Laura at 08:44, 22 May 2026

2026-05-22T08:44:47Z

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			{{ChapterNavigation
			\| cover = Cover-WGII.jpg
			\| reporturl = IPCC:AR6/WGII
			\| reporttitle = WGII
			\| prevurl = IPCC:AR6/WGII/TS
			\| nexturl = IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-2
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Laura: Laura moved page IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-1 to IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-1 without leaving a redirect

2026-05-18T18:25:11Z

Laura moved page IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-1 to IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-1 without leaving a redirect

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#119

Laura: /* Chapter 1: Point of Departure and Key Concepts */

2026-05-13T14:11:43Z

Chapter 1: Point of Departure and Key Concepts

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:11, 13 May 2026
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	<div id="chapter-citation"></div>		<div id="chapter-citation"></div>

	This chapter should be cited as:		'''This chapter should be cited as:'''

	Ara Begum, R., R. Lempert, E. Ali, T.A. Benjaminsen, T. Bernauer, W. Cramer, X. Cui, K. Mach, G. Nagy, N.C. Stenseth, R. Sukumar, and P. Wester, 2022: Point of Departure and Key Concepts. In: ''Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.'' Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 121–196, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.003.		Ara Begum, R., R. Lempert, E. Ali, T.A. Benjaminsen, T. Bernauer, W. Cramer, X. Cui, K. Mach, G. Nagy, N.C. Stenseth, R. Sukumar, and P. Wester, 2022: Point of Departure and Key Concepts. In: ''Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.'' Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 121–196, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.003.

imported>Design: /* Chapter 1: Point of Departure and Key Concepts */

2026-05-11T08:02:24Z

Chapter 1: Point of Departure and Key Concepts

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← Older revision		Revision as of 12:19, 15 May 2026
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	[[File:1a6b0a7a28d1a7955f1f9ec69af78dda IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_001.png]]		[[File:1a6b0a7a28d1a7955f1f9ec69af78dda IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_001.png]]

	'''Figure 1.1 \|~~'''~~ ''''''Evidence of climate change impacts in many regions of the world~~'''''' '''~~.''' Global density map shows climate impact evidence, derived by machine-learning from 77,785 studies. Map colouring denotes the number of weighted studies per grid cell for all evidence on climate impacts (N= 77,785). Figure adopted from [[#Callaghan--2021\|Callaghan et al. (2021)]] .		'''Figure 1.1 \|''' '''Evidence of climate change impacts in many regions of the world.''' Global density map shows climate impact evidence, derived by machine-learning from 77,785 studies. Map colouring denotes the number of weighted studies per grid cell for all evidence on climate impacts (N= 77,785). Figure adopted from [[#Callaghan--2021\|Callaghan et al. (2021)]] .

	Concurrently, since AR5, a growing share of people around the world perceive a changing climate, regard these changes as significant and consider climate action to be a matter of high urgency ( [[#Wilson--2019\|Wilson and Orlove, 2019]] ; Section 17.4.5). A survey, representing over half the world’s population, found that almost two-thirds of people across 50 countries view climate change as an emergency ( [[#Flynn--2021\|Flynn et al., 2021]] ), compared to just over half across 23 countries in 2013 ( [[#Fagan--2019\|Fagan, 2019]] ). The highest level of support for climate action is among small island developing states (SIDS) (74%), followed by high-income countries (72%), middle-income countries (62%) and, then, least developed countries (58%) ( [[#Flynn--2021\|Flynn et al., 2021]] ). Notably, after mid-2018, global media showed a large increase number of mentions of ‘global warming’, ‘climate change’ and similar terms ( [[#Thackeray--2020\|Thackeray et al., 2020]] ). The business community now consistently includes climate change, including ‘climate action failure’ as a major risk ( [[#World%20Economic%20Forum--2021\|World Economic Forum, 2021]] ). In late 2019, protests calling for strengthened climate action reached an unprecedented level of over 6000 events in 185 countries, with a reported estimate of 7.6 million participants, largely led by the ‘Fridays for Future’ youth movement ( [[#Chase-Dunn--2020\|Chase-Dunn and Almeida, 2020]] ).		Concurrently, since AR5, a growing share of people around the world perceive a changing climate, regard these changes as significant and consider climate action to be a matter of high urgency ( [[#Wilson--2019\|Wilson and Orlove, 2019]] ; Section 17.4.5). A survey, representing over half the world’s population, found that almost two-thirds of people across 50 countries view climate change as an emergency ( [[#Flynn--2021\|Flynn et al., 2021]] ), compared to just over half across 23 countries in 2013 ( [[#Fagan--2019\|Fagan, 2019]] ). The highest level of support for climate action is among small island developing states (SIDS) (74%), followed by high-income countries (72%), middle-income countries (62%) and, then, least developed countries (58%) ( [[#Flynn--2021\|Flynn et al., 2021]] ). Notably, after mid-2018, global media showed a large increase number of mentions of ‘global warming’, ‘climate change’ and similar terms ( [[#Thackeray--2020\|Thackeray et al., 2020]] ). The business community now consistently includes climate change, including ‘climate action failure’ as a major risk ( [[#World%20Economic%20Forum--2021\|World Economic Forum, 2021]] ). In late 2019, protests calling for strengthened climate action reached an unprecedented level of over 6000 events in 185 countries, with a reported estimate of 7.6 million participants, largely led by the ‘Fridays for Future’ youth movement ( [[#Chase-Dunn--2020\|Chase-Dunn and Almeida, 2020]] ).
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	[[File:7cdadd53eeb14bb0f4b38efbe206fc61 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_002.png]]		[[File:7cdadd53eeb14bb0f4b38efbe206fc61 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_002.png]]

	'''Figure 1.2 \|~~'''~~ ''''''Connecting key concepts in this report.~~'''~~''' The current coupled human and natural system is insufficiently resilient and does not meet societal goals of equity, well-being and ecosystem health. Meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development Goals and other policy statements requires the system to move to a new and more resilient state. Key concepts used in this report help illuminate our current situation and potential solutions. These key concepts are usefully organised around the concepts of risk, solutions and transformation. Risk can prompt solutions and transformation. Both solutions and transformation seek to reduce some risks but may also generate others. Solutions can enable transformation, and transformation can expand the set of feasible solutions.		'''Figure 1.2 \|''' '''Connecting key concepts in this report.''' The current coupled human and natural system is insufficiently resilient and does not meet societal goals of equity, well-being and ecosystem health. Meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development Goals and other policy statements requires the system to move to a new and more resilient state. Key concepts used in this report help illuminate our current situation and potential solutions. These key concepts are usefully organised around the concepts of risk, solutions and transformation. Risk can prompt solutions and transformation. Both solutions and transformation seek to reduce some risks but may also generate others. Solutions can enable transformation, and transformation can expand the set of feasible solutions.

	Key concepts that contribute to an understanding of risk include its components hazards, exposure, and vulnerability (Section 1.2.1.1); the recognition that risks may be complex and cascading (Section 1.3.1.2); and the reasons for concern framework used to summarise the most policy-relevant risks (Section 1.3.1.1). Key concepts that contribute to an understanding of feasible, effective, and just solutions (1.4.1) include the enablers of governance, finance and knowledge (Section 1.4.2); Transformation is supported by systems transitions in energy, land, infrastructure, industry and society (Section 1.5.1), which if successful can contribute to climate resilient development (Section 1.5).		Key concepts that contribute to an understanding of risk include its components hazards, exposure, and vulnerability (Section 1.2.1.1); the recognition that risks may be complex and cascading (Section 1.3.1.2); and the reasons for concern framework used to summarise the most policy-relevant risks (Section 1.3.1.1). Key concepts that contribute to an understanding of feasible, effective, and just solutions (1.4.1) include the enablers of governance, finance and knowledge (Section 1.4.2); Transformation is supported by systems transitions in energy, land, infrastructure, industry and society (Section 1.5.1), which if successful can contribute to climate resilient development (Section 1.5).
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	[[File:d6dd397e0c00712abb95b3e926e4283a IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_007.png]]		[[File:d6dd397e0c00712abb95b3e926e4283a IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_007.png]]

	'''Figure 1.7 \|~~'''~~ ''''''Assessing adaptation solutions and success~~'''''' '''~~.''' A solution is defined as an adaptation option which is effective, feasible and conforms to principles of justice. These attributes can be assessed ''ex ante'' during adaptation planning. During implementation, the overall success of a response can be judged via monitoring and evaluation of these attributes. Adaptation unfolds as an iterative learning process of assessment, implementation, monitoring, adjustment and learning. A set of responses is adequate to the extent that they sufficiently reduce climate risk to levels considered tolerable. Adaptation may not fully avoid residual risks, but the more adequate the response, the less residual risk remains. Adaptation also has limits beyond which it is no longer possible to avoid intolerable risks and impacts.		'''Figure 1.7 \|''' '''Assessing adaptation solutions and success.''' A solution is defined as an adaptation option which is effective, feasible and conforms to principles of justice. These attributes can be assessed ''ex ante'' during adaptation planning. During implementation, the overall success of a response can be judged via monitoring and evaluation of these attributes. Adaptation unfolds as an iterative learning process of assessment, implementation, monitoring, adjustment and learning. A set of responses is adequate to the extent that they sufficiently reduce climate risk to levels considered tolerable. Adaptation may not fully avoid residual risks, but the more adequate the response, the less residual risk remains. Adaptation also has limits beyond which it is no longer possible to avoid intolerable risks and impacts.

	A solution is just when its outcomes, the process of implementing the action and the process of choosing the action respects principles of distributive, procedural and recognitional '''justice''' (Section 1.4.1.1). Any assessment of justice depends on an understanding of potential outcomes of alternative options (Chapter 16), as well as processes of decision making (Chapter 17). Consideration of justice necessarily introduces normative elements into any assessment of what constitutes a solution.		A solution is just when its outcomes, the process of implementing the action and the process of choosing the action respects principles of distributive, procedural and recognitional '''justice''' (Section 1.4.1.1). Any assessment of justice depends on an understanding of potential outcomes of alternative options (Chapter 16), as well as processes of decision making (Chapter 17). Consideration of justice necessarily introduces normative elements into any assessment of what constitutes a solution.
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	[[File:54e0dcb506b10fdcca978fbba749c74e IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_008.png]]		[[File:54e0dcb506b10fdcca978fbba749c74e IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_008.png]]

	'''Figure 1.8 \|~~'''~~ ''''''Adaptation assessment prior to implementation and M&E during and after implementation~~'''''' '''~~.''' Both systematic assessment of adaptation needs and options and M&E of implemented adaptation are key to iterative climate risk management and to achieving effective and equitable adaptation. Most assessments to date have referred to aspects prior to implementation. There is much less systematic evidence on adaptation action, and even less evidence on adaptation outcomes and impacts and their implications for climate change impacts, risks, vulnerabilities and resilience. Figure 17.9 provides more detail on M&E.		'''Figure 1.8 \|''' '''Adaptation assessment prior to implementation and M&E during and after implementation.''' Both systematic assessment of adaptation needs and options and M&E of implemented adaptation are key to iterative climate risk management and to achieving effective and equitable adaptation. Most assessments to date have referred to aspects prior to implementation. There is much less systematic evidence on adaptation action, and even less evidence on adaptation outcomes and impacts and their implications for climate change impacts, risks, vulnerabilities and resilience. Figure 17.9 provides more detail on M&E.

	Tracking adaptation planning and policies : Since AR5, interest in M&E for tracking progress in adaptation has grown substantially at the local, national and global level. The Paris Agreement calls for a global stocktake every 5 years starting in 2023 (Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS in Chapter 17). It also encourages states to monitor and evaluate their adaptation plans, policies, programmes and actions and provides guidance on communicating information about adaptation to the international community ( [[#UNFCCC--2015b\|UNFCCC, 2015b]] , Article 7.9d; [[#UNFCCC--2018a\|UNFCCC, 2018a]] , Decision 9/CMA.1; [[#UNFCCC--2018b\|UNFCCC, 2018b]] , Decision 18/CMA.1).		Tracking adaptation planning and policies : Since AR5, interest in M&E for tracking progress in adaptation has grown substantially at the local, national and global level. The Paris Agreement calls for a global stocktake every 5 years starting in 2023 (Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS in Chapter 17). It also encourages states to monitor and evaluate their adaptation plans, policies, programmes and actions and provides guidance on communicating information about adaptation to the international community ( [[#UNFCCC--2015b\|UNFCCC, 2015b]] , Article 7.9d; [[#UNFCCC--2018a\|UNFCCC, 2018a]] , Decision 9/CMA.1; [[#UNFCCC--2018b\|UNFCCC, 2018b]] , Decision 18/CMA.1).
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	[[File:4ba5481e99914f2b89eb61533e2454ee IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_009.png]]		[[File:4ba5481e99914f2b89eb61533e2454ee IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_009.png]]

	'''Figure 1.9 \|~~'''~~ ''''''Alternative pathways to transformation.~~'''~~''' Adaptation goals may be accessible by actions within or beyond the existing solution space. In the former case, incremental adaptation may stay within soft limits and hold risks to tolerable levels. In the latter case, deliberate transformational adaptation becomes necessary to achieve goals. If a successful deliberate transformation does not occur, the system may nonetheless undergo a forced transformation. Multiple actors are involved at each stage so that some people may nonetheless find themselves coping with what they regard as intolerable risks.		'''Figure 1.9 \|''' '''Alternative pathways to transformation.''' Adaptation goals may be accessible by actions within or beyond the existing solution space. In the former case, incremental adaptation may stay within soft limits and hold risks to tolerable levels. In the latter case, deliberate transformational adaptation becomes necessary to achieve goals. If a successful deliberate transformation does not occur, the system may nonetheless undergo a forced transformation. Multiple actors are involved at each stage so that some people may nonetheless find themselves coping with what they regard as intolerable risks.

	Multiple narratives describe pathways for pursuing deliberate transformations ( [[#Cavanagh--2017\|Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2017]] ). While building on the new ‘green economy’ framing that emerged with the Rio+20 conference in 2012 ( [[#UNEP--2011\|UNEP, 2011]] ; [[#De-Mello--2012\|De Mello and Dutz, 2012]] ; [[#OECD--2012\|OECD, 2012]] ), these narratives reflect differing trade-offs among values and differing assumptions about the factors driving system change (see WGIII). The narratives range from ‘business-as-usual’ scenarios focused on modernisation of sectors such as energy, agriculture and use of natural resources to more transformational propositions such as various green new deal proposals ( [[#European%20Commission--2019\|European Commission, 2019]] ), the new climate economy ( [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20the%20Economy%20and%20Climate--2018\|Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2018]] ), and ‘doughnut economics’ ( [[#Raworth--2017\|Raworth, 2017]] ). Some literature suggests significant benefits from such new climate economy proposals, claiming tens of trillions in economic benefits, tens of millions of new jobs and close to a million fewer premature deaths from pollution over the coming decade ( [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20the%20Economy%20and%20Climate--2018\|Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2018]] ).		Multiple narratives describe pathways for pursuing deliberate transformations ( [[#Cavanagh--2017\|Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2017]] ). While building on the new ‘green economy’ framing that emerged with the Rio+20 conference in 2012 ( [[#UNEP--2011\|UNEP, 2011]] ; [[#De-Mello--2012\|De Mello and Dutz, 2012]] ; [[#OECD--2012\|OECD, 2012]] ), these narratives reflect differing trade-offs among values and differing assumptions about the factors driving system change (see WGIII). The narratives range from ‘business-as-usual’ scenarios focused on modernisation of sectors such as energy, agriculture and use of natural resources to more transformational propositions such as various green new deal proposals ( [[#European%20Commission--2019\|European Commission, 2019]] ), the new climate economy ( [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20the%20Economy%20and%20Climate--2018\|Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2018]] ), and ‘doughnut economics’ ( [[#Raworth--2017\|Raworth, 2017]] ). Some literature suggests significant benefits from such new climate economy proposals, claiming tens of trillions in economic benefits, tens of millions of new jobs and close to a million fewer premature deaths from pollution over the coming decade ( [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20the%20Economy%20and%20Climate--2018\|Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2018]] ).

IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-1 - Revision history

Laura at 08:44, 22 May 2026

Laura: Laura moved page IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-1 to IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-1 without leaving a redirect

Laura: #119

Laura: /* Chapter 1: Point of Departure and Key Concepts */

imported>Design: /* Chapter 1: Point of Departure and Key Concepts */