Chapter-7 without leaving a redirect

← Older revision	Revision as of 16:17, 18 May 2026
(No difference)

Laura: /* 7.4.4.1.3 Overall assessment of polar amplification */

2026-05-15T11:59:20Z

7.4.4.1.3 Overall assessment of polar amplification

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:59, 15 May 2026
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	<span id="overall-assessment-of-polar-amplification"></span>		<span id="overall-assessment-of-polar-amplification"></span>
	===== ''7.4.4.1.3 Overall assessment of polar amplification'' =====		===== 7.4.4.1.3 Overall assessment of polar amplification =====

	<div id="h4-15-siblings" class="h4-siblings"></div>		<div id="h4-15-siblings" class="h4-siblings"></div>
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	<span id="tropical-pacific-sea-surface-temperature-gradients"></span>		<span id="tropical-pacific-sea-surface-temperature-gradients"></span>

	==== 7.4.4.2 Tropical Pacific Sea Surface Temperature Gradients ====		==== 7.4.4.2 Tropical Pacific Sea Surface Temperature Gradients ====

Laura: /* 7.4.2.5.1 Non-CO 2 biogeochemical feedbacks */

2026-05-15T11:58:56Z

7.4.2.5.1 Non-CO 2 biogeochemical feedbacks

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:58, 15 May 2026
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	<span id="non-co-2-biogeochemical-feedbacks"></span>		<span id="non-co-2-biogeochemical-feedbacks"></span>
	===== ''7.4.2.5.1 Non-CO'' <sub>2</sub> ''biogeochemical feedbacks'' =====		===== 7.4.2.5.1 Non-CO <sub>2</sub> biogeochemical feedbacks =====

	<div id="h4-10-siblings" class="h4-siblings"></div>		<div id="h4-10-siblings" class="h4-siblings"></div>
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	<span id="biogeophysical-feedbacks"></span>		<span id="biogeophysical-feedbacks"></span>

	===== 7.4.2.5.2 Biogeophysical feedbacks =====		===== 7.4.2.5.2 Biogeophysical feedbacks =====