IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-3 - Revision history

Laura at 08:54, 22 May 2026

2026-05-22T08:54:11Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:54, 22 May 2026
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			\| reporturl = IPCC:AR6/WGIII
			\| reporttitle = WGIII
			\| prevurl = IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-2
			\| nexturl = IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-4
			}}

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Laura: Laura moved page IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-3 to IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-3 without leaving a redirect

2026-05-18T18:32:32Z

Laura moved page IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-3 to IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-3 without leaving a redirect

← Older revision	Revision as of 18:32, 18 May 2026
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Laura: #119

2026-05-18T06:12:50Z

#119

Laura: /* Chapter 3: Mitigation pathways compatible with long-term goals */

2026-05-13T14:36:43Z

Chapter 3: Mitigation pathways compatible with long-term goals

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:36, 13 May 2026
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	<div id="chapter-authors"></div>		<div id="chapter-authors"></div>

	Coordinating Lead Authors:		'''Coordinating Lead Authors:'''

	Keywan Riahi (Austria), Roberto Schaeffer (Brazil)		Keywan Riahi (Austria), Roberto Schaeffer (Brazil)

	Lead Authors:		'''Lead Authors:'''

	Jacobo Arango (Colombia), Katherine Calvin (the United States of America), Céline Guivarch (France), Tomoko Hasegawa, (Japan), Kejun Jiang (China), Elmar Kriegler (Germany), Robert Matthews (United Kingdom), Glen P. Peters (Norway/Australia), Anand Rao (India), Simon Robertson (Australia), Adam Mohammed Sebbit (Uganda), Julia Steinberger (Switzerland/United Kingdom), Massimo Tavoni (Italy), Detlef P. van Vuuren (the Netherlands)		Jacobo Arango (Colombia), Katherine Calvin (the United States of America), Céline Guivarch (France), Tomoko Hasegawa, (Japan), Kejun Jiang (China), Elmar Kriegler (Germany), Robert Matthews (United Kingdom), Glen P. Peters (Norway/Australia), Anand Rao (India), Simon Robertson (Australia), Adam Mohammed Sebbit (Uganda), Julia Steinberger (Switzerland/United Kingdom), Massimo Tavoni (Italy), Detlef P. van Vuuren (the Netherlands)

	Contributing Authors:		'''Contributing Authors:'''

	Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Christoph Bertram (Germany), Valentina Bosetti (Italy), Elina Brutschin (Austria), Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), Tamma Carleton (the United States of America), Leon Clarke (the United States of America), Annette Cowie (Australia), Delavane Diaz (the United States of America), Laurent Drouet (Italy/France), Navroz K. Dubash (India), James Edmonds (the United States of America) Jan S. Fuglestvedt (Norway), Shinichiro Fujimori (Japan), Oliver Geden (Germany), Giacomo Grassi (Italy/European Union), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Anders Hammer Strømman (Norway), Frank Jotzo (Australia), Jarmo Kikstra (Austria/the Netherlands), Zbigniew Klimont (Austria/Poland), Alexandre Köberle (Brazil/United Kingdom), Robin Lamboll (United Kingdom/the United States of America), Franck Lecocq (France), Jared Lewis (Australia/New Zealand), Yun Seng Lim (Malaysia), Giacomo Marangoni (Italy), Eric Masanet (the United States of America), Toshihiko Masui (Japan), David McCollum (the United States of America), Malte Meinshausen (Australia/Germany), Aurélie Méjean (France), Joel Millward-Hopkins (United Kingdom), Catherine Mitchell (United Kingdom), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Zebedee Nicholls (Australia), Brian O’Neill (the United States of America), Anthony Patt (Switzerland), Franziska Piontek (Germany), Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), Joeri Rogelj (Belgium/United Kingdom), Steven Rose (the United States of America), Bastiaan van Ruijven (the Netherlands), Yamina Saheb (France/Algeria), Marit Sandstad (Norway), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Chris Smith (Austria/United Kingdom), Björn Soergel (Germany), Florian Tirana (France), Kaj-Ivar van der Wijst (the Netherlands), Harald Winkler (South Africa)		Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Christoph Bertram (Germany), Valentina Bosetti (Italy), Elina Brutschin (Austria), Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), Tamma Carleton (the United States of America), Leon Clarke (the United States of America), Annette Cowie (Australia), Delavane Diaz (the United States of America), Laurent Drouet (Italy/France), Navroz K. Dubash (India), James Edmonds (the United States of America) Jan S. Fuglestvedt (Norway), Shinichiro Fujimori (Japan), Oliver Geden (Germany), Giacomo Grassi (Italy/European Union), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Anders Hammer Strømman (Norway), Frank Jotzo (Australia), Jarmo Kikstra (Austria/the Netherlands), Zbigniew Klimont (Austria/Poland), Alexandre Köberle (Brazil/United Kingdom), Robin Lamboll (United Kingdom/the United States of America), Franck Lecocq (France), Jared Lewis (Australia/New Zealand), Yun Seng Lim (Malaysia), Giacomo Marangoni (Italy), Eric Masanet (the United States of America), Toshihiko Masui (Japan), David McCollum (the United States of America), Malte Meinshausen (Australia/Germany), Aurélie Méjean (France), Joel Millward-Hopkins (United Kingdom), Catherine Mitchell (United Kingdom), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Zebedee Nicholls (Australia), Brian O’Neill (the United States of America), Anthony Patt (Switzerland), Franziska Piontek (Germany), Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), Joeri Rogelj (Belgium/United Kingdom), Steven Rose (the United States of America), Bastiaan van Ruijven (the Netherlands), Yamina Saheb (France/Algeria), Marit Sandstad (Norway), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Chris Smith (Austria/United Kingdom), Björn Soergel (Germany), Florian Tirana (France), Kaj-Ivar van der Wijst (the Netherlands), Harald Winkler (South Africa)

	Review Editors:		'''Review Editors:'''

	Vaibhav Chaturvedi (India), Wenying Chen (China), Julio Torres Martínez (Cuba)		Vaibhav Chaturvedi (India), Wenying Chen (China), Julio Torres Martínez (Cuba)

	Chapter Scientists:		'''Chapter Scientists:'''

	Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), Eduardo Müller-Casseres (Brazil)		Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), Eduardo Müller-Casseres (Brazil)
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	<div id="chapter-citation"></div>		<div id="chapter-citation"></div>

	This chapter should be cited as:		'''This chapter should be cited as:'''

	Riahi, K., R. Schaeffer, J. Arango, K. Calvin, C. Guivarch, T. Hasegawa, K. Jiang, E. Kriegler, R. Matthews, G.P. Peters, A. Rao, S. Robertson, A.M. Sebbit, J. Steinberger, M. Tavoni, D.P. van Vuuren, 2022: Mitigation pathways compatible with long-term goals. In IPCC, 2022: ''Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change'' [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.005		Riahi, K., R. Schaeffer, J. Arango, K. Calvin, C. Guivarch, T. Hasegawa, K. Jiang, E. Kriegler, R. Matthews, G.P. Peters, A. Rao, S. Robertson, A.M. Sebbit, J. Steinberger, M. Tavoni, D.P. van Vuuren, 2022: Mitigation pathways compatible with long-term goals. In IPCC, 2022: ''Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change'' [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.005

imported>Design: /* FAQ 3.3 | How plausible are high emissions scenarios, and how do they inform policy? */

2026-05-11T09:24:19Z

FAQ 3.3 | How plausible are high emissions scenarios, and how do they inform policy?

Show changes

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	~~'''~~'''Box 3.4, Figure 1~~'''''' ''''''~~\|~~'''''' ''''''~~Cumulative CO~~'''''' '''~~2~~''' ''''''~~emissions from AR6 scenario categories (coloured dots), adjusted for distinct~~'''''' '''~~0.''' '''1°C warming levels (black bars) in comparison to the WGI remaining carbon budgets (grey bars).''' The cumulative carbon emissions for the AR6 scenarios are shown for the median peak warming '''(a)''' , the 33rd-percentile peak warming '''(b)''' and the upper 67th-percentile peak warming '''(c)''' calculated with the WGI-calibrated emulator MAGICC7 (IPCC AR6 WGI, Cross-Chapter Box 7.1). The adjustment to the nearest 0.1°C intervals is made using AR6 WGI TCRE (at the relevant percentile, e.g., the 67th-percentile TCRE is used to adjust the 67th-percentile peak warming), with the 5–95% range of adjusted scenarios provided by the black bar. The AR6 WGI remaining carbon budget is shown, including the WGI estimate of at least a ±220 GtCO 2 uncertainty due to non-CO 2 emissions variations across scenarios (grey bars). For median peak warming (panel a) projections below 2°C relative to 1850–1900, the AR6 WGIII assessment of cumulative carbon emissions tends to be slightly smaller than the remaining carbon budgets provided by WGI but well within the uncertainties. Note that only a few scenarios in WGIII limit warming to below 1.5°C with a 50% chance, thus statistics for that specific threshold have low confidence.		'''Box 3.4, Figure 1 \| Cumulative CO 2 emissions from AR6 scenario categories (coloured dots), adjusted for distinct 0.''' '''1°C warming levels (black bars) in comparison to the WGI remaining carbon budgets (grey bars).''' The cumulative carbon emissions for the AR6 scenarios are shown for the median peak warming '''(a)''' , the 33rd-percentile peak warming '''(b)''' and the upper 67th-percentile peak warming '''(c)''' calculated with the WGI-calibrated emulator MAGICC7 (IPCC AR6 WGI, Cross-Chapter Box 7.1). The adjustment to the nearest 0.1°C intervals is made using AR6 WGI TCRE (at the relevant percentile, e.g., the 67th-percentile TCRE is used to adjust the 67th-percentile peak warming), with the 5–95% range of adjusted scenarios provided by the black bar. The AR6 WGI remaining carbon budget is shown, including the WGI estimate of at least a ±220 GtCO 2 uncertainty due to non-CO 2 emissions variations across scenarios (grey bars). For median peak warming (panel a) projections below 2°C relative to 1850–1900, the AR6 WGIII assessment of cumulative carbon emissions tends to be slightly smaller than the remaining carbon budgets provided by WGI but well within the uncertainties. Note that only a few scenarios in WGIII limit warming to below 1.5°C with a 50% chance, thus statistics for that specific threshold have low confidence.

	<div id="box-3.4" class="h2-container box-container"></div>		<div id="box-3.4" class="h2-container box-container"></div>
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	[[File:3cf307f6bcda7d4aa1cb8cce69661ddd IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Box_3_4_Figure_2.png]]		[[File:3cf307f6bcda7d4aa1cb8cce69661ddd IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Box_3_4_Figure_2.png]]

	~~'''~~'''Box 3.4, Figure 2 \|~~'''''' ''''''~~(a) Differences in regressions of the relationship between peak surface temperature and associated cumulative CO~~'''''' '''2''' ''''''emissions~~ from 2020 derived from scenarios of eight integrated assessment model frameworks.~~'''~~''' The coloured lines show the regression at median for scenarios of the eight modelling frameworks, each with more than 20 scenarios in the database and a detailed land-use representation. The red dotted lines indicate the non-CO 2 uncertainty range of AR6 WGI [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-5\|Chapter 5]] (±220 GtCO 2 ), here visualised around the median of the eight model framework lines. Carbon budgets from 2020 until 1.5°C (0.43K above 2010–2019 levels) and 2.0°C (0.93K above 2010–2019 levels) are shown for minimum and maximum model estimates at the median, rounded to the nearest 10 GtCO 2 . Panel '''(b)''' shows the relationship between the estimated non-CO 2 warming in mitigation scenarios that reach net zero and the associated peak surface temperature outcomes. The coloured lines show the regression at median for scenarios of the eight modelling frameworks with more than 20 scenarios in the database and a detailed land-use representation. The black dashed line indicates the non-CO 2 relationship based on the scenarios and climate emulator setup as was assessed in AR6 WGI Chapter 5.		'''Box 3.4, Figure 2 \| (a) Differences in regressions of the relationship between peak surface temperature and associated cumulative CO 2e missions from 2020 derived from scenarios of eight integrated assessment model frameworks.''' The coloured lines show the regression at median for scenarios of the eight modelling frameworks, each with more than 20 scenarios in the database and a detailed land-use representation. The red dotted lines indicate the non-CO 2 uncertainty range of AR6 WGI [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-5\|Chapter 5]] (±220 GtCO 2 ), here visualised around the median of the eight model framework lines. Carbon budgets from 2020 until 1.5°C (0.43K above 2010–2019 levels) and 2.0°C (0.93K above 2010–2019 levels) are shown for minimum and maximum model estimates at the median, rounded to the nearest 10 GtCO 2 . Panel '''(b)''' shows the relationship between the estimated non-CO 2 warming in mitigation scenarios that reach net zero and the associated peak surface temperature outcomes. The coloured lines show the regression at median for scenarios of the eight modelling frameworks with more than 20 scenarios in the database and a detailed land-use representation. The black dashed line indicates the non-CO 2 relationship based on the scenarios and climate emulator setup as was assessed in AR6 WGI Chapter 5.

	After correcting for the categorisation, some (small) differences between the AR6 WGI and WGIII numbers arise from remaining differences between the outcomes of the climate emulators and their set-up (IPCC AR6 WGI Cross-Chapter Box 7.1) and the differences in the underlying scenarios. Moreover, the WGI assessment estimated the non-CO 2 warming at the time of net zero CO 2 emissions based on a relationship derived from the SR1.5 scenario database with historical emission estimates as in [[#Meinshausen--2020\|Meinshausen et al. (2020)]] (AR6 WGI Chapter 5). The WGIII assessment uses the same climate emulator with improved historical emissions estimates ( [[#Nicholls--2021\|Nicholls et al. 2021]] ) (AR6 WGI Cross-Chapter Box 7.1). Annex III.II.2.5.1 further explores the effects of these factors on the relationship between non-CO 2 warming at peak cumulative CO 2 and peak surface temperature.		After correcting for the categorisation, some (small) differences between the AR6 WGI and WGIII numbers arise from remaining differences between the outcomes of the climate emulators and their set-up (IPCC AR6 WGI Cross-Chapter Box 7.1) and the differences in the underlying scenarios. Moreover, the WGI assessment estimated the non-CO 2 warming at the time of net zero CO 2 emissions based on a relationship derived from the SR1.5 scenario database with historical emission estimates as in [[#Meinshausen--2020\|Meinshausen et al. (2020)]] (AR6 WGI Chapter 5). The WGIII assessment uses the same climate emulator with improved historical emissions estimates ( [[#Nicholls--2021\|Nicholls et al. 2021]] ) (AR6 WGI Cross-Chapter Box 7.1). Annex III.II.2.5.1 further explores the effects of these factors on the relationship between non-CO 2 warming at peak cumulative CO 2 and peak surface temperature.
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	~~'''~~'''Cross-Chapter Box 3, Figure 1 \| Selected global CO~~'''''' '''~~2~~''' ''''''~~emissions trajectories with similar shape and different net zero CO~~'''''' '''~~2~~''' ''''''~~date (a), different shape and similar net zero CO~~'''''' '''~~2~~''' ''''''~~date (b), and similar peak warming, but varying shapes and net zero CO~~'''''' '''~~2~~''' ''''''~~dates (c).~~'''''' '''~~Funnels show pathways limiting warming to 1.''' 5 °C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (light blue) and limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) (beige). Historic CO 2 emissions from [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.2\|Section 2.2]] (EDGAR v6).		'''Cross-Chapter Box 3, Figure 1 \| Selected global CO 2 emissions trajectories with similar shape and different net zero CO 2 date (a), different shape and similar net zero CO 2 date (b), and similar peak warming, but varying shapes and net zero CO 2 dates (c). Funnels show pathways limiting warming to 1.''' 5 °C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (light blue) and limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) (beige). Historic CO 2 emissions from [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.2\|Section 2.2]] (EDGAR v6).

	'''Pathways following emissions levels projected from the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) announced prior to COP26 until 2030 would result in substantially (>0.1°C) exceeding 1.5°C.''' They would have to reach net zero CO 2 around 5–10 years later [[#footnote-013\|7]] than in pathways with no or limited overshoot in order to reach the net negative emissions that would then be required to return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot by 2100. Those high overshoot pathways have higher transient warming and higher reliance on net negative CO 2 emissions towards the end of the 21st century. As they need to reach net zero CO 2 emissions in only limited amount of time but from much higher 2030 emissions levels, their post-2030 CO 2 emissions reduction rates are substantially higher (by around 30%) than in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. ( [[#3.5\|Section 3.5]] ).		'''Pathways following emissions levels projected from the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) announced prior to COP26 until 2030 would result in substantially (>0.1°C) exceeding 1.5°C.''' They would have to reach net zero CO 2 around 5–10 years later [[#footnote-013\|7]] than in pathways with no or limited overshoot in order to reach the net negative emissions that would then be required to return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot by 2100. Those high overshoot pathways have higher transient warming and higher reliance on net negative CO 2 emissions towards the end of the 21st century. As they need to reach net zero CO 2 emissions in only limited amount of time but from much higher 2030 emissions levels, their post-2030 CO 2 emissions reduction rates are substantially higher (by around 30%) than in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. ( [[#3.5\|Section 3.5]] ).
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	[[File:6041fe6cd5708620fd974af53e25ea46 IPCC_AR6_WGIII_CWGBox_3_Figure_1_left.png]]		[[File:6041fe6cd5708620fd974af53e25ea46 IPCC_AR6_WGIII_CWGBox_3_Figure_1_left.png]]

	~~'''~~'''Cross-Working Group Box 1, Figure 1 \| Global aggregate economic benefits of mitigation from avoided climate change impacts in 2100 corresponding to shifting from a higher temperature category (4°C (3.~~75°C–'''''' '''4~~.~~''' '''~~25°C), 3°C (2.75°C–3.25°C), or above 2°C (2°C–2.5°C), to below 2°C (1.5°C–2°C), as well as from below 2°C to below 1.5°C (1°C–1.5°C)), from the five studies discussed in the text.''' Panel '''(a)''' is adapted from AR6 WGII Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC, Figure 1, showing global aggregate economic impact estimates (% global GDP loss relative to GDP without additional climate change) by temperature change level. All estimates are shown in grey. Estimates used for the computation of estimated benefits in 2100 in panel (b) are coloured for the selected studies, which provide results for different temperature change levels. See the AR6 WGII AR6 WGII Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC for discussion and assessment of the estimates in panel (a) and the differences in methodologies. For B18 and T19, median estimates in the cluster are considered. Shape distinguishes the baseline scenarios. Temperature ranges are highlighted. HS17 estimates are based on their preferred model –50th percentile of non-catastrophic damage. Panel '''(b)''' shows the implied aggregate economic benefits in 2100 of a lower temperature increase. Economic benefits for point estimates are computed as a difference, while economic benefits from the curve HS17 are computed as ranges from the segment differences.		'''Cross-Working Group Box 1, Figure 1 \| Global aggregate economic benefits of mitigation from avoided climate change impacts in 2100 corresponding to shifting from a higher temperature category (4°C (3.75°C–4.25°C), 3°C (2.75°C–3.25°C), or above 2°C (2°C–2.5°C), to below 2°C (1.5°C–2°C), as well as from below 2°C to below 1.5°C (1°C–1.5°C)), from the five studies discussed in the text.''' Panel '''(a)''' is adapted from AR6 WGII Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC, Figure 1, showing global aggregate economic impact estimates (% global GDP loss relative to GDP without additional climate change) by temperature change level. All estimates are shown in grey. Estimates used for the computation of estimated benefits in 2100 in panel (b) are coloured for the selected studies, which provide results for different temperature change levels. See the AR6 WGII AR6 WGII Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC for discussion and assessment of the estimates in panel (a) and the differences in methodologies. For B18 and T19, median estimates in the cluster are considered. Shape distinguishes the baseline scenarios. Temperature ranges are highlighted. HS17 estimates are based on their preferred model –50th percentile of non-catastrophic damage. Panel '''(b)''' shows the implied aggregate economic benefits in 2100 of a lower temperature increase. Economic benefits for point estimates are computed as a difference, while economic benefits from the curve HS17 are computed as ranges from the segment differences.

	Aggregate benefits from avoided impacts expressed in GDP terms, as in Figure 1, do not encompass all avoided climate risks, adaptation possibilities, and do not represent their influence on well-being and welfare (AR6 WGII Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC). Methodological challenges for economic impact estimates include representing uncertainty and variability, capturing interactions and spillovers, considering distributional effects, representing micro- and macro-adaptation processes, specifying non-gradual damages and non-linearities, and improving understanding of potential long-run growth effects. In addition, the economic benefits aggregated at the global scale provide limited insights into regional heterogeneity. Global economic impact studies with regional estimates find large differences across regions in absolute and percentage terms, with developing and transitional economies typically more vulnerable. Furthermore, (avoided) impacts for poorer households and poorer countries can represent a smaller share in aggregate quantifications expressed in GDP terms or monetary terms, compared to their influence on well-being and welfare ( [[#Hallegatte--2020\|Hallegatte et al. 2020]] ; [[#Markhvida--2020\|Markhvida et al. 2020]] ). Finally, as noted by AR6 WGII, other lines of evidence regarding climate risks, beyond monetary estimates, should be considered in decision-making, including Key Risks and Reasons for Concern.		Aggregate benefits from avoided impacts expressed in GDP terms, as in Figure 1, do not encompass all avoided climate risks, adaptation possibilities, and do not represent their influence on well-being and welfare (AR6 WGII Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC). Methodological challenges for economic impact estimates include representing uncertainty and variability, capturing interactions and spillovers, considering distributional effects, representing micro- and macro-adaptation processes, specifying non-gradual damages and non-linearities, and improving understanding of potential long-run growth effects. In addition, the economic benefits aggregated at the global scale provide limited insights into regional heterogeneity. Global economic impact studies with regional estimates find large differences across regions in absolute and percentage terms, with developing and transitional economies typically more vulnerable. Furthermore, (avoided) impacts for poorer households and poorer countries can represent a smaller share in aggregate quantifications expressed in GDP terms or monetary terms, compared to their influence on well-being and welfare ( [[#Hallegatte--2020\|Hallegatte et al. 2020]] ; [[#Markhvida--2020\|Markhvida et al. 2020]] ). Finally, as noted by AR6 WGII, other lines of evidence regarding climate risks, beyond monetary estimates, should be considered in decision-making, including Key Risks and Reasons for Concern.
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	~~'''~~'''Box 3.6, Figure 1 \| Difference in per-capita emissions of Kyoto gases between the highest emitting and the lowest emitting of the 10 regions, in 2030 and 2050, by temperature category of pathways.~~'''~~'''		'''Box 3.6, Figure 1 \| Difference in per-capita emissions of Kyoto gases between the highest emitting and the lowest emitting of the 10 regions, in 2030 and 2050, by temperature category of pathways.'''

	Through avoiding impacts of climate change, which fall more heavily on low-income countries, communities and households, and exacerbate poverty, mitigation reduces inequalities and poverty ( [[#3.6.4.2\|Section 3.6.4.2]] ).		Through avoiding impacts of climate change, which fall more heavily on low-income countries, communities and households, and exacerbate poverty, mitigation reduces inequalities and poverty ( [[#3.6.4.2\|Section 3.6.4.2]] ).